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PETER L. STRAUSS

ON RESEGREGATING THE WORLDS OF
STATUTE AND COMMON LAW
Qui tacet, consentire videtur1

I. INTRODUCTION-THE GOTTSHALL CASE

In the early afternoon of a humid, 97 degree summer day,
James Gottshall was part of a crew of mostly 50- to 60-year-old men
replacing track for Conrail. Michael Norvick, the crew supervisor,
pressed the men to finish the work. He discouraged observance of
the scheduled breaks. Richard Johns collapsed in the heat; Norvick
ordered the men back to work as soon as a cold compress had
revived him. Five minutes later Johns collapsed again, the victim
of a heart attack. Gottshall began 40 minutes of ultimately fruitless

cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Johns, his friend for 15 years.
Norvick was unable to radio for assistance because Conrail was
repairing that part of its communications system; by the time he
could drive for help, Johns was dead. Norvick made the men work
in sight of his body, which lay covered with a sheet to await the
coroner. The next day, Gottshall alleged, Norvick reprimanded
Gottshall for his efforts to revive Johns, and-in the same heat

and humidity-pushed the crew even harder, with three or four
Peter L. Strauss is Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University.
AuToR's NOTE: Beyond the usual debts an author owes to colleagues for work developed
in their midst are those I have to John Manning and Richard Pierce. Thanks are also owing
to Christopher Cross for research help and to the Rockefeller Foundation, whose generosity
in providing four weeks' time at their Bellagio Study and Conference Center, in the midst
of humanists and far from Lexis and Westlaw, provided unparalleled opportunities for
reflection on this paper.
I UnitedStates v Irvine, 114 S Ct 1473, 1483 (1994) (Scalia concurring).
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hours of overtime. Within a few days Gottshall was hospitalized,
suffering major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder; he
continued to need treatment after his release three weeks later. He
sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908,2
asserting that his condition was caused by its negligent infliction of
emotional distress-both through Norvick's actions, and through
Conrail's failure to maintain operative communications links with
the work party.
FELA, like many state statutes of its time, sought to mitigate
the rigor of the existing common law remedies for workplace injuries. Its general thrust was to create a federal tort remedy for railroad workers injured by their employers' negligence, under rules
that significantly limited the common law defenses employers
could otherwise use. While injured workers still had to show negligence, their employers could claim neither assumption of the risk
nor the fellow servant defense; contributory negligence served only
to reduce proportionately, not to eliminate, a worker's claim. The
statute left the federal courts responsible to develop the contours
of this negligence recovery. FELA neither named nor precluded
"negligent infliction of emotional distress" as a cause of action.
Although the Supreme Court had not had to decide whether it was
available before Gottshall sued, in 1987 it had noted both that
question and the fact-dependency of any answer to it.3
During the years before FELA, state courts had given grudging
readings to statutes that sought directly to modify common law
tort doctrine on injured workers' behalf. (In reaction, state reform
statutes at this time predominantly took the form of worker compensation laws whose implementation was assigned to a new competitor with the courts, the administrative agency.)4 That state
court approach reflected what Roscoe Pound, writing in the same
year FELA was enacted, characterized as "the orthodox common
law attitude towards [a] legislative innovation[ ]"-to "give to it a
strict and narrow interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those
cases which it covers expressly." 5 Although he thought the better
2

35 Stat 65, as amended, 45 USC §§ 51-60.

Atchison T. & S.F. R. Co. v Buell, 480 US 557, 568-70 (1987).
Louis Jaffe and Nathaniel Nathanson, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials 133-36
(1961).
5 Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv L Rev 383, 385 (1908).
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courts were already tending to give statutes "a liberal interpretation
to cover the whole field [they were] intended to cover," he hoped
for the day when a statute would be treated, as well, as a source
of policy for courts' analogical reasoning; they should, he believed,
receive a statute "fully into the body of the law as affording not
only a rule to be applied but a principle from which to reason, and
hold it, as a later and more direct expression of the general will,
of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same general subject." 6 The judicial attitude he decried, we now associate with the
general hostility to legislative (i.e., political) change captured by
the metaphor of Lochner v New York. 7 It would take the New Deal
Court to put his more cooperative vision in place; in 1936, Harlan
Fiske Stone would evoke "the ideal of a unified system of judgemade and statute law woven into a seamless whole by the processes
of adjudication."' The "switch in time" brought not simply a retreat from substantive due process and its constitutional cousins,
but also strikingly open attitudes toward statutes and the federal
agencies Congress often appointed to administer them.
FELA, a beneficiary of these changing attitudes, was more successful than the initial state statutes had been in generating liberal
interpretation. Responding to "the breadth of the statutory language [and] the Act's humanitarian purposes," 9 the courts, led by
the Supreme Court, accepted it as a remedy to "be developed and
enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of
industry's duty toward its workers." 1 That is, until Gottshall's
case and a companion reached the Supreme Court from the Third
Circuit. Conrail v Gottshall,1 ' like many of the Court's statutory
cases in October Term 1993, suggests a return to the treatment of
statutes as commands "to be obeyed grudgingly, by construing
[them] narrowly and treating [them] as though [they] did not exist
for any purpose[s] other than th[ose] embraced within the strict
construction of [their] words"12-to the formalist orthodoxy identified by Dean Pound.
6 Id.

198 US 45 (1905).
Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the UnitedStates, 50 Harv L Rev 4, 12 (1936).
9 Urie v Thompson, 337 US 163, 180 (1949).
10Kernan v American Dredging Co., 355 US 426, 432 (1958).
"114 S Ct 2396 (1994).
12Stone, 50 Harv L Rev at 14 (cited in note 8).
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Responding to the Court's 1987 invitation, 13 the Third Circuit
had found "negligent infliction of emotional distress" to be a cause
of action under FELA.14 It then had to define what that cause of
action was, and it considered the three principal tests state courts
employ for delimiting compensable emotional harm: the first requires an actual physical impact associated with the claimed emotional harm; the second, that the plaintiff, if not actually touched,
nonetheless have been immediately exposed to the danger of physical injury by the defendant's negligent conduct; and the third,
that a bystander plaintiff, even if outside the zone of danger (say,
watching her children play on the street from behind a secondstory window), was so closely related to and so immediately engaged in observing an incident causing physical harm to another
that the defendant could reasonably have foreseen her emotional
injury as one direct consequence of its negligence. Since Gottshall's
emotional injuries resulted from working conditions remarkable
principally for their psychological stress, his chances under any of
these tests were remote. Mindful of the interpretations underscoring FELA's generosity and the need for contemporaneous standards, and mindful as well of the somewhat restrictive character
of the traditional state tests, the Third Circuit had articulated a
fourth test, "whether the factual circumstances . . . provide a
threshold assurance that there is a likelihood of genuine and serious
emotional injury," 15 an injury that the defendant could foresee.
The facts of Gottshall's case, it concluded, gave the necessary assurance.
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court in reversing the Third Circuit and adopting for FELA use the more liberal of the two causes
of action that had been in place in 1908, when Congress had acted.
Invoking the remedial purposes of the statute, he easily found that
FELA gave a remedy for "negligent infliction of emotional distress"; the problem lay in delimiting permissible actions. No jurisdiction allows recovery for all emotional harms that might be causally linked to negligence, given both the ease with which such
injuries might be imagined or even falsified and the frequent remoteness of asserted causation. These factors, together with what
Atchison T. & S.F. R. Co. v Buell, 480 US at 568-70 (cited in note 3).
Conrail, 988 F2d 355 (1993).
15Id at 371.
"

'4Gottshall v
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Justice Thomas concluded was the Third Circuit's failure to respect
the common law approaches established in the states, led him to
reject that court's approach as too liberal-threatening "essentially
infinite" liability and conversion of the railroads into "insurers of16
the emotional well-being and mental health of their employees."
He then turned to choose among the three state common law approaches. "[We begin with the state of the common law in 1908,
when FELA was enacted."' 7 Only the first two of the three established tests were then in use, and of these the more "progressive
...zone of danger test would have been more consistent than the
physical impact test with FELA's broad remedial goals."'" The
bystander test (currently adopted in some form in about half the
states) "was not developed until 60 years after FELA's enactment
and therefore lacks historical support"; moreover, "in most jurisdictions that adhere to it, this test limits recovery to persons who
witness the severe injury or death of a close family member,"' 9 a
circumstance that would rarely arise in the FELA workplace. Since
fourteen jurisdictions continue to use the zone of danger
test, "cur20
rent usage only confirms this historical pedigree."
In at least two respects, Justice Thomas's opinion is a strikingly
limited exercise of what he admits to be a common law judicial
function; both will figure in the following pages. First, conceding
the Court's formal freedom to choose, Congress's general purpose
to create a broadly remedial statute, and the evident ferment and
growth in state court development of the emotional distress remedy, his opinion takes a static view of what his choices were. He
begins and virtually ends with the choices Congress would have
had in 1908, had it focused on this question and the then content
of the common law. As Justice Ginsburg's dissent for herself and
Justices Stevens and Blackmun is at pains to point out, the intervening eight and one-half decades had generally been characterized by liberal judicial construction to protect railroad workers, a
remedy that "would be developed and enlarged to meet changing
conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty toward its
114 S Ct 2396, 2409 (1994).
Id at 2410.
1 Id.
19Id at 2411.
20 Id at 2410.
'6

'7
8
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workers."21 Causation requirements had been relaxed, negligence
enlarged, liability for industrial accidents extended without diffi22
culty into liability for negligently caused occupational disease all as a widely remarked element of the Court's jurisprudence that
attracted no correcting response from Congress. Rather than continue this line of development, focused on the hazards of work in
the instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce, the majority tied itself to general common law doctrine as it had been developing in the states. Nor did it consider the most progressive aspects
of that evolving remedy; rather, it privileged those elements of
doctrine that could have been known to the enacting Congress.
This is not a case in which the meaning of statutory text ("negligence") might be played off against legislative history or other contextual data from the time of enactment pointing in some other
direction. The issue is understanding "negligence" in 1994, and
the majority's conclusion appears to be that it should be guided by
the common law choices available in 1908.
Justice Souter wrote a one-paragraph concurrence expressing for
himself alone the view that the majority was choosing the appropriate contemporary rule ufider "the evolving common law," a choice
he found "well within the discretion left to the federal courts under
FELA."23 Indeed, reading the majority opinion in isolation from
the rest of the Term's work, one might be tempted to find its
reasoning from what Congress might have chosen in 1908 more
clumsy than portentious. Or perhaps one might say that it reflects
a contemporary resistance to expansive tort liability that is not to
be found only among some Justices of the United States Supreme
Court. But a review of the rest of the Term's work reveals this
element of Gottshall as part of a pattern of hostility to congressional
output that threatens to return us to 1908 in more senses than one.
Not every decision, but too many, suggest that we have entered a
period of Supreme Court uncooperativeness with Congress and
resistance to learning from statutes not seen since the early 1930s.
Accretive change and integration of law, so characteristic of common law courts, seem no longer to be federal judges' responsibilities in dealing with statutes. The apparent rejection of Chief Justice
21 Id

at 2412, quoting Kernan v American Dredging Co., 355 US 426, 432 (1958).

22 Urie v Thompson, 337 US 163 (1949).

23 114 S Ct at 2412 (Souter, J, concurring).
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Stone's coherence-building ideal for the federal judiciary suggests a
remarkably weak, even irresponsible, vision for the federal courts.
Combined with a somewhat rigid and time-bound textualism, it is
also a profoundly destabilizing vision. That is the burden of the
remaining pages.
This point may be sharpened, in relation to Gottshall, by contrasting a 1988 opinion of the Court, Monessen Southwestern R. Co.
v Morgan, 4 that the majority identified as a precedent for its approach. In Monessen, the Court had reversed a lower court award
of prejudgment interest to a FELA plaintiff. It had observed, in
part, that recovery of prejudgment interest was generally barred
in common law actions in 1908, when FELA was enacted; and it
had reasoned, seeing the sweeping changes made in other remedies
at the time, that this "well-established doctrine" was one that Congress had left intact. Yet the thrust of Monessen was that granting
prejudgment interest would have unjustifiable implications for federal remedies generally. The courts had frequently decided against
the award of prejudgment interest in intervening years, without
congressional interference. Only six years earlier, Congress had
considered but not enacted a general provision for prejudgment
interest as a part of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982.25
Monesson thus was characterized by attention to contemporary legislative-judicial dialogue, existing FELA precedent, and implications
for procedural claims; these elements were generally missing in
Gottshall. While a dissent had criticized Monesson, too, for its failure
fully to realize the remedial purposes of FELA, the Monesson majority voiced no commitment to take the common law as of the statute's enactment in 1908; rather its judgment was that the remedy
Congress failed to give in 1908, Congress had affirmatively decided
not to give in 1982. In Gottshall, Congress's only discernible signal
in 1908 was a delegation to the courts to develop common law
ideas of negligence to secure broadly remedial ends; and in the
intervening decades Congress had stood quietly by while the courts
aggressively pursued that mandate. Thus, along the principal dimension of interest here, the two cases stand in sharp contrast.
The second respect in which Justice Thomas's opinion takes a
2 486 US 330 (1988).
25 Pub L 97-164, 96 Stat 25. See 486 US at 339 n 8, also citing the explanation of the
omission at S Rep No 97-275, pp 11-12 (1981).
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limited view of federal court common law function is perhaps more
subtle, but also worth noting in an introductory way; it too will
recur. Recall that in rejecting the widely adopted bystander test,
he argued in part that "in most jurisdictions that adhere to it, this
test limits recovery to persons who witness the severe injury or
death of a close family member." If this aspect of the test were
binding upon the Court, that might be an ahistorical reason for
rejecting it. But what "most" state jurisdictions do would be binding on the Court only if the Court itself lacks common law authority
to adapt that element to the workplace for FELA's federal purposes. It does not seem that Justice Thomas is reinvoking the "natural" common law of Holmes's "brooding omnipresence in the
sky";26 the Court can choose, on federal principles, from among
the several possibilities that state common law resolutions offer.
The hidden premise seems to be, however, that unlike state courts,
the Supreme Court cannot properly make its own test. It is as if
Congress's delegation to the federal courts to develop common law
remedies for railroad worker injuries conveyed or recognized far
less judicial authority than a state common law court would
have-an authority necessarily dependent on what the state courts
were doing. In this respect, the Supreme Court (and by implication
the other federal courts) is not a common law court even when it
operates under delegated authority to fill gaps in federal law, under
what is undoubtedly the federal question jurisdiction. That would
be a strikingly limited view of the federal judicial function.
II.

INTEGRATION AND INTERPRETATION

The focus of this article is the issue of integrating statutory
and other law. A sustantial number of statutory cases decided during October Term 1993 offered the Court a choice between treating
statutes as static, isolated instructions from higher authority, and
regarding them as part of a "unified system of judge-made and
statute law."27 It tended to make the former choice, one that segregates statutes from the common law. The argument here is that,
in the process, it diminishes both statute and common law, both
legislature and court. Integrating statutes and common law has the
26 See

note 114.

27Stone, text at note 8.
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opposite effect. Legislative influence and statutes are extended
when statutory policy becomes the basis for analogical reasoning
to decide cases that have not been provided for. The judicial function is also augmented if the world in which judges act to promote
coherence includes statutory as well as judge-made law. Thus, to
include statutes implies that judges may shape their readings within
the possibilities offered by the text, over time, as changing general law and the social circumstances to which it responds may suggest.
The contrast between legislation as static judgment, and legislation as an element in the continuing evolution of law's fabric, is
strongly rooted in my own specialty in administrative law. One
characteristic of administrative law, so intuitive that we easily lose
sight of it, is that it is administered law-that we expect its dimensions constantly to change. Administrative agencies are continuing
bodies with proactive responsibilities, acting under the oversight
of the political branches as well as the judiciary. We anticipate that
they will change course; they are in effect the preferred managers
of change. In the communities they influence, their administration
produces expectations about what is permissible that vary across
time. Congress is watching and the President is watching; the
emerging solutions frame community understandings to be generally acted upon, and can come to be taken as the governing law.
In these respects, integrative approaches are of the essence. Whatever else, the agency, in its context, will not have encountered
issues of statutory meaning freed of considerations of purpose, politics, or contemporary understandings. For those subject to or interested in the agency's work, one may be reasonably sure the situation is the same. Congress's continuing oversight assures that it
legislates in the context of existing judicial and agency "law," as
well as its own prior work. Similarly, agencies act in a context
framed by statute and case law; and the judiciary, too, proceeds
under the premise of mutual responsibility for the development of
law.
The static view of statutory law is in sharp contrast. Its premise
is that the elements of government work sporadically and in isolation from one another. At the beginning of this century, premises
like these found expression in the idea that legislative actions in
derogation of the common law were to be narrowly construed; that
is, since the common law was an area for judicial responsibility,
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the legislature really shouldn't intrude, and if it tried to do so its
actions should be given minimal impact. In many of the cases that
concern this essay, the premise seems to be the obverse-where
Congress has acted, it has (sole) responsibility for the elucidation
of policy, and the only appropriate role of courts is to apply the
policies enacted by the acting Congress, whose dimensions properly change only when Congress chooses to act again. Or, Congress
may have delegated to an agency some authority to give shape
to statutory language; if a court using standard tools of statutory
interpretation is unable to determine what the language means, it
must accept the agency's view. But in deciding in the first instance
what the statutory language might mean, the court will look only
to its own resources; for judges who are also formalists, those resources do not include the understandings reached by others, such
as the agency initially responsible for the statute's implementation.
One way to characterize these competing views might be in
terms of how they understand congressional silence. One takes
from that silence implicit consent; the other understands that the
burden of seeking new law has not been met by those who might
propose it. 8 In a complex world characterized on all sides by information overload and large impersonal organizations that both generate information and attempt to deal with it, one would be foolish
to claim that either view completely captured institutional reality.
Congress is a bureaucracy of tens of thousands, and too frequently
acts on legislative behemoths no member can have read; the claim
that it "knows" anything is absurd. But so, too, is any claim that
its actions are wholly independent of the expectations about law,
however imperfect, generated by the work of courts and agencies.
Legislation, including amendments to existing laws, responds to
current problems. While the absence of problems makes it unlikely
Congress will pass new laws, that absence hardly indicates that
"law" is missing; most social conduct occurs in the shadow of already established expectations about what existing law requires or
permits.
This way of understanding the choice might suggest that each
28 Compare Barry K. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, BureaucraticDiscretionor Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J Pol Economics 765
(1983), making a similar point about "bureaucratic" and "congressional dominance" theories
of the relationships between agencies and their congressional committees.
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is inherently political-the integrative view likely to be favored by
judges (and others) believing in law and expansive government, the
static view by those who are more skeptical of the desirability of
large government. In the one case, judicial sympathy for previous
congressional judgments, expansively treated in the light of current
conditions, places the burden of congressional gridlock (the difficulty in securing new legislation) on those who would oppose innovation; in the other, holding Congress to its precise dispositions
places the burden of gridlock on those who want innovation. If
both positions are inherently political, neither side, a priori, is
entitled to the advantage; neither judicial position has greater legitimacy. We may be politically distressed that the Court is in the
hands of Justices who are skeptical about government, but cannot
claim that their position is any more "political," that is, unjudicial,
than the integrative view would be.
That interpretation depends, however, on a crucial premise: that
law emerges only as the product of political action, not as the product of (judicial) reason acting within the already extant framework
of law, that is, not as "common law." And it also assumes that
Congress will always act in the direction of enlarging government.
At a given moment, Congress might opt for regulation or for deregulation-indeed, for economic regulation since the 1970s its direction has been predominantly the latter. A court sensitive to that
deregulatory trend would be warranted in extending it by analogy,
without entailing its own politics. In this way, an integrative approach would produce smaller rather than larger government. Refusing to do so-treating a deregulatory statute as expressing no
larger judgment than its explicit terms require-would result in
the judiciary leaving more government in place than would follow
from its giving that statute larger effect. It is perhaps true that, in
general, our explicitly political institutions have been choosing for
more rather than less government over the past century; but then
building on those judgments can be defended as accepting political
outcomes from those authorized to reach them. "Larger government," like "smaller government," is not an inevitable consequence
of integrative reasoning with statutes. Dependent on the judgments
Congress has been reaching, it reflects legislative rather than judicial politics; the static approach cannot be so described.
Neither choice entails liberating judges from their subordination
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in ordinary law matters to legislative judgment, or resolves the
question of what are the appropriate materials of interpretation.
The point, well made by Professor Alexander Aleinikoff of Michigan, 29 can be illustrated by a table:

Statutes are static, always
meaning what was first enacted
Formalist

Only text may be consulted, its
meaning amplified by usages at
the time of enactment

Intentionalist

Political history, including a variety of legislative materials, may
be consulted to discover the enacting legislature's intents, or,
more broadly, purposes

Statutes acquire meaning over
time, as social and legal
contexts change
Only text may be consulted, but
contemporary usage and intervening texts may be considered
All materials may be consulted;
the court seeks the outcome
that best fits contemporary law

Thus, either a textualist or an intentionalist may use her preferred
tools in the service of giving relatively static meaning to a statute,
the one free of any obligation to consider the information that
political context provides to interpretation, the other seeking in
evidence of purpose and political history the meaning that would
probably have been assigned it by the enacting legislature. Both
then expect that meaning to remain constant over the ensuing
years. While the integrative choice lacks that expectation, it too is
dependent on statutory language, and can be made by textualists
as well as intentionalists.30 In and of itself, it does not authorize a
judge simply to disregard a statutory text that she thinks may have
outlived its usefulness 31 or to invent policies of her own preference,
29 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev 20 (1988).
30 A striking example is provided by a case once thought to have sounded the death knell
of "plain meaning" interpretation, UnitedStates v American TruckingAss'n, 310 US 534(1940).
The Court was divided, 5-4, between New Deal appointees who relied heavily on legislative
history materials, and more experienced Justices who found the text controlling. A close
reading of the dissent to which the latter subscribed reveals that its principal mechanism
lies in understanding that text in a manner that integrates it well with other statutory
elements of the law. Indeed, that characteristic is reinforced on seeing that the opinion
appears under the signature of Justice Stone, see text at note 8.

"' Compare Guido Calabresi, A Common Lawfor the Age of Statutes (Harvard, 1982); Robert
Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 Stan L Rev
213 (1983).
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independent of those instinct in existing law.32 The cases to be
discussed are ones in which alternative understandings of the texts
were available, with different results if they were treated as discrete
instruments of a particular time, than if they were taken contemporaneously, as part of the evolving fabric of the general law.
Either choice, in particular judicial hands, could generate undesirable consequences for the relationship between the courts and
Congress. Static approaches joined with a formal textualism, that
limits judicial data to statutory words and disclaims judicial authority to make supplementary judgments, may induce prolix drafting, 33 reduce the likely useful lifespan of legislative judgments, and
contribute to continuous friction between Congress and courts. An
integrative approach, on the other hand, may weaken Congress's
incentives to legislate and may encourage judicial adventurism. A
strong belief in separation of powers seems to support the idea that
judges should not treat statutes as they do the common law-if
judges are not scrupulously attentive to legislative judgments, to
do so risks confusing legislative with judicial authority.34 Here, the
32 That is, a judge taking an integrative approach may nonetheless regard herself as bound
by the various considerations, external to herself and largely of legislative creation, that
circumstances require her to integrate. The problem is just that faced by the self-aware
common law judge; she is not the initiator of values, but a loyal agent of what she finds in
the law as a whole, for whose evolving coherence and "fit" she is constantly responsible.
Compare Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical
Analysis, 70 Tex L Rev 1073, 1081-84 (1992), describing "dynamic" theories as if they
entailed personal responsibility for such ends as "furthering virtue in the body politic."
33

The British spirit of civil liberty induced the English judges to adhere strictly to
the law, to its exact expressions. This again induced the law-makers to be, in their
phraseology, as explicit and minute as possible, which causes such a tautology and
endless repetition in the statutes of that country that even so eminent a statesman
as Sir Robert Peel declared, in parliament, that he "contemplates no task with so
much distaste as the reading through an ordinary act of parliament." Men have at
length found out that little or nothing is gained by attempting to speak with
absolute clearness and endless specifications, but that human speech is the clearer,
the less we endeavor to supply by words and specifications that interpretation
which common sense must give to human words. However minutely we may
define, somewhere we needs must trust at last to common sense and good faith.
Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics 20 (rev 3d ed. 1880). McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 Georgetown L J 705,
716 (1992), argues that "[i]nterpretive canons.., should aid the legislative process, making
it less costly for policy bargains to be struck"; judicial behavior that raises those costs, for
example, by forcing the expense of anticipating and countermanding court decisions, is
justifiable only on premises that disfavor legislation.
3' See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev 1,
32-33 (1985).
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revealing contrast may involve gap-filling rather than interpretation
in the strict sense-that is, it may involve the willingness of a court
to acknowledge cases not provided for by statutes and then use
statutory material as a source of analogy to decide them. Unmistakably, permitting analogy from a statute to fill an acknowledged gap
is friendlier to legislative authority than refusal; but unmistakably,
too, it is the court that draws the analogy, risking judicial adventurism. The result may be to lead judges into a certain lack of candor
about whether they are filling gaps, or simply interpreting what
35
they pretend Congress has provided for.
Yet if risks of misuse fall on either side, some characteristics of
the legal environment argue strongly for integration: For citizens,
law is inevitably an integral system, premised in contemporary
social expectations and political judgments; a person interested in
her legal obligations looks to the whole environment, not a disordered collection of fragmentary, isolated, mutually independent
pieces. Legislation will inevitably be imprecise, requiring both interpretation and gap-filling; pretending otherwise increases its
costs. 36 Courts are better suited than legislatures for the classic
common law function of continually inventing coherence out of
the materials of the law. With statutes the dominant form of law,
and especially as they become more numerous, problems of aging
statutory judgment will inevitably arise and need to be resolved
" On the importance of candor, see, for example, Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor
and Statutory Interpretation, 78 Georgetown L J 353 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr., and
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321 (1990);
on its frequent absence, Zeppos, cited in note 32.
36 The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is not
that they are poorly drafted-though many are-and not that the legislators failed
to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the statute-though often they
do fail-but that a statute necessarily is drafted in advance of, and with imperfect
appreciation for the problems that will be encountered in, its application.
Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U Chi L
Rev 800, 811 (1983).
[O]nly rarely can statutory language be precise in conveying either policy bargains
or instructions to agencies. Nature has a nasty habit of creating situations in which
the applicability of a statute is unclear. But even if nature were not unkind, the
meaning of statutes would still be problematic because language is inherently
imprecise and because rational political actors, having numerous ways to occupy
their time, would never devote the effort necessary to minimize the indeterminacy
of statutory language.
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation,
57 L & Contemp Probs 3, 13 (1994). See also Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 25 (cited in
note 29).
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before legislative attention can be directed to them. In the long run,
finally, successful government must be a cooperative enterprise in
its everyday affairs; as the years leading to the New Deal should
antagonism over orhave taught us, continuous legislative-judicial
37
dinary political judgments is unsustainable.
The explicit argument here, then, is about judicial responsibility-the difference between an integrative approach to legal materials and one that takes statutes as individual, isolated, and static
events-and, consequently, about the evolving political dynamic
between Congress and the Court. Moreover, the cases, not the
literature, are the focus.'I These pages are intended more to sketch
the Court's work, to explore the factual ground, than to reason to
a foundational theory of interpretation. A growing body of literature has plumbed the issues of interpretation in a theoretical way,
and the reader probably has already found a good deal of tangency
between the views offered here and those of younger scholars characterizing their approaches as "dynamic," "practical," "updating,"
and the like.3 9 Admiring that work and indebted to it, I have none" "Ordinary political judgment" signals a limit here to matters that do not in themselves
raise questions of constitutional law-whether liberties of the citizen, or structural arrangements such as underlay invalidation of the legislative veto. In that context, Woodrow Wilson's words have commanding force:
. . . [G]overnment is not a machine, but a living thing.... No living thing can
have its organs offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its
life is dependent upon their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct or intelligence, their amicable community of purpose. Government is not a body of blind forces; it is a body of men, with highly differentiated
function, no doubt, in our modern day of specialization, but with a common task
and purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their warfare fatal. There can
be no successful government without leadership or without the intimate, almost
instinctive, coordination of the organs of life and action. This is not theory, but
fact, and displays its force as fact, whatever theories may be thrown across its
track.
ConstitutionalGovernment in the United States 56-57 (1908). Wilson's argument may be taken
as one about the limits of "separation of powers" or "checks and balances" rather than as
an effort completely to refute those constitutionally embedded ideas. The challenge of
constitutional government, as Madison described it, is that "you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." Federalist
51 (Madison). Wilson addresses what is required to "control the governed"-a government,
one "law." Central to Madison's paradox is the understanding that institutional threats to
that capacity are as dangerous to the constitutional ideal as are threats to produce "a gradual
contentration of the several powers in the same department." Id.
38 See also Zeppos, cited in note 32, for a valuable effort to explore the Court's statutory
work empirically, over the course of a century; he found few pronounced changes in practice
along the dimensions he sought to measure.
'9 For example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L
Rev 1479 (1987); Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic
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theless found it more urgent to address the Justices and their work
than any academic colleagues. Nonetheless, the discussion will inevitably be caught up to a degree in the raging debates over interpretation, particularly those that concern the competitition between textual and purposive approaches to statutory texts.
Unmistakably, the recent cases enact the Court's preference that statutes be understood, where possible, from the surface meaning of their
words, and the reader has sensed my discomfort with the implications
of that approach, also, for legislative-judicial conflict. The Court's shift
to textualism has been adeptly documented by others, 40 and is well captured in two recently published graphics. Professor Thomas Merrill of
Northwestern, for example, gives the following table to illustrate the
relative use of legislative history and dictionaries in statutory interpretation cases in 1981, 1988, and 1992:41
TExTuAuSM IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1981-92

Term

Total Statutory
Interpretation
Cases

Cases Making
Substantive
Use of Legislative Hist.

1981 .............

69

69 (100%)

1988 .............
1992 .............

71
66

53 (75%)
12 (18%)

Cases Not
Mentioning
Legislative
History

Cases Relying
on Dictionaries

(0%)

1 (1%)

10 (14%)
41(62%)

9 (13%)
22 (33%)

0

Nature of FederalIndian Law, 78 Cal L Rev 1137 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability
of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand L Rev 533 (1992); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev 20 (1988); Edward
L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum L Rev 369 (1989); Cass
R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev 405 (1989); Zeppos,
cited in note 29. Compare, however, note 32 above.
This eruption of materials on the problems of statutory interpretation, dating from the late
1980's, has been widely noted. As figures central to their development have appropriately
recognized, their work is well grounded in the work of intellectual centrists of an earlier
time. Farber, 45 Vand L Rev (Karl Llewellyn); William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P.
Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 Harv L Rev 2031 (1994) (Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
and Albert M. Sacks); see also Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1948);
Stone, cited in note 8; Pound, cited in note 5.
'o For example, the works cited in note 39. For a contrasting view founded on an optimism
about the Court's seeking shared ground, that the sharp division of the past Term's work
makes hard to join, see Frederick Schauer, Statutory Constructionand the CoordinatingFunction
of Plain Meaning, 1990 Supreme Court Review 231; Professor Merrill, in the work about to
be cited in text, persuasively argues that the adamancy of Justices Scalia and Thomas
respecting their preferred modes of interpretation may cloak a larger disposition to compromise over such matters on the part of other Justices.
41Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash U L Q
351, 355 (1994).
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And a recent student note counts the number of cases referring to dictionaries in each term of Court since 1842:42
NUMBER OF REFERENCESC TO DICTIONARIES,
1842 TERM-1992 TERM
3530

2S20

ISI

0

01IJM 0 1I0 0

0

0

.0

.0

0

.

.

c Includes all cases that use the words "dictionary" or "dictionaries." Search of LEXIS,
Genfed library., US file (Jan. 4, 1994).

The past Term's performance was not quite so dramatic in these
terms-of forty-three cases that referred to statutory interpretation or
meaning in the text of at least one opinion, sixteen also referred to a
"dictionary" or "dictionaries," while a slightly larger number contained
the term "legislative history."43 And in a number of cases, some justices
appeared self-conscious about noting the ongoing disputes over the use
of legislative history, sometimes narrowing but not disclaiming the ap44
propriateness of their use.
'2 Note, Looking It Up: DictionariesandStatutory Interpretation, 107 Harv L Rev 1437, 1454
(1994).

" The initial search of the Lexis Genfed:US database was for "(statut! w/10 (interpret!
or mean!)) and Congress! and date(aft 10/1/93)"; it was then modified (for these purposes)
by adding "and dictionar!"; the modification "and (dictionar! or defin!" produced 40 results;
"and legislative history," 22; "and (legislat! v/5 (purpose or inten!)," 23. Of this last group
of 23, six occurrences coincided with mentions of both legislative history and dictionaries,
two with mentions of dictionaries but not legislative history, 11 with mentions of legislative
history but not dictionaries, and four in the absence of either. "Legislative history" and
"dictionar!" appeared together in four additional opinions; dictionaries alone, in four opinions; and "legislative history" appears without the other terms in one opinion only.
The presence of a term doesn't show the Court's attitude or use, or whether it appeared
in majority or dissent; clearly a more qualitative assessment is called for.
' For example, Shannon v United States, 114 S Ct 2419, discussed at p 471; City of Chicago
v EnvironmentalDefense Fund, 114 S Ct 1588, discussed at p 499.
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The pages following take up most of the Term's opinions referring to issues of statutory interpretation or meaning, omitting those
45
that did not seem to raise the questions under discussion here.
They begin with the civil and criminal cases in which only the
courts and the legislature are prominent as possible sources of
meaning, and then turn to cases in which administrative agencies
may also have spoken to the problems raised. We will find that, in
general, Court majorities did not take seriously the contributions
that settled expectations and Congress's role as a continuing legislative body can make to interpretation; their tendency was to take
statutes as static events. In this sense, the majorities rejected the
common law responsibility for statutes suggested long ago by Stone
and others. This phenomenon was particularly striking in the last
group of cases, in which Congress has signaled that agencies have
primary responsibility for shaping law and, as the result of those
responsibilities, agencies will have acquired a natural expertise in
the issues that complex statutes present. 6 Again, the result, in my
judgment, has been to recreate an atmosphere of virtual warfare

'5 For example, United States v Irvine, 114 S Ct 1473, from which the epigram is taken,
note 1, was an all but unanimous interpretation of the gift tax statutes and regulations.
Justice Scalia stood apart from Justice Souter's opinion for the remainder of the participating
court to insist that the dimensions of the "reasonable time" limitation on which all Justices
agreed should be derived from text, rather than policy. For the gift-giver in that case, if
not for the Congress whose work he regularly assesses, "the failure to make a reasonably
prompt disclaimer of a known bequest is an implicit acceptance." Id at 1483. Key Tronic
Corp. v United States, 114 S Ct 1960, is characterized by divided opinions on a statutory
issue-Justice Stevens writing for the majority and Justice Scalia for Justices Thomas and
Blackmun-but does not clearly raise the problem discussed in text. At issue was whether
a provision of CERCLA authorized recovery of attorneys' fees incurred by one responsible
party who settled its action with EPA, against other responsible parties. Justice Stevens's
opinion examines legislative history and judicial developments along with text, while Justice
Scalia contents himself with textual analysis alone; but the question is not one as to which
there appears to have been any development of a judicial or agency view over time, that
could have influenced the shape of the relevant legislative text. In Dalton v Specter, 114 S
Ct 1719, Justice Souter's concurrence for four prefers to ground judgment in a contextual
assessment whether Congress meant to preclude review of a Commission's actions under
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act than in a formal assessment of whether
those actions were "final" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC
704, as Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. Posters 'n Things v United States, 114
S Ct 1747, concerned the issue of scienter under a federal statute prohibiting the sale of
drug paraphernalia. All agreed that a scienter element was required to convict of the offense,
but Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas would have defined that element in a manner
that would give the prosecution somewhat more latitude in seeking conviction. In none of
these cases do the lines developed in the text appear to me to be particularly prominent.
' See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum L Rev (forthcoming).
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between Congress and Court that we have not witnessed since the
first years of the New Deal.
III. CIVIL CASES
47

A.

CONRAIL V GOTTSHALL

B.

HECK V HUMPHREY

Heck v Humphrey48 possibly echoes Gottshalls commitment to
common law readings tied to the time a statute is enacted. In this
case, nine Justices agreed for varying reasons that, while his conviction remains in effect, a state prisoner has no cause of action for
monetary damages under the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC § 1983,
for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment. In effect, the holding requires prisoners to secure the invalidation of
their convictions by other means (such as the federal habeas corpus
statute) before a Civil Rights Act cause of action can be maintained.
Justice Scalia, for five Justices (the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg), grounded that conclusion in a
study of the analogous common law cause of action for malicious
prosecution, one element of which is "termination of the prior
criminal proceeding in favor of the accused." Justice Souter, for
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, preferred to ground
the outcome in what he perceived to be the appropriate relationship
between § 1983 and the federal habeas corpus statute. Since the
habeas statute is specifically directed at issues of legality in state
criminal processes and § 1983 is a much more general form of
relief, Justice Souter concluded that permitting the § 1983 action
prior to an available habeas outcome would frustrate Congress's
specific judgment about the manner in which relief from state convictions should be sought in federal courts.
It is striking that the Court's two former state court judges, and
the three Justices who we will see most often favored integrative
over static-meaning approaches to statutes during the Term, preferred to treat the case as involving the contemporary reconciliation
of two federal statutes, rather than the implications for one statute
41 114 S Ct 2396 (1994); the case is discussed at p 42 9.

48 114 S Ct 2364 (1994).
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(§ 1983) of a common law cause of action. Justice Souter is at pains
to examine the issues in relation to what the two statutes have
become at the present time, and what legislative policies would
justify denying an individual federal damages "today." Thus, for
him, making contemporary sense of congressional judgments was
at the core; he worried that the majority's analysis would frustrate
Congress's judgments by precluding § 1983 actions in cases in
which habeas would not be available-for example, because state
proceedings had resulted only in a fine.
The majority opinion made no specific claim that the common
law action for malicious prosecution was a congressional model for
§ 1983; given Justice Scalia's distaste for legislative history, one
would be surprised if an opinion of his rested on that kind of
evidence. And the majority opinion's preference for the common
law analysis may entail no necessary commitment to a static view.
Section 1983, as it remarked, "creates a species of tort liability," '49
and that arms the opinion's reference to malicious prosecution.
The discussion cites contemporary as well as nineteenth-century
sources as to the meaning of both § 1983 and that tort,5" appearing
to address § 1983 in the present day. What the common law action
is for purposes of this federal action, however, appears to be dictated by external sources. The majority does not discuss it as if
it were in any sense a federal tort. In relying on the "malicious
prosecution" model, then, the majority hints at the subordination
of the federal statute(s) to the common law.
Justice Thomas's characterization of the majority opinion, however, suggests the static view. He wrote separately to confess the
Court's fault, as it were, for the situation that confronted it in this
case: "it is we who have put § 1983 and the habeas statute on
what Justice Souter appropriately terms a 'collision course,'" by
expanding both statutes "far beyond the limited scope either was
originally intended to have."" The rhetoric suggests that this is a
regrettable state of affairs, not the expectable consequence of judicial dealings with century-old statutes. "[T]hat the Court created
the tension" is the factor that makes it "proper for the Court to
41114 S Ct 2364, 2370 (1994), quoting Memphis Community School Dist. v Stachura, 477 US
299, 305 (1986) and Carey v Piphus, 435 US 247, 257-58 (1978).
'0114 S Ct at 2372.
"I Id at 2374 (Thomas concurring).
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devise limitations . . . provided that it does so in a principled

fashion."5 2 And Justice Thomas's one stated reason for finding the
majority decision principled is that its approach is "consistent with
5 3
the state of the common law at the time § 1983 was enacted.
For him, at least, the echo of Gottshall is unmistakable.
C. BFP V RESOLUTION TRUST CORP.

The 5-4 split in BFP v Resolution Trust Corp.5 4 seems to illustrate
the second of the problems in Gottshall, that of considering federal
statutes in relation to the common law and judicial responsibilities
for its formation. The question concerned the bankruptcy laws, in
particular, the meaning to be attributed to 11 USC § 548(a)(2).
That section permits the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid transfers
for which "the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily ...received less

than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
. . .and was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made
. . .or became insolvent as a result of such transfer." BFP had

purchased ocean-front real estate in California, obligating itself to
sizable first and second mortgages on the property. It failed to
make payments on the mortgages, and the first mortgage was foreclosed. At a properly conducted foreclosure sale, the property was
sold for about 60% of its alleged fair market value-an amount
that repaid the first mortgage, but left insufficient surplus to repay
the second mortgage, much less contribute more generally to the
bankrupt's estate. The question, then, was whether this "bargain"
price constituted a "reasonably equivalent value in exchange for"
the mortgaged premises.
Since its revision in 1984, the Bankruptcy Act has been explicit
that it applies to involuntary as well as voluntary transfers, and that
S
"foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption" is a "transfer."
Shortly before the 1984 revisions, the Fifth Circuit, interpreting
an analogous provision, had set aside a foreclosure sale that yielded
57% of estimated fair market value, stating that it thought 70%
was the appropriate dividing line;16 in enacting § 548(a), Congress
52Id.
3

1d
I at 2375.
s 114 S Ct 1757.
SS 11 USC § 101(54) (1988 ed, Supp IV).
56Durett v Wasbington Nat. Ins. Co., 621 F2d 201 (1980).
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rejected an alternative formulation that would explicitly have precluded the avoidance in bankruptcy proceedings of procedurally
regular state foreclosure sales. Subsequently, the circuits divided
on whether "reasonably equivalent value," in the mortgage context,
referred to a price within reasonable range of what the property
could have been expected to sell for on the open market (i.e., in
the absence of a forced sale) or whether instead the phrase referred
to a reasonable forced sale price, as would be received in a procedurally regular sale under state foreclosure law. Avoiding transfers
at prices well under fair market value could provide additional
resources for the bankruptcy debtor's other creditors to share and,
perhaps, enlarge the debtor's estate for the fresh start that bankruptcy law promises. It would also render the title delivered at
foreclosure sales somewhat less secure, arguably affronting state
policies in this way.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, discusses
the federal statute at length, but seems to derive its principal impetus from this state policy concern, the effect of decision on the
security of title resulting from foreclosure sales. As Justice Scalia
sets out at some length, foreclosure sales are the result of a state
common law process of development that sought to balance fairness
to debtors (through participation in the proceeds of the sale) with
protection to creditors and security of title. When federal bankruptcy law permitted the avoidance of fraudulent transfers, its focus was on fraud perpetrated by the debtor (also an inheritance
from the common law). By contrast, the chance that a forced sale
would generate an unfairly low price was dealt with by state law
in varying ways-by state procedural requirements for such sales,
including requirements to publish notice of such sales, and by state
rules permitting a foreclosure sale to be set aside if it generated a
price "so low as to 'shock the conscience or raise a presumption of
fraud or unfairness."' 5 7 The constraints of time and the seller's
requirement to sell will cause a forced sale to yield a lower price
than a voluntary transaction. Since the precise character of those
constraints in any given case will determine just how much lower
that price will be, the referent of a "reasonably equivalent value"
in the federal statute cannot be to a fair market price, but must be
" 114 S Ct at 1763-64.
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to the price that would be received at a forced sale held in conformity with local law.5 8 Thus, for a sale held in conformity with
local law, the price actually received is"reasonably equivalent"
with that value, definitionally.
The unattractiveness of the alternative appears to have been a
good part of the impulse for this conclusion. Justice Scalia could
find no judicially administrable standard for a federal court to say,
otherwise, what such a price could be. In a footnote, he dismissed
a standard that would measure the reasonableness of the relation
between forced sale price and fair market value under all the circumstances, as no different from "reasonably infinite value."59 Before the 1984 revisions to the Bankruptcy Act, as already noted,
the Fifth Circuit had set 70% of fair market value as a threshold
of reasonable relationship; 60 that, Justice Scalia thought, "represent[ed a] policy determinationl] which the Bankruptcy Code gives
us no apparent authority to make."'61 Nor did he think the 1984
Act itself ratified the Fifth Circuit's work, despite its timing and
the defeat of a measure that would have overruled it; that that Act
might have modified his historical explanation, he barely considered: "absent clearer textual guidance . . .we will not presume

such a radical departure." 62 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
had more recently adopted a case-by-case "facts and circumstances"
8

Justice Scalia also invoked formalist arguments in support of this position. "Reasonably
equivalent value" should be given a different meaning from "fair market value," as the latter,
well-known phrase appears elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code; different formulations should
be given to different wordings. This is reinforced by the practical consideration that fair
market value and forced sale price will almost inevitably differ. 114 S Ct at 1761. He says
that he is interpreting "reasonably equivalent" as "roughly equivalent" or "approximately
equivalent" rather than "tortur[ing]" the phrase to mean "as close to [fair market value] as
can reasonably be expected," because the latter would express an empty proposition-no
court could decide how close that was. Id at 1762 n 4.
This last move makes the argument an equivalent of that developed in text: choice of an
arbitrary figure (like the Fifth Circuit's 70%) would be beyond judicial authority; but a
case-by-case factual analysis would lack governing rules. Justice Souter's dissent responded
to the formalist argument by noting that "fair market value," a phrase that appears more
than 150 times in federal tax legislation, appears only twice in the Bankruptcy Code (one
of those times, in a tax-related section); "value," "unadorned and undefined ... appears in
more than 30 sections of the Bankruptcy Code ... [and] is, with respect to many of them,
read to mean 'fair market value.'" Id at 1768 n 1.
9Id at 1762 n 4.
60Durrett(cited in note 56).
61 114 S Ct at 1762.
6 Id at 1764.

452

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1994

approach;63 as the footnote about "reasonably infinite value" suggests, that demonstrated the unsuitability of the matter for judicial
determination.
As in Heck, Justice Souter, for the dissenting Justices, centered
his opinion on federal rather than state law and policy, statutory
rather than common law development. The language of § 548(a)(2)
applies to all transfers, not just those occurring as a result of foreclosure sales; in every other context it naturally refers to fair market
value, as the majority conceded. Justice Souter thought giving it a
special meaning in the foreclosure context both indefensible on the
language and contrary to federal bankruptcy policy. From the federal perspective, assuring adequate compensation at forced sales
serves important purposes, both for the bankrupt estate itself and
for other creditors. Such legislative history as exists suggests that
Congress had been aware of this in 1984, when it added the references to involuntary transfers that picked up foreclosure sales as a
matter of federal concern. It had rejected language that would explicitly have adopted the majority's view; the language it chose
tended to echo the Fifth Circuit's prior holding.64 Not implausibly-if ironically-Justice Souter upbraided the majority for its
attempt to escape the "plain effect" of these changes. Moreover,
he argued, the Fifth Circuit rule had not proved embarrassing to
security of title in operation, nor was there reason to think it would.
Its chief effect would be to encourage bidders at forced sales to
offer more than 70% of fair market value. That outcome would
limit their bargain, to be sure, but do so in the service of important
federal bankruptcy policies. It is hard to articulate a worthy state
interest in having purchasers at foreclosure sales get unusual bargains, as against the federal policies favoring reasonable value to
bankrupt estates. Nor was "case-by-case" determination, the alternative approach, an unusual judicial function as a general matter.
For a rather technical, even humdrum legal issue, the level of
conflict between the two opinions is striking and the positions
taken, even ironic.65 One line of strain, wholly familiar and articulated in both opinions, is whether state property or federal bank63 In

re Bundles, 856 F2d 815 (7th Cir 1988); In re Grissom, 955 F2d 1440 (1lth Cir 1992).

64 114 S Ct 1757, 1768 n 1; 1770 n 6; 1772 (1994) (Souter dissenting).
65 Regarding the level of conflict, see David J. Garrow, 'JusticeSouter Emerges," New York

Times (Sept 25, 1994), Sec 6, p 36.
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ruptcy policies are entitled to pride of place. Justice Scalia, widely
experienced in federal government, 66 generates his preference for
the former from the long-established prior harmony of foreclosure
and fraudulent conveyance law, and the importance of security of
title. Justice Souter, from a state, common law tradition, 67 reminds
us that the Bankruptcy Act is a federal statute and the Supreme
Court a federal court; state regulation must yield to the extent it
actually conflicts with federal law, and Justice Souter argues
strongly that a federal rule, once in place, will be so readily accommodated as hardly to inconvenience state interests.
In a number of respects, Justice Scalia's line of argument rests
on the relatively weak stance toward federal judicial function we
have already seen in Gottshall and Heck. For example, he devotes
considerably more energy to his powerful exegesis of state common
law development than to thoroughly working through the Bankruptcy Code, its changes and federal context. Perhaps most telling
is his attitude toward the judicial fact-finding function that would
be entailed in saying whether a price actually received at a foreclosure sale was fair in relation to the price that might have been
expected on a voluntary sale market. Federaljudges lack the means
to make such determinations; Justice Scalia works hard to establish
that § 548(a)(2) does not in terms command it. Yet he also takes
reassurance from the possibility that state judges will perform the
identical function, and may void forced sales if they conclude that
the price was "so low as to 'shock the conscience of raise a presumption of fraud or unfairness."' 68 What is it that makes this is a more
acceptable judicial function at the state level? The only explanation
Justice Scalia offers is that this set-aside occurs "under stateforeclosure law, rather than fraudulent transfer law," 69 an observation that
does not much illuminate the judicial function of comparing price
and value.
6Justice Scalia had served on a White House telecommunications task force, as Chair of
the Administrative Conference of the United States, as Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Office of Legal Counsel, and as a judge of a uniquely national court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, before coming to the Supreme

Court.
" Virtually all ofJustice Souter's prior government employment had been in New Hampshire, as a state attorney, Attorney General, and the Judge of its Supreme Court before a
brief tour on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
"8 114 S Ct at 1763-64.
69Id at 1763 (emphasis in original).
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Perhaps this opinion, like Gottshall and Heck, reflects a reluctance
to consider federal judges to be common law judges, to be officials
with acknowledged law-generating authority and responsibility."0
Common law judges-for example, state judges applying the test
quoted above-often decide cases on the basis of "standards" as
well as "rules." Common law emerges from the slow accretion of
standard-based decisions over time. Administration of standards is
common fare at trial if not at the appellate level. In his writings,
Justice Scalia has argued against "standards" for federal judges; in
his judgment, they can only be trusted with rules. 7 Thus the
approach of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, intellectually indistinguishable from the state court test Justice Scalia cites, creates a
fact-bound standard, inappropriate for a federal judge. That is the
burden of the dismissive footnote about "reasonably infinite value."
The alternative, a 70% test like that of the Fifth Circuit, does create
a "rule"; but the creation of "rules" is the constitutional business
of Congress, not the courts. The circle is closed, and the failure to
accomplish the sensible federal bankruptcy policy Congress almost
certainly chose (to judge, that is, by the state of the law when it
acted in 1984, by what it chose to say, and by what it chose not
to say) is certainly no responsibility of the courts. Congress should
be clearer.
D.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT RETROACTIVITY

The character of judicial-legislative dialogue, and judicial responsibility for implementing legislative judgment, acquire particular importance when the legislature and the courts have already
established a pattern of disagreement in a given policy area. Continuing struggles inevitably acquire political coloration and invite political responses-from the creation of administrative agencies to
take over responsibilities the courts prove unwilling to implement
responsibly, to court-packing plans and other pressures on the ap70

See Thompson v Thompson, 484 US 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia dissenting).

Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law ofRules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989). Compare
Justice Scalia's acceptance of the obligation to use a standard, when inescapably imposed
by statute, in Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S Ct 367, 372 (1993) (Scalia concurring)
(while the Court's interpretation of statutory language prohibiting sexual harrassment leaves
juries "virtually unguided" in deciding whether employer conduct is "egregious enough to
warrant an award of damages," "I know of no test more faithful to the inherently vague
statutory language than the one the Court today adopts.").
71
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pointive processes. Interpretive techniques that stress plain language, refusing to improvise to secure congressional goals that
might be demonstrated by the political history of legislation, extend those struggles if they require repeated expressions of congressional will until Congress "gets it right." That effect is even more
pronounced if courts take legislative correction as only futureregarding, and are disinclined themselves to correct what are arguably their past errors. The burdens of securing change-and hence
the opportunities for frustration and inefficiency-grow higher.
73
Rivers v Roadway Express, Inc.72 and Landgrafv USI Film Products
were among the Term's more prominent cases. Mr. Rivers and a
co-worker had been fired in 1986 in what they alleged to have been
a racially discriminatory manner. Section 1981 of Title 42, part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, conferred on all persons the right "to
make and enforce contracts" free of racial discrimination; at the
time, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
where Rivers's job was, had interpreted § 1981 to prohibit racial
discrimination in the administration as well as the formation of
contracts of employment, 74 and the Supreme Court in dictum had
appeared to approve the "well settled" conclusion in the courts of
appeals "that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination
in private employment on the basis of race."7' 1 In 1989 in Patterson
v McClean Credit Union, however, the Supreme Court had decided
that § 1981's conferral of the right was limited to contract formation, and did not apply to "conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to
enforce [it]." ' 76 The suit Rivers had brought was thus dismissed;
while appeal on a related matter was pending, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 amended § 1981 to make explicit its application to "the
making, performance, modification discrimination in terminating
a contract of employment., 77 Rivers then argued for reinstatement
of his suit.
7,114 S Ct 1510.
7'Id at 1483.
4 Leonard v City of Frankfort Elec. and Water Plant Bd., 752 F2d 189 (1985).
' 5 Jobnson v Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 US 454, 459-60 (1975); see also Runyon v
McCrary, 427 US 160 (1976).
76491 US 164, 171; see Aleinikoff, cited in n 29, an essay written as Pattersonwas pending,
arguing strongly for an integrative reading of § 1981.
77Section 101, Pub L No 102-166, 105 Star 1071.
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Ms. Landsgraf had been subjected to repeated sexual harassment
by a co-worker on her production line at USI Film Products and
resigned in 1986 a few days after the firm appeared to respondalbeit mildly-to her complaints;78 after a bench trial, a district
court found the harassment not so severe as to constitute a constructive discharge, and denied the equitable relief that Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 then made available. While her
appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 established a
right to jury trial and to monetary damages in such Title VII
actions, 79 and she sought retrial before a jury. Both actions, then,
called upon the Court to decide whether certain provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 were to be retroactive in effect; in Rivers,
the provision appears to have been enacted directly in response
to the Court's unexpectedly narrow construction of the statute it
amends.
The 1991 statute reflected the parlous quality of Congress's recent experience with the Supreme Court in civil rights matters,
but it failed to deal directly with the retroactivity issue. Reversing
earlier patterns, disagreement between the Court and Congress has
become frequent in this area of the law, as the Supreme Court has
announced interpretations of civil rights legislation frustrating both
to civil rights plaintiffs and to a Congress that thought remedies
available. A not insubstantial proportion of the Court's debates
over proper approaches to legislative history and the role of "plain
meaning" have arisen in that context. In one notable dissent, on the
eve of the 1991 changes, Justice Stevens listed six recent opinions of
the Court that had attracted congressional "correction" in civil
rights legislation, upbraiding his colleagues for their seeming refusal to act in the spirit of congressional legislation, despite these
consistent signals."0 (Earlier, when the Court was more often finding merit in civil rights actions, he had reflected the other side of
that coin: in 1976 he joined the Court's opinion in Runyon v
McCrary, relying on a 1968 interpretation of § 1981 that he thought
"would have amazed the legislators who voted for it" in 1866, but
78After repeated complaints, her harasser was reprimanded and transferred within the
firm; she quit four days later.
79Rev Stat § 1977A(a), 42 USC § 198la(a), as added by § 102 of Pub L No 102-166,
105 Stat 1071.
80 West Virginia Univ. Hospitalsv Casey, 499 US 83, 113-15 (1991) (Stevens dissenting).
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that had become well established and "surely accords with the
prevailing sense of justice today"; 81 his separate opinion in Patterson
reiterated that theme. 82) The 1991 act was passed after Congress
had failed to override President Bush's veto of the Civil Rights Act
of 1990 by the slimmest of margins. The 1990 Act had been explicit
about retrospectivity, enacting that its provisions should govern
litigation pending at its enactment; objection to that had been
among President Bush's grounds for veto. The 1991 Act omitted
that explicit language and provided generally that it should "take
effect upon enactment," "except as otherwise specifically provided"; the only specific provisions were two sections that provided
against retrospective application in litigation relating to particular
Supreme Court judgments among those that the Act was overturning. Neither concerned the issues in Rivers or Landgraf.
The Chief Justice assigned both of the opinions to Justice Stevens, a striking gesture given Justice Stevens's views-both the
specific views noted above, and his general preference for integrative approaches to interpretation, as is reflected in these pages.
As Justices Scalia (writing), Kennedy, and Thomas complained in
identical concurrences filed in the two cases, the result was a mixed
signal. With the concurrers' enthusiastic agreement, the majority
found against retrospective application of the two provisions. The
general presumption against giving legislation retrospective effect,
they reasoned, must be overcome by clearly manifested congressional intent; the muddle following the President's successful veto
of the 1990 legislation could not supply that manifestation. But for
the majority, whether such an intent had been manifested depended on an elaborate assessment of the actual course of debates,
the political situation, and the likely realities of the legislative process; for the more formal Justices of the concurrence, this was an
inappropriate inquiry. Moreover, while the majority refused to
apply the new legislation to cases pending at its enactment-the
formal question presented-it also catalogued and indicated its acceptance of the reversals, noting in part that the new legislation
had not merely restored, but expanded the causes of action involved, and had added a number of provisions that were not expres-

8' Runyon, 427 US at 189, 191 (Stevens concurring).
82491 US at 222. See text at note 99.
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sive of disagreement with Supreme Court precedent.8 3 The statute
in Landgraf, enlarging the remedies available for violations of Title
VII, was one of the latter. 84
All this signaling of attentiveness to Congress's processes and
stance toward the judiciary, and suggestion that future applications
of the Act would be influenced by its spirit as well as its words,
was galling to three who thought the governing principle clear.
Absent a clear legislative statement in text otherwise, statutes apply
only to relevant activity occurring after their effective date. It is
unnecessary to say more. For them, it appears, Congress and the
courts work in mutual isolation; and one may infer that (except
to the extent it is expressed in unmistakably clear instructions)
congressional frustration is not relevant to the courts' interpretive
task. "We hear you" seems not to be an appropriate signal.
The limited statutory provisions against retroactivity persuaded
Justice Blackmun, but none of his colleagues, that the other provisions of the act should apply to pending cases, "at least where application of the new provision would not disturb the parties' vested
rights or settled expectations.""5 USI Film Products could not have
imagined in 1984-86 that it was entitled to engage in sexual harassment of Ms. Landgraf; in 1986, under the well-settled court of
appeals interpretation of § 1981 that seemed to have been approved
by the Supreme Court, Roadway Express could not have imagined
that it was entitled to engage in racial discrimination in administering Mr. Rivers's contract of employment. Justice Blackmun
thought postponing the availability of new remedies, or prolonging
the life of the congressionally repudiated decision in Patterson,
could not be justified.
The majority's conclusion otherwise rested on a variety of considerations. In developing a general approach to the prospectivity
question, it undertook a wide-ranging review of the Court's prior
decisions in conventional common law manner and appeared to
find the means-to the concurrence's considerable distaste-of
preserving all. 86 In reviewing at length the contentious political
83114 S Ct 1483, 1489 (1994).

4In providing the possibility of compensatory and punitive damage actions for Title
VII, however, Congress eliminated one of the differences between Title VII and § 1981
relief that had armed the majority argument in Patterson.
5 114 S Ct at 1520 (Blackmun dissenting); see also 114 S Ct at 1509 (1994) (Blackmun
dissenting).
8 Two decisions, Thorpe v HousingAuthority of Durham, 393 US 268 (1969) and Bradley v
Richmond School Board, 416 US 696 (1974), themselves both extending remedies in civil rights
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history of the measure (and its predecessor), it emphasized that the
issue in this case was notorious and deliberately passed over. This
review both signals Congress about its responsibilities when issues
are on the table, and suggests a willingness to infer judgments that
do not appear deliberately to have been withheld. In both cases,
it appears to have been significant that the legislation undeniably
created claims that would not have existed before its passage; it
did not just revivify or expand available relief for existing claims.
Thus, if the legislation had been given retrospective application
here, it would have been difficult to deny its application to these
new matters as well, unless by asserting a constitutional limitation-and that intellectual difficulty in itself supports a conclusion
that Congress ordinarily should deal with such cases. All of this is
rather supportive of, indeed premised upon, an interactive relationship in which legislature and courts learn from each other, and
deal with each others' work product in a dialogic fashion.
At one point in Rivers, however, the majority takes a more formal
stance that is worth examining. One element that makes the claim
for retroactive application particularly strong, Justice Blackmun had
argued, is that when trial began on Rivers's claim that he had been
fired because of his race, the courts of appeals had held that § 1981
forbade racial discrimination in the administration of contracts of
employment; the Supreme Court had seemed to have approved those
holdings. Pattersonlater held, however, that § 1981 "does not apply
to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which
does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations."8 7 In the 1991 Act, Congress unmistakably provided that §
1981 does apply to such conduct, appearing thus to return § 1981 to
the meaning it had been given prior to the Pattersondecision. To the
majority, however, restoration is not simply a matter for the courts
to infer judicially in response to the congressional action; it must be
that Congress has itself enacted retrospectivity:
Patterson did not overrule any prior decision of this Court;
rather, it held and therefore established that the prior decisions
settings, marked the Court's willingness to apply to pending cases "the law in effect at the
time of decision," an outcome the concurrence thought "simply misread our precedents and
invented an utterly new and erroneous rule." Like its attention to legislative history, preserving those decisions might be thought to suggest to the Court's partner in dialogue, Congress,
that the Court would remain attentive to the appropriateness of retroactive application even
when Congress had not been explicit ("clear") about the matter.

" 491 US at 171.
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of the Courts of Appeals which read § 1981 to cover discriminatory contract termination were incorrect. They were not wrong
according to some abstract standard of interpretive validity, but
by the rules that necessarily govern our hierarchical federal
court system. Cf. Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result). It is this Court's responsibility to
say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is
the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the
governing rule of law. A judicial construction of a statute is an
authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well
as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction. 88
Thus, Patterson provides the authoritative interpretation of the
phrase "make and enforce contracts" in the Civil Rights Act of
1866 before the 1991 amendment went into effect on November
21, 1991. That interpretation provides the baseline for our conclusion that the 1991 amendment would be "retroactive" if applied to cases arising before that date.
Congress, of course, has the power to amend a statute that
it believes we have misconstrued. It may even, within broad
constitutional bounds, make such a change retroactive and
thereby undo what it perceives to be the undesirable past consequences of a misinterpretation of its work product. No such
change, however, has the force of law unless it is implemented
through legislation. Even when Congress intends to supersede
a rule of law embodied in one of our decisions with what it
views as a better rule established in earlier decisions, its intent
to reach conduct preceding the "corrective" amendment must
clearly appear. We cannot say that such an intent clearly appears with respect to § 101. For this reason, and because it
creates liabilities that had no legal existence before the Act was
passed, § 101 does not apply to preenactment conduct.89
The formal element here is clearest in the last sentence of the
Court's footnote: "[Gliven the structure of our judicial system, the
8 When Congress enacts a new statute, it has the power to decide when the statute will
become effective. The new statute may govern from the date of enactment, from a specified
future date, or even from an expressly announced earlier date. But when this Court construes
a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since
the date when it became law. In statutory cases the Court has no authority to depart from
the congressional command setting the effective date of a law that it has enacted. Thus, it
is not accurate to say that the Court's decision in Patterson "changed" the law that previously
prevailed in the Sixth Circuit when this case was filed. Rather, given the structure of our
judicial system, the Patterson opinion finally decided what § 1981 had always meant and
explained why the Courts of Appeals had misinterpreted the will of the enacting Congress.
[Court footnote; emphasis in original.]
89114 S Ct at 1519-20 (emphasis in original).
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Patterson opinion finally decided what § 1981 had always meant and
explained why the Courts of Appeals had misinterpreted the will
of the enacting Congress."9 But this is a surprising characterization
of "our judicial system" from a common law point of view. Justice
Stevens would not normally contend that the only proper meaning
for § 1981 is the meaning it had upon enactment in 1866: He had
in fact taken a quite different view in joining the Court's opinion
9 2 itself; the other cases of the 1993
in Runyon 91 and in Patterson
Term saw him, quite characteristically, regularly promoting meanings that had emerged through judicial exposition, and judiciallegislative interaction, over time. This is the characteristic common
law process, which incrementally takes the law to places it previously has not been and applies those results to facts that occurred
(of necessity) before the court acted. The law of product liability
and the law of antitrust are both relatively stable; but both have
shifted enormously since the late nineteenth century and neither
still depends for its legitimacy on ideas of what it has "always
meant." That courts are constrained to the text of statutes, as they
are, does not entail treating their words as an immanent, brooding
omnipresence. The existing body of statutes, no less than the existing doctrines and trends of the common law, inform contemporary judicial judgment; to insist that the statutory part is static in
its content, that legislation must be taken to mean what it "always
meant," is to rob judicially administered law of its most democratic
element by subtracting the impulse to build on the policies set
in motion by legislatures and restricting the building to policies
93
generated by courts.
An alternative way of understanding the situation would be to
frame the question, not in terms of the retrospectivity of the 1991
Act, but as whether the Court would have been justified in overruling Patterson. We know from other work of the Term that the
Court has not hesitated to overrule its prior interpretations of statutes even when Congress has not acted. Overruling has, perforce,
a retrospective effect, since the Court acts in the case before it,
and that case arose under-or, as in Rivers, at least passed through
' Id; emphasis in original.
91 See text at n 81.
92 See note 99.

93See Pound (cited in n 5), and Stone (cited in n 8).
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the shadow of-the interpretation that is to be discarded. If, with
the rest of law, statutes evolve, ought a court to take prompt legislative repudiation of its conclusions as a sign that it was in error?
This is not a rhetorical question, and in some respects the majority
opinion wrestles with its difficulties: A legislative response, even
if in some respects generated by a corrective impulse, may head
off in such fresh or varied directions as to sap its action of that
implication. Or, the judicial action being responded to may have
been entirely in line with its precedents, so that it served merely
to emphasize the need to attend to a long-standing problem of
policy.
But Pattersonwas itself a sharp change of direction from the body
of judicial precedent that had previously developed under the aegis
of § 1981. While it is certainly true, as the Court remarks, that the
hierarchical nature of the judiciary established, in a formal sense,
"that the prior decisions of the Court of Appeals . ..were incorrect,"9 4 those decisions had previously reflected, and in turn served
to generate, a climate of understanding respecting legal obligation
in contemporary society that, until the Court acted, both had the
force of law and deprived an agreeing legislature of any need to act.
Supreme Court judgments are final, but the Court is not and need
not pretend to be infallible. Observing the speed with which the
law has been returned by the legislature to its prior state (and
more), a court exhibiting the sensitivity Justice Stevens has generally shown to the dialogic qualities of law could easily conclude
that it had been wrong in its earlier reading, and overrule it. That
would not give the statute retrospective effect; what has been overruled is the earlier decision, and any fresh legislative judgments
are naturally limited to future effect. It would avoid the embarrassment of having to apply repudiated social policy to facts that
95
arose under other expectations, as in Rivers.
To put the proposition this way again illuminates the sometimes
strangeness of the boundary between the (common law) courts and
the legislature. In Patterson itself, the reader may recall, the Su' Supra; emphasis in original.
9'The argument is less strong for the period 1989-1991, between Patterson and the
1991 Act. During virtually all that time, however, actors were on notice that retrospective
application of an explicit congressional overruling was likely; in the usual terms in which
common law courts consider the fairness of retrospective application of new doctrine, no
more is required.
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preme Court had invited argument whether Runyon should be overruled. It unanimously decided against that step, then dividing 5-4
over the interpretation of § 1981 that defeated existing expectations, and that the 1991 Act repudiated. The controlling opinion
was written by Justice Kennedy; it carefully avoided saying
whether Runyon was decided incorrectly or not, invoking instead
considerations of stare decisis "that have special force in the area
of statutory interpretation."9 6 But it was emphatic that these considerations attached to the opinion, not the statute the opinion had
read. "Congress may legislate . . . only through the passage of a
bill which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President.
Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute."97 It
would be a reason to overrule even statutory precedent, the majority
agreed, if "the intervening development of the law, through either
the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress[, has] removed or weaked the conceptual underpinnings from
the prior decision or ... rendered the decision irreconcilable with
competing legal doctrines or policies," if that precedent was "a
positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law," or
if, "after being "'tested by experience, [it] has been found to be
98
inconsistent with the sense of justice or the social welfare."'
These descriptions of the proper basis for overruling even statutory
precedent seem to fit the Rivers situation well; in Patterson,Justice
Stevens's separate opinion had criticized the majority in just such
terms:
The Court's repeated emphasis on the literal language of § 1981
might be appropriate if it were building a new foundation, but
it is not a satisfactory method of adding to the existing structure. In the name of logic and coherence, the Court today adds
a course of bricks dramatically askew from "the secure foundation of the courses laid by others," replacing a sense of rational
direction and purpose in the law with an aimless confinement to
a narrow construction of what it means to "make" a contract. 99
9' 491 US at 172.

1 At 175 n 1.
98At 173-74, omitting citations.
99At 222. The concluding passage quotes Justice Stevens's opinion in Runyon, in turn
quoting Benjamin Cardozo's The Natureof theJudicialProcess149 (1921), explaining his reasons
for joining an opinion interpreting § 1981 in a manner he thought its drafters could not
have imagined.
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Petititioners seem not to have argued Rivers in this way; and one
notes that the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor subscribed to
both Justice Kennedy's opinion in Patterson and Justice Stevens's
opinion here. Still, to say that a prior Court interpretation is revealed to have been wrong is not the same as giving retroactive
effect to a statute whose prompt enactment may contribute to that
judgment; and eliding that argument tends to hide from view the
important judicial responsibilities, in partnership with Congress,
that Justice Kennedy's Patterson considerations acknowledge.
E.

HOLDER V HALL

Holder v Hall,1"' a Voting Rights Act case decided on the last
day of Term, captures the static quality of Justices Thomas's and
Scalia's approach to statutes, their disinterest in congressionaljudicial dialogue, and Justice Stevens's position at the opposite
pole. A Georgia county conferred on its single elected commissioner all the county's elective authority, executive and legislative;
at issue was whether this arrangement was a "standard, practice
or procedure ... which results in an abridgement or denial of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race
or color," in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. l01 Whites held a slim population majority in the county, and
the contention was that choosing the single-commissioner form of
government rather than a multimember "legislature" discriminated
against blacks by "diluting" their vote. None but whites had been
elected to (or run for) this county office, although blacks had stood
for and been elected to the multimember county school board.
Vote dilution is not explicitly a violation of Section 2 or the
similarly worded Section 5; both in terms appear to deal only with
obstacles to physical registration and voting. Like the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,102 the Voting Rights Act was adopted just as southern
resistance to civil rights legislation had been overcome; as had been
the case with that Act, its supporters in Congress made no grand
'00 114 S Ct 2581 (1994).
10142 USC § 1973.
10242 USC § 2000e-2(a) and (d); cf United Steelworkers of America v Weber, 443 US 193
(1979), and the continuing debate over the meaning of Title VII. The similarity is explicitly
recognized in Justice Ginsburg's separate dissent, which stresses the challenge posed to the
courts when congressional politics result in compromise outcomes. 114 S Ct 2581, 2624
(1994) (Ginsburg dissenting).
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claims for its reach-indeed, tended to present it as its words suggested, as concerned with access to the ballot, and not proportionality of representation. A court acting in the late 60's or early 70's
would have found it easier, as a technical matter, to give the Act
correspondingly narrow meaning. The Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Allen v State Board of Elections,10 3 however, broadly interpreted the language of Section 5 to reach "all action necessary to
make a vote effective,""' including the matter of vote dilution; in
1986, the Court specifically applied Section 2 to the
problem of
05
vote dilution in its decision in Thornburgv Gingles.1
Six opinions were written in Holder; no more than two Justices
agreed fully with any of three plurality opinions finding that the
Georgia practice did not violate Section 2. Justice Thomas's opinion was one of those three;' 6 Justice Stevens's, one of three dissents. 07
1 Most of the opinions accepted the existing case development as a starting point, and then asked whether the "dilution"
concept could reasonably be applied on the facts of the case presented to the Court. As the number of opinions suggests, that task
proved both difficult and controversial.
Justice Thomas took a different approach, returning to the interpretive question as an initial matter. Whether analyzing the text
alone (as he emphatically prefers) or viewing the legislative history
as a whole, he found it limited to obstacles to physical registration
and voting-that the statute did not reach behaviors that might
tend to imbalance voter influence on outcomes along racial lines,
as long as the vote itself was assured. That then presented him with
a question he characterized in strictly judicial terms, a question of
stare decisis, whether the Court should continue to adhere to its
prior decisions; and that question he thought answered by the unmanageability and inappropriately political character for judicial
action of the task the Court had set for itself. The opinion was a
major undertaking, substantially longer than the other five opinions
"' 393 US 544.
04At 565-66.
US 30 (1986).

lOS478

" Justices Kennedy and O'Connor also wrote.
107Other dissents were filed by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg. Justice Blackmun's

dissent on the merits was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter; Justice Stevens's
response to Justice Thomas was also joined by all his dissenting colleagues.
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combined, and this brief account can hardly capture it; its fervor
may be suggested by the following:
In my view, our current practice should not continue. Not for
another Term, not until the next case, not for another day.
The disastrous implications of the policies we have adopted
under the Act are too grave; the dissembling in our approach
to the Act too damaging to the credibility of the federal judiciary.' 08
What is striking and illustrative about the argument for current
purposes is its quality of stasis. The statute is what it was on
its adoption in 1965. Postenactment history is consulted only in
acknowledging that stare decisis is often sound policy in matters
of statutory construction, and in examining whether the past interpretations of the Court have proved refractory or unworkable (a
subject about which, I wish to be clear, it appears reasonable arguments can be made).
At the center of Justice Stevens's responsive dissent are a series
of intervening congressional events to which Justice Thomas does
not refer:
In 1970, one year after Allen, and with that case and its implications before it, Congress reenacted Section 5 without change.
In 1975, it did so again.

In 1982, now after over a decade of broad interpretation of the
statutory references to voting "standard, practice or procedure," Congress further amended Section 2 to extend its application to circumstances the Court had recently found outside the
statute as initially written; ° henceforth, Section 2 was to reach
invidious results as well as invidious purposes."o
That is, Congress's consistent pattern, in dealing with a statute of
high political moment and visibility, had been to leave the Court's
expansive interpretations undisturbed, and to override the limitations that the Court did find in it. These facts took the case well
beyond simple congressional silence in the face of judicial interpretation; they involved reenactment, high controversy, and indeed
statutory change hard to understand other than as implicit approval
of judicial constructions to date.
108 114 S Ct at 2618.
1o9Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980).

"' 114 S Ct at 2626-27.
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When a statute has been authoritatively, repeatedly, and consistently construed for more than a quarter century, and when
Congress has reenacted and extended the statute several times
with full awareness of that construction, 111
judges have an especially clear obligation to obey settled law.
For Justice Stevens and his colleagues, the statute and the Court's
interactions with Congress are organic. For Justices Thomas and
Scalia, Congress's work concluded with enactment; subsequent
events are relevant (if at all) only to establish the workability or
not of the Court's approach to the original issue of meaning-an
issue that remains open to revision in accordance with the original
understanding, however expectations and general law may have
changed in the interim.
F. THREE EASIER PIECES

In three civil cases decided fairly early in the Term, perhaps less
difficult and in any event somewhat less adventurous in their claims
on the Court, the seams between statute and case law were less
evident.
In American Dredging Co. v Miller,"2 the Court was faced with
Louisiana's statutory decision to make the doctrine of forum non
conveniens unavailable in Jones Act and maritime law cases
brought in its courts."' The frequent involvement of foreign ships
and sailors gives issues of the appropriateness of American venues
particular significance in admiralty. As it happened, plaintiff and
defendant in this case were both domestic. Justice Scalia emphasized that tact in his opinion for a majority of six, upholding Louisiana's choice; he stressed, too, that state courts would be unable
to exercise in rem jurisdiction that could result in the possibly
embarrassing impoundment of a foreign vessel. Thus, Louisiana
may find itself more limited in cases arising out of international
commerce than the decision at first suggests.
Two strands characterize Justice Scalia's majority opinion. The
Id at 2629.
114 S Ct 981 (1994). American Dredging was not produced by the Lexis search described above, note 43, but is mentioned at the suggestion of my colleague John Manning,
"
l

who argued the case for the Solicitor General as amicus curiae.
...
Strikingly, Louisiana made this judgment only for admiralty cases; the majority asserted
that the propriety of this discrimination was "a question not remotely before us." 114 S Ct
at 988 n 3.
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first, less interesting for our purposes, applies a test for preemption
in admiralty cases first articulated in 1917 and finds that Louisiana's
choice is not preempted.114 The second examines the relationship
among the Jones Act (the maritime remedy for seamen under which
this particular action was brought) and FELA, the more general
statute also involved in Gottshall. The Jones Act incorporates FELA
by reference, and FIKLA also requires state courts to apply uniform
federal law; but an early decision under FELA nonetheless permitted state courts to apply their own principles of forum non conveniens. l ls "We think it evident that the rule . . . announced for the
FELA applies as well to the Jones Act, which in turn supports the
view that maritime commerce does not require a uniform rule of
forum non conveniens. "116 The statutory judgment which the
Court first found in FELA is carried through by implication at
least to Jones Act litigation, without any need to see that judgment
expressed in the Jones Act text.
Justice Kennedy (with Justice Thomas) dissented from this "harmonization of general admiralty law with congressional enactments,"117 seeming to give dominant force to the Court's common
law responsibilities in a setting in which they are particularly
strong.1 18 The admiralty jurisdiction, he thought, imposed a
114Southern Pacific Co. vJensen, 244 US 205, 216 (1917). Justice Stevens, in a lone concurrence, strongly objected to unnecessarily giving life toJensen, a 5-4 decision he characterized
as of a piece with Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905), in its attitude toward state legislative
authority trenching on admiralty. The specific holding inJensen was that New York could
not apply workers' compensation remedies to a longshoreman injured in the admiralty
jurisdiction; thus, the result was among those suggesting a certain judicial hostility to legislative innovations seeking to overcome the then cruelty of the common law. See text at note
3. It was in dissent here that Holmes proclaimed the necessarily "interstitialf" quality of
judicial policy-making, and that "[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified."
244 US at 221, 222, quoted in 114 S Ct at 991, n I (Stevens dissenting). Is it too much to
find, in this particular cleavage between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens, some echo of a
similar disinclination on Justice Scalia's part to use statutory instruction to the fullest? Note
that Justice Scalia prefaces his discussion of the matter next discussed in the text, on which
he and Justice Stevens agree, by characterizing it as a secondary point and observing that
"[w]hile there is an established and continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in
admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as possible, to harmonize with the enactments
of Congress in the field." (Emphasis added.) Id at 989. That is, separation is insisted upon
and judicial primacy asserted. Admiralty is one of the few contexts in which Justice Scalia
admits a common law function for federal courts. Compare note 70.
"15Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v Mayfield, 340 US 1 (1950).
116114 S Ct at 990.
117Id.
"' Id at 995.
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strong, implicitly constitutional obligation of uniformity. FELA is
a domestic statute; litigation about railroad activity "interposes no
obstacle to our foreign relations." 1 9 The Jones Act makes no explicit judgment about forum non conveniens, and the Court's opinion in any event reaches the whole of admiralty jurisdiction, not
just Jones Act cases. Absent assurance that foreigners could be
protected from inconvenient fora, which he could not find in the
majority opinion, he would not build an exception from uniformity
on the basis of FELA. The worlds of statute and common law are
more widely separated here-but also with an assignable reason
on the merits that has its own intellectual force. It is hard to take
the implication here that the exercise would be generally inappropriate.
Formally at issue in Liteky v United States12 ° was the meaning to
be attached to 28 USC § 455(a), which since its amendment in 1974
has required a federal judge to recuse "himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Disqualification was sought on the basis of a judge's conduct of politically
charged trials, and the Court was unanimous that it was not required on the facts before it. Justice Scalia wrote for the Chief
Justice and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Ginsburg; Justice
Kennedy wrote for the remainder, concurring in the result. The
majority's analysis was somewhat more formal than the concurrence; the latter thought Justice Scalia emphasized too greatly doctrinal structure (whether the disqualifying impulse must come from
an "extrajudicial source") and drew unwarranted limitations to the
broad principle of § 455(a) from the series of specific prohibitions
that is set out in § 455(b). Most striking for our purposes, however,
is that both opinions were content to regard § 455 as establishing
the foundation upon which judicial doctrine about disqualification
would be built. The statute here was imagined as a starting point,
rather than an isolated and unchanging diktat. No complaint is
uttered about Congress's failure of clarity in specifying so subjective an inquiry, nor is Congress pointed out as the only proper
source of any appropriate clarification. The Court builds on cases
that preceded the 1974 amendment and are assumed to have in-

19

Id.

"0 114 S Ct 1147 (1994).
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formed it, and on cases that followed that amendment and contribute to understanding its meaning.
Possibly the statute's concern with judicial administration underlies the ease with which all members of the Court seem able to
treat it as establishing a somewhat malleable framework, rather
than an unchanging specification. Disqualification may seem like
it should be judicial business in the first instance, so that treating
the statute as confirmatory and instructive rather than as an external command has an intuitive if unexpressed appeal. To be confirmed oneself in substantial discretion of administration is perhaps
less alarming than to see that discretion awarded to another body.
The minority-Justices who, save Justice Kennedy, were characteristically more wedded to integrative perspectives throughout the
Term-are prepared to see Congress's instruction in less confining
a way than the majority; but even the majority approaches the task
with a willingness to examine context and shoulder the premises
and responsibilities of continuity that were missing from much of
the Term's work.
Somewhat to the same effect was Fogerty v Fantasy, Inc.,121 where
the question was whether courts should employ differing standards
in assessing the requests of prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants for the award of attorneys fees in copyright infringement
actions under 17 USC § 505. Section 505 provides that "the court
may ... award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party
as part of the costs," drawing no textual distinction between successful prosecutors and successful defenders of infringement actions. In earlier decisions construing essentially identical language
in the Civil Rights laws, however, the Court had differentiated
between plaintiffs and defendants, finding that successful plaintiffs
should "ordinarily" recover attorneys' fees unless "special circumstances would render such an award unjust," but that successful
defendants were not entitled to a similar presumption. 122 Those
earlier decisions identified as a purpose of the Civil Rights laws
the encouragement of often "impecunious" plaintiffs' actions, to
vindicate congressional policies of the highest priority; and they
2 114 S Ct 1023.

See 42 USC § 200e-5(k) ("in its discretion may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney's fee"); Newman v PiggiePark Enterprises, Inc., 390 US 400, 402 (1968)
(successful plaintiff's presumptive recovery); ChristianburgGarment Co. v EEOC, 434 US 412
(1978) (successful defendants not entitled to presumptive recovery).
1
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relied in part on legislative history supporting that understanding.
The Justices were unanimous that these earlier constructions were
not controlling, but they were not unanimous in their reasoning.
The Chief Justice, writing for eight members of the Court, saw
a policy distinction between the two statutes that produced no
embarrassment: copyright plaintiffs were no more likely to be impecunious than copyright defendants, nor did they have a special
"private attorney general" role in enforcing a particularly important
congressional policy. And the majority considered with some care
whether the legislative history of § 505, or the prior history of the
attorney's fee issue in copyright litigation, would itself support a
dual standard-concluding that neither would. The premise of
such inquiries into context must be that congressional action is
appropriately to be understood in the framework of expectations
about law that exist at the time. The questions would not have
been necessary if the earlier civil rights statute, and its interpretation, had no intellectual bearing for the copyright law. Only Justice
Thomas took that position, in a solitary concurrence; he stressed
that straightforward attention to the text was the better analysis,
would have preferred to limit if not abandon the earlier readings
as error, and regretted the resulting inconsistency in construing
the virtually identical language of the Copyright and Civil Rights
Acts. For him, but in this case only for him, text alone, and not
the context of its adoption, had bearing.
IV. CRMINAL CASES
A. SHANNON V UNITED STATES

On the same day as the Court decided Gottshall,Justice Thomas,
and Justice Stevens, each took a similar approach in Shannon v
United States,'23 a criminal case in which the defendant relied alternatively on an asserted congressional-judicial interaction, and on
the Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal criminal
power-its common law function in that respect. At issue was
whether a trial court had erred in refusing a defendant's request
for a jury instruction explaining the consequences of a verdict of
123 114 S Ct 2419 (1994).
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Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity under the relatively new Insanity
Defense Reform Act of 1984.
Prior to 1984, no statute had governed the use or consequences
of the insanity defense in federal criminal trials outside the District
of Columbia. Congress had enacted such a statute for the District
in 1955. In 1957, the D.C. Circuit had decided en banc that, given
juries' probable unfamiliarity with the insanity defense, defendants
were entitled to have juries informed about the consequences of
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, despite the usual
unwillingness of courts to invite juries to consider the consequences
of their action:
We think the jury has a right to know the meaning of this
possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts. 124
This opinion was uncontroversial and had been followed for almost
three decades when, in the wake of the assassination attempt on
President Reagan, Congress enacted the general federal statute.
The 1984 statute was generally modeled on the District Act, although many of its specific judgments were somewhat harsher toward the defense. 12' The procedure the D.C. Circuit put in place
was "endorse[d]" by the Senate Committee in its report, apparently
the only mention of the matter in the legislative history. 126
Justice Thomas, writing for all but Justices Stevens and Blackmun, concluded that the defendant had no right to the instruction
that he sought. The text of the new Act did not address this problem. Examining its several changes, he found that it varied sufficiently from its D.C. predecessor to make "inapplicable" the canon
that when a statute with a settled construction is borrowed, its
settled interpretation is presumed adopted as well. In a footnote,
he added a comment that very sharply distinguishes between the
124Lyles v UnitedStates, 254 F2d 725, 728 (1957);Judge, later ChiefJustice, Warren Burger
was one of the authors of this opinion.
125As detailed in the majority opinion, the insanity test is more restrictively formulated.

Also, a federal defendant must affirmatively establish the defense by clear and convincing
evidence, not a mere preponderance; is subject to a civil hearing within 40 days, not 50; in
a serious matter must show entitlement to release by clear and convincing evidence, not a
preponderance; and, if then committed, will be released only when he no longer presents
a substantial risk of harm to others or their property, rather than when he has ceased to be
"dangerous to himself or others."
126S Rep No 98-225, 240 (1983), quoted in 114 S Ct at 2426.
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worlds of statute and case law: since the D.C. Circuit's action had
been taken under its supervisory authority over federal courts in
the District rather than as an act of statutory construction as such,
a "canon of statutory construction" would be inapplicable; "there was
no 'known and settled construction' of the statute that Congress
could have adopted by virtue of borrowing language from the D.C.
statutory scheme."' 2 7 But the District of Columbia's criminal bar
is unlikely to have distinguished between "statutory construction"
and how it knew the D.C. statute had been applied without controversy or difficulty for three decades. Nor would the Court adopt
the D.C. approach judicially, fearing that "the rule against informing jurors of the consequences of their verdicts would soon
be swallowed by the exceptions" if the Court adopted Shannon's
argument as an exercise of its supervisory power over the federal
courts.12 8 And, again, the majority found force in an argument that
tends to isolate the world of Congress from the world of the court:
"Congress's recent action in this area counsels hesitation in invoking our supervisory powers."' 29 Congress is thus credited with having chosen by not acting, when its only relevant experiencewhich the Court does not permit itself to know-is that judicial
exercise of supervisory powers had well solved the issue.
A similarly sharp division between the two worlds is reflected
in the majority's treatment of the Senate Committee Report. While
acknowledging that Justices hold "differing views regarding the
role that legislative history should play in statutory interpretation,"
Justice Thomas was "not aware of any case ... in which we have
given authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative history
that is in no way anchored in the text of the statute.' 130 In the
abstract, one easily agrees that a "snippet of legislative history"
lacking any "statutory reference point" ought to be disregarded.
But here the point is tenable only if the "snippet" is itself read in
isolation-if one's premise is that legislators act in the abstract,
without any knowledge of or stance toward the existing body of
law. Once we permit ourselves as well as the Senate to know about
127 114

S Ct at 2426 n 8 (emphasis in original).

Id at 2428.
129Id.
130Id at 2426. Passages like these appear to be building a wall of defense against the
future return of attention to legislative history.
2
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the 1955 statute and its well-established and uncontroversial interpretation, the "snippet" becomes not an isolated scribble but "as
much as you could expect." There wasn't a problem requiring
legislative resolution in the context against which the Senate was
acting. To require advance legislative identification and explicit
resolution of all issues, including those that are not issues, is to ask
what cannot be done. Failing to anticipate what a court might insist
upon, Congress had no reason to say more than it did. Justice
Thomas's position holds as a matter of logic; it fails as a description
of events that acknowledges the continuing interaction of all the
bodies responsible for law's development, and the expectations that
interaction engenders. 131
For Justices Stevens and Blackmun, "a rule that has minimized
the risk of injustice for almost 40 years should not be abandoned
without good reason.' 132
Fears of possible unfairness to defendants
are answered by the need for defendants to request the charge; fears
that the general rule against informing jurors of the consequences of
their verdicts would be swallowed up by exceptions are answered
by the connection here to a particular statute, and by the experience of almost 40 years in the D.C. courts that no such expansion
had occurred. The Court need not simply "presume" a prior construction had been adopted by Congress, when it is evident that
construction was actually known to the legislature and was uncontroversial-indeed, they suggest, the D.C. approach was the developing trend in the states generally.
One opinion sees an abstract question, and works hard to preserve it in that frame. Indicators that might place it into a developmental context or frame the issues in dialogic terms are rejected.
For Justice Thomas in this case, Congress doesn't act in a contextits obligations are to see to it each time that all its instructions are
clear-and neither should the Court. The other opinion is
grounded in a premise that law is developmental, that what occurs
at any moment is informed by what has gone before, by the perva131Compare the discussion of City of Chicago v EDF, discussed in text at 499. One could
add, perhaps, that in preferring what he found to be the usual treatment of this issue in
state courts over that developed in the District of Columbia, a distinctly federal jurisdiction,
Justice Thomas again reflects a preference for judicial development of law dependent on
state rather than federal sources, even when federal questions are unmistakably involved.
See text at p 436.
132 114 S Ct at 2428-29.
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sive set of expectations against which, necessarily-their time and
insight limited-humans act. And here, of course, the Court was
also presented with the alternative of acting in common law mode,
in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction (as in this context that is
called). For one writer, that possibility was to be evaluated by
possible logical extensions of the desired holding; 13 3 for the other,
by practical experience and the apparent trend in other jurisdictions.
B. STAPLES V UNITED STATES

Justices Thomas and Stevens again took opposed positions in
Staples v United States,'34 but in this opinion Justice Thomas used
contextual materials more freely, and in the service of finding
against criminal liability; Justice Stevens was perhaps the more
attentive to the statute in itself. Staples possessed a gun, originally
a semiautomatic weapon, that had been modified so that it would
fire repeatedly on one pull of its trigger. That modification made
it a machine gun under the National Firearms Act; 35 the Act defines as an offense punishable by up to 10 years in prison the
possession of a machine gun that has not been federally registered.' 36 The government prosecuted Staples for failing to register
the gun. The question dividing the Court was the scienter required
to support his conviction. Should the jury have been instructed
that it must find that Staples himself knew that the gun had been
modified to make it a fully automatic weapon? Or was it enough
to have been told, as in fact they were, that they must find that
the gun Staples knew he had, and had not registered, had been so
modified? Justice Thomas wrote for five Justices that to support
133Compare Priestly v Fowler, 3 Mees. & Wels. 1, 150 Eng Rep 1030 (Exch Pleas 1837);
Winterbottom v Wrigbt, 10 Mees. & Wels. 109 (Exch Pleas 1842), opinions by Lord Abinger
long taken as caricatures of fear-ridden reasoning. Over the course of a century and a half,
Lord Abinger's fears have been born out; and so, perhaps, would Justice Thomas's be. The
concern is not irrelevant; yet time frame and pace are central to its legitimacy. If that
change were to occur slowly, it would presumably be because of the accretion of factual
circumstances demonstrating that that would be the just outcome, and in the absence of
legislative reaction to the direction taken by the courts. Once again, then, the fundamental

imperative here is that of stasis. Such opinions trust the future no more than they consult
the past.
1"4114 S Ct 1793 (1994).

..
s 26 USC § 5845.
'

26 USC § 5861(d).
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conviction Staples had to have known that the gun was an automatic, and therefore his conviction must be reversed; Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor concurred in that result; Justices Stevens and
Blackmun dissented, believing that the semiautomatic character of
the gun together with its modification in fact were enough to establish criminal liability.
Justice Thomas's opinion is integrative in significant respects,
drawing on a wide range of other opinions and statutes in reasoning
to its conclusion favoring a relatively demanding scienter standard.
It derives its principal thrust from propositions that might be disputed, but that plainly figure as policy threads running through
the law-that the general legality of gun ownership in our society
and the severity of the sentence Staples might receive argue for
regarding the offense as a regulation of conduct malum in se rather
than as an offense to public welfare. (Public welfare offenses, all
agreed, do not require proving scienter in the manner the Staples
majority required.) The text of the National Firearms Act does not
answer the question of what state of mind is required for violation
of its provisions; the Act is to be construed, Justice Thomas said,
in light of the "background rules of the common law," ' but in
this case without the dating that had characterized his opinions in
Gottshall"I and Heck. 139 In a criminal case, interpretations varying
over time would raise special and important questions if their effect
was to expand liability; thus, one might suppose that had the issue
been presented Justice Thomas would again have been particularly
interested in what the common law was on the date of enactment.
Yet the tone here is quite different from those other efforts. Indeed,
in a case involving hand grenades, an earlier Supreme Court opinion had directly characterized the Act as a public welfare statute,
"a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety, which
may well be premised on the theory that one would hardly be
surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.'" But that case was concerned with knowledge of the
registration requirement, not of the character of a hand grenade;
the majority's view that the possession of guns is innocent in Ameri...
114 S Ct at 1797.
138Discussed in text following p 429.
139Discussed in text following p 447.
'40

United States v Freed, 401 US 601, 609 (1971), quoted in 114 S Ct at 1799.
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can society-the more general proposition-thus distinguished
that case, and made it permissible in these facts to invoke the more
usual malum in se reasoning.
Justice Stevens's opinion draws on the legislative history of the
Act, in particular, and on the special character of semiautomatic
weapons, to support its conclusion that the "regulatory offense"
approach is fully appropriate to Staples's case. Which of the two
one finds more persuasive probably turns on the latter issue of
characterization. In Justice Stevens's view, the majority "reaches
the rather surprising conclusion that guns are more analogous to
food stamps than to hand grenades";"' Justice Thomas analogizes
the equities to the Court's probable hesitation "to conclude on the
basis of silence [in a statute attaching major penalties to violations
of automobile emissions standards] that Congress intended a prison
term to apply to a car owner whose vehicle's emissions levels,
wholly unbeknownst to him, began to exceed legal limits between
regular inspection dates."' 42 For Justice Stevens, the guns in question are semiautomatic weapons that give notice of their special
dangerousness and are not within American traditions of gun ownership; for Justice Thomas, that limitation cannot be constructed
out of a statute that refers to "firearms" and then to the limited
subclass of "machine guns." Within this framework of debate over
characterization, however, Justice Thomas's opinion seems quite
unlike many of his other efforts during the Term in its willingness
to bring general considerations to bear on the interpretation of
statutory text.
C. CUSTIS V UNITED STATES

In Custis v United States,' 43 announced on the same day as BFP,144
Justice Souter's common law sensibilities and attention to the actualities of rule administration failed for the second time that day to
"' 114 S Ct at 1810 (Stevens dissenting). The reference is to Liparota v United States, 471
US 419 (1985), a case involving the mens rea requirement associated with food stamp offenses
under a statute that, unlike the National Firearms Act (as Justice Stevens points out, id at
n 15), referred to offenses committed "knowingly."
141
114 S Ct at 1802.
14 114 S Ct 1732 (1994).
4 Discussed in text following p 449. The cases were announced May 23, 1994. Seven
opinions were announced on that Monday, six of them involving at least in part the meaning
of federal statutes, and splitting the Court in similar ways.
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persuade a majority of his colleagues. Section 924(e) of the Armed
Career Criminal Act imposes significantly enhanced penalties for
persons convicted of felonies and possessing firearms if they have
"three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious
drug offense." 145 Custis, convicted of possessing cocaine and a firearm, had three prior state convictions for violent property offenses.
The government moved to enhance his sentence under the statute.
At the sentencing hearing, Custis challenged two of his prior convictions collaterally, as infected with constitutional procedural errors. The question for the Supreme Court was whether the
ACCA's reference to "three previous convictions" should be understood to permit such collateral challenges.
The Chief Justice wrote for six-Justice Ginsburg now joining
the BFP majority-that the Act does not authorize such collateral
attacks. He reasoned that "the statute focuses on the fact of conviction."'" 4 Another section of the statute, § 92 1(a)(20), detailed what
convictions counted, excluding those that had been "expunged, or
set aside" or had resulted in a pardon or the restoration of civil
liberties. The implication of reference to convictions already set
aside is that those not yet impugned may be counted. In a drug
offense statute, Congress had explicitly provided for collateral challenges to prior convictions that would otherwise cause sentence
enhancement. And in Lewis v United States, 147 the Court had held it
unnecessary to permit collateral challenges to convictions on which
federal prosecutors premised the felony of gun possession by one
previously convicted of a felony. The Court had twice held as a
constitutional matter that prior convictions could not be used for
sentencing enhancement; but, the Chief Justice explained, those
cases involved outright denials of the right to counsel, a "unique
constitutional defect" that was "jurisdictional" in character. 141
None of the flaws Custis claimed had that severity. Permitting
collateral inquiry into such issues as the adequacy of representation
would create practical difficulties and undermine the finality of
judgments.
The first argument in Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justices
141

18 USC § 924(e).

114 S Ct at 1736 (emphasis in original).
(1980).
148 114 S Ct at 1733.
'46

141 445 US 55
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Stevens and Blackmun, strikes a characteristic difference in tone.
For him, the starting point is that the Court's two constitutional
holdings were in place when § 924(e) was enacted, and were uniformly understood by both commentators and the courts of appeal
to require courts generally "to entertain claims that prior convictions relied upon for enhancement were unconstitutional." After the enactment of § 924(e), the courts of appeals uniformly
understood its reference to "conviction" to mean "lawful conviction"-that is, to permit collateral challenge-yet a Congress that
subsequently amended § 924 with some frequency did not change
its language in this respect. This more detailed view of "the contemporary legal context" within which Congress could be said and
had previously been understood to have acted gave its silence about
collateral challenge a different spin. Justice Souter reasoned that
the legislative history of § 92 1(a)(20), enacted two years after § 924,
showed it to have been dealing with problems arising under another
section; the explicit reference to collateral attack in the drug statute,
enacted in 1970, provided little information about Congress's understanding in 1984, by which time the constitutional claim to
collateral relief had become well established. And Lewis itself carefully distinguished the earlier collateral relief cases as involving
sentencing; although "a sentence-enhancement law 'depend[s] upon
the reliability of a past ...conviction,"' Congress could rationally
decide to exclude all persons who had previously been convicted
of felonies from lawful gun possession as "'a sweeping prophylaxis'
designed 'to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons."' 1 49 The constitutional validity of conviction was irrelevant
if the statute thus served to regulate primary conduct.
Justice Souter had additional arguments in his quiver-that the
statute ought to be interpreted to avoid a difficult constitutional
question,150 that the feared practical difficulties had failed to emerge
in the intervening years when the courts of appeals had been permitting collateral challenges. I don't wish to suggest that the reader
must be persuaded by any of them. One supposes, too, that the
49 Id at 1742 (Souter dissenting), quoting 445 US at 63, 67.
"' 114 S Ct at 1743. In particular, he deplored the reassertion of the idea of"jurisdictional"
constitutional violations, one he thought had long been discredited. The distance between
deprivation of one's constitutional right to counsel by utter failure to provide one and
deprivation by providing one who fails to do the work is in any event not large; inadequate
representation was one of Custis's claims.
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opinions in the case may have been influenced by the writers' attitude toward postconviction relief, a matter quite apart from judicial
style. What seems worth remarking here, again, is the difference
in the two opinions' stance toward Congress and the job of judges.
The majority holds Congress to a standard of precision in speaking,
and is relatively indifferent to the context in which it speaks-even
when important elements of that context are of the courts' own
making. The statutory text is an abstract given; its subsequent
interpretation by the courts and the fact or absence of congressional
response are not worth mention. For Justice Souter, Congress is a
much more human institution, and its relations with the judiciary
are to be seen as interactive and dialogic. "[T]he assumption that
all omissions in legislative drafting are deliberate [is] an assumption
we know to be false." 15 ' Congress's actions and failures to act are
to be set in the context of the developing law of the times; the
premise here is one of shared responsibility, in which the development of judicial decision plays a significant role in assigning meaning to text and the integrative role of the judiciary is stressed.
D.

HAGEN V UTAH

A case involving criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans
provided one of the Term's most thoroughly integrative opinions
for those members of the Court who-particularly in the administrative contexts we have yet to reach-were generally the most
likely to avoid inquiries into legislative history, the history of law's
application, and resulting expectations. In Hagen v Utah,' 2 Utah's
criminal jurisdiction over a Native American accused of a drug
offense turned on whether statutes enacted in the period 1902-05
had the effect of diminishing the size of the Uintah Indian Reservation. The offense occurred on land that had been within the original boundaries of the Reservation, but that had subsequently been
opened to non-Indian settlement. State criminal law could not
apply to the acts of Native Americans occurring on reservation
lands. The fact that the land had been opened to non-Indians was
not enough in itself to establish that the reservation had been diminished. A majority of seven, Justice O'Connor writing, found
that the statutes in question worked to effect a diminution, so that
"5IId at 1741.
152

114 S Ct 958 (1994).

INTEGRATING STATUTORY AND OTHER LAW

481

Utah could prosecute the alleged crime; Justices Blackmun and
Souter, invoking the checkered past of our national government's
dealings with Indian tribes, could not find the "clear and unequivocal evidence of congressional intent to reduce reservation boundaries" prior cases required.'
Both opinions examined in detail the course of dealings with the
Uintahs that led to the statutes in question and the records of
legislative action in reaching their respective conclusions. Their
disagreement over the result of this inquiry is less significant here
than that both opinions undertook it. And, in contrast with the
analysis often offered by Justices tending to approach statutory
issues formally, Justice O'Connor credited what happened after
the adoption of the statutes in question as significant for determining their meaning. She noted that the population of the apparently
ceded lands was almost entirely non-Indian, that traditional Uintah
administration had been limited in practice to the areas not opened
for non-Indian settlement, and that Utah had regularly exercised
jurisdiction over the opened lands. "This 'jurisdictional history,'
as well as the current population situation . . . , demonstrates a

practical acknowledgment that the Reservation was diminished; a
the justifiable expectacontrary conclusion would seriously disrupt
154
area."'
the
in
living
people
tions of the
From a justice standpoint, it is somewhat perverse thus to credit
behavior and results rooted in the exercise of superior force over
exploited peoples, while leaving unexplored similar considerations
arising from ordinary day-to-day administration of law. Justices
Blackmun and Souter, who were usually more willing to credit
such behavior with significance during the Term, made this irony
explicit.155 Yet one cannot escape that the premise is one argued
for in this essay; like legislative history, it did not wholly disappear
from the Term's work.
E. THREE HARD CASES

As with many issues of approach to judicial function, ideas such
as the primacy and stability of the original text can be overcome
13 Id
statutes
were to
114Id

at 971. The majority disagreed that a "clear statement" was required, but not that
must establish a congressional purpose to diminish the reservation and that doubts
be resolved in the Indians' favor.
at 970.

"I Id at 971, 978, 980.
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by other factors, such as attitudes toward crime. The varying opinions in three criminal decisions from the 1993 Term are illustrative;
Justices who would ordinarily eschew indicators outside the text
sometimes appear to be tempted by results its use produces. The
special force of principles of lenity in criminal law, like the law's
assertion of solicitude for Native American interests that might
have been at work in Hagen, gives some of the Term's opinions an
ironical turn.
Williamson v United States"6 promised to "clarify the scope of the
'
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest."'17
(With
four opinions supporting a remand for reconsideration-none fully
the opinion of the Court-the Court seems to have fallen short of
that worthy goal.) Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
permits the introduction into evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of self-inculpatory "statements."' 58 The Court had to decide whether that provision reached past an accomplice's acknowledgement that he himself was carrying cocaine, to his saying that
he was carrying it for the defendant. A majority of the courtJustices O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Souter-relied chiefly on textual materials to conclude that "statements" could not be taken to mean the whole of a suspect's conversation with authorities, but only those parts of it that were selfinculpatory. The six disagreed among themselves whether any part
of the accomplice's narrative was likely genuinely to fit the latter
description; only Justices O'Connor and Scalia concluded that
some probably would. Striking for present purposes is that Justice
Kennedy argued strongly for himself, the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas that collateral materials (in this case, primarily Advisory
Committee notes) should be relied on to give the text a meaning
that made it more likely that the accomplice's words could find use
against the defendant's interest. Ordinarily, they deprecated the
use of such materials; here, they failed as well to deal with the
constitutional questions raised by broad admissibility of statements
whose maker cannot be confronted.
16 114 S Ct 2431 (1994).
157 Id at 2433.

' "Statement" is defined by Fed R Ev § 801 as "an oral or written assertion." Justice
O'Connor shows by dictionary references that the definition is unhelpfully circular ("Assertion" --> "declaration" -- "statement"), and then argues that "the principle behind the Rule,
so far as it is discernable from the text, points clearly to the narrower meaning." Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, atypically for him, does not mention the textual indicator of § 801.
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United States v Granderson'59 brought the Court face-to-face with
imperfections in legislative process. Granderson had been convicted of a postal offense that, under the sentencing guidelines,
could have resulted in at most a six-month penitentiary term; he
had been placed on probation for five years. He was shortly found
in possession of cocaine, and a 1988 amendment to the criminal
code required the court in such a case, after a hearing, to "revoke
the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less
than one-third of the original sentence."16 The italicized language
creates the problem. Other indicators give strong signals that Congress wanted the new sentence to require confinement. That would
have been the natural result under the practice once followed in
the federal courts. Before 1984, if probation was to be the court's
choice, the sentencing court would first impose a penitentiary sentence and then suspend it for the probationary period. But passage
of the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, four years before the
amendment in question, had ended that federal practice. Under
that statute, probation is now a "sentence." There is no longer any
"original sentence" other than the sentence of probation. What is
"one-third of the original sentence"?
Justice Ginsburg, writing for five Justices, 161 was willing to improvise with "the original sentence" to rescue the apparent sense
of the legislation, while the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, in three opinions,"' insisted on fidelity to text.
Thus, glancing sideways at the size and complexity of the overall
legislation, and the last-minute and largely unexplained introduction of this section as a floor amendment, the majority concluded
that the statute requires at a minimum confinement for one-third
of the maximum jail sentence that might initially have been imposed under the sentencing guidelines, had a jail term been chosen.
In effect, they treated Congress as if it had simply forgotten the
1984 change in sentencing practice, and in 1988 had referred back
to what everyone remembered sentencing practice to have been.
They were willing to repair a statute that Congress had left in a
state of disarray, following as best they could the indicators of
"9 114 S Ct 1259.
60 18 USC § 3565(a).
161Justice

Ginsburg for herself and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, and Souter.

' Justices Kennedy and Scalia wrote individually, concurring in the result; the Chief

Justice, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote in dissent.
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congressional purpose that could be derived from the statute and
its context and measuring their success by their result-a required
jail sentence, within the range that might originally have been imposed.
The four textualists insisted that "the original sentence" must
refer to the sentence actually imposed, the sixty-month probation
sentence, but disagreed whether the required replacement sentence
was to be a minimum of 20 months in jail, or a minimum of 20
months on probation, with jail up to six months still possible on
resentencing. Justices Kennedy and Scalia, separately concurring
in the result, chose 20 months' probation; the Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas chose a 20-month jail term. Both results are possible on the text, and both are extraordinary. One permits a significant amelioration rather than enhancement of sentence; while that
amelioration can be controlled against, Congress cannot be imagined to have desired this interpretation. The other interpretation
achieves sentence enhancement, but at the cost of offending legality; it requires imposition of a longer jail term, after a relatively
informal hearing, than could normally have been given even after
a criminal trial for drug possession followed by maximum consecutive sentences under the sentencing guidelines for the two offenses
that would then have been established. 163
Finally, Ratzlafv UnitedStates, Justice Ginsburg's second opinion
for the Court, also for a majority of five. 16" As a means (in part) of
tracing money laundering, 31 USC § 5313 requires banks and other
financial institutions to report transactions involving $10,000 or
more in cash. Section 5324(3) makes it illegal, "for the purpose of
evading [these] reporting requirements," to "structure . . . any
transaction," and § 5322(a) states the criminal penalties applicable
to anyone "willfully violating" § 5324(3) and other provisions of
these reporting statutes. Ratzlaf concerned the problem of scienter
under these statutes. Casino employees had driven Ratzlaf from
bank to bank in Reno and Lake Tahoe to facilitate his cash purchase
of $9,500 bank checks to meet his large gambling debt to the casino.
He and they plainly knew that he was structuring his transaction
163The usual maximum sentences under the guidelines would be six months for the mail
offense, one year for possession of cocaine.
'64 114 S Ct 655. Not until her fourth opinion of the Term did Justice Ginsburg succeed
in attracting the concurrence of all her colleagues, although, traditionally, a new Justice's
first assigned opinion has been a unanimous one.
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in order to avoid the reports that would have to be made if he paid
the casino with the cash he at first brought them, or bought larger
bank checks. But the jury was told it did not need to find he knew
that this structuring was unlawful.
Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter in concluding that "willfully violating" entailed
that the government did have to make that showing. That had
been the conclusion the courts of appeals had reached in prior
interpretations of scienter requirements under other provisions of
31 USC referred to by § 5322(a). The majority thought people
would often "structure" cash transactions for reasons other than
giving some hint that they possessed cash from illegal sources-to
hide it, for example, from a divorcing spouse or others who might
be looking for signs of wealth. Both in its attention to general
consistency and in its attention to other factual patterns proposed
interpretations could affect, the majority opinion was unexceptional; arguments from text have the strongest claim in criminal
cases, as it remarked, and here the text, thus illuminated, persuaded it that Congress meant to require knowledge of the unlawfulness of structuring as an element of the offense.
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor and Thomas. With the exception of Justice
Blackmun, the dissenters are among those who during the Term
generally opposed the use of materials and arguments from congressional process. Yet the dissent relied on two process arguments
for its conclusion that knowledge of unlawfulness need not be
shown. First, it argued, § 5324 was enacted after the rest of the
subchapter had been in place for some years, as a direct response
to private structuring of transactions to avoid the desired reporting.
The amendment expresses directly the element of purpose Congress wished to capture. Knowing this history of development,
the dissent argued, undercuts the claim that the umbrella phrase
"willfully violating" of § 5322(a), generally applicable to the subchapter, introduced an unusual requirement of knowledge here.
Second, the dissent reasoned, the legislative history indicates (as
the majority virtually conceded) that Congress meant to require
no more than knowledge of (and purpose to evade) the reporting
requirements. The text ought to be interpreted faithfully to that
history. These are, of course, quite standard arguments. What is
striking is to find these three Justices, perhaps especially Justice
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Thomas, joining an opinion that relies so heavily on the context in
which Congress acted, and on the political history of its particular
actions, as its bases for understanding what Congress has said.
CASES IMPLICATING THE JUDGMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE

V.

AGENCY
A.

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS V
GREENWICH COLLIERIES, INC. AND HAWAIIAN AIRLINES V NORRIS

The question in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
v Greenwich Collieries16 was whether the Department of Labor could
rule for benefit claimants, in cases arising under programs it administered, if the evidence supporting the claim was in equipoise; or,
was the Department statutorily required to assign claimants the
burden of ultimate persuasion (i.e., demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence). Two different programs were involved; under one, the Department had been ruling for claimants if evidence
was equally balanced for more than 50 years; in the other, it had
been doing so for more than 15 years. Since 1946, however, the
Administrative Procedure Act has provided that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the
burden of proof, ' 16 6 and no statutory provision allocated the burden of proof under either benefit program. The question for the
Court was whether this concededly applicable provision precluded
the Department's pro-claimant stance.
The question may not have much practical importance. Since
the "preponderance" test is satisfied by the slightest differences in
proof, equipoise must be an unusual outcome. And presumably
the Department could find other ways to favor claimants in considering the evidence. Yet the issue is harder than a first reading of
the statute might suggest. "Burden of proof," as all the Justices
recognized, is an ambiguous phrase. It might mean the burden of
showing that a claim is plausible-frequently referred to as the
burden of production, of going forward, or of establishing a prima
facie case; or, it could mean the burden of ultimate persuasion.
The Court divided 6-3; its opinions again reflect the contrast between static and developmental approaches to issues of meaning,
and the usual prevalence of the former.
'

114 S Ct 2251 (1994).
USC § 556(d).

'665
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Justice O'Connor, for herself and five others, 16 7 identified the
interpretive task as "ascertain[ing] the ordinary meaning of 'burden
of proof' in 1946, the year the APA was enacted";' 68 ultimately
she concluded that "burden of ultimate persuasion" was what had
been meant. This was not an easy intellectual process, and in it
Justice O'Connor consulted a range of materials rather broader
than those the more formal members of the Court usually seemed
willing to consider-the understanding of "burden of proof" in the
legal community, courts, and commentators in the years leading
up to the APA's passage, and its legislative history before the Congress. Justice Souter's dissent for himself and Justices Stevens and
Blackmun makes a reasonable argument that the majority reached
the wrong result on its own premises, but for our purposes the
more notable characteristic of the majority argument, in this respect, may have been its openness to sources beyond the text for
understanding what Congress had done.
Several developments occurring after 1946 could be thought to
bear on the section's meaning: The programs had been administered under a different understanding for years; for one of them,
the Secretary plausibly claimed to have varied the APA's application by departmental rule, as the governing statute permitted. An
intervening Supreme Court precedent had summarily rejected the
"burden of persuasion" interpretation of § 7(c), remarking with
supporting lower court citation that the section "determines only
the burden of going forward, not the burden of persuasion. "169
Other Supreme Court opinions and a significant body of precedent
in the lower courts built on this understanding. The majority credited none of these developments. It characterized the departmental
rule in question as general in terms; the majority did "not think
this regulation can fairly be read as authorizing the Department's
rule and rejecting the APA's burden of proof provision"17 0 _a
thought that neglected both the frequently expressed obligation
to defer to an agency's interpretations of its own rules17 1 and the
possibility that, at the time, the Secretary might not have thought
she was "rejecting" what the APA provided.
67The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg.

S Ct at 2255.
,6NLRB v TransportationManagement Corp., 462 US 393, 404 n 7 (1983).
170114 S Ct at 2254.
171See ThomasJefferson University v Shalala, discussed in text at p 525.
'6'114
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The majority also put aside the Court's own prior construction
of § 7(c), despite what it acknowledged to be "the importance of
adhering to precedent, particularly in a case involving statutory
' It deprecated
interpretation."172
the prior interpretation as a "cur73
sory conclusion,'
to which limited attention had been given in
the briefs of that case. That conclusion also was in "tension" with
a somewhat earlier Supreme Court interpretation of § 7(c) that had
not mentioned the "burden of persuasion" approach but could be
argued to support it by implication.' 74 The majority did not now
ask, however, whether this "tension" had been generating practical
difficulties; and there appear to have been deficiencies in the
briefing in Greenwich Collieries as well as in the earlier precedent:
As the dissent remarked in a note, 175 none of the parties argued for
overruling the Court's previous decision (one amicus did), and the
lower courts had not considered that issue. Effectively conceding
that the text of § 7(c) could be given either the "burden of persuasion" or the "burden of production" meaning, the only reason the
majority gave for changing the law governing "burden of persuasion" in 1994 is its judgment that this is what Congress likely chose
in 1946.
Justice Souter's dissent also addressed what Congress probably
understood "burden of proof" to mean in 1946, but it was far more
concerned with what the judiciary had done with the phrase since
its adoption. The majority directly discussed only the two post1946 Supreme Court decisions mentioned above, and did so only
to set forth their doctrine. The dissent invoked 28 opinions of the
courts of appeals either addressing the § 7(c) issue or supporting
the application of the Department's rule in benefits claim cases; it
cited as well every major treatise on federal administrative law as
uncritically accepting, indeed supportive of, the "burden of production" interpretation. And it also showed how this "burden of
"72114 S Ct at 2258. Where high stakes and accompanying visibility for the Court's
actions have produced strong pressures around this issue, Justice O'Connor has strongly
asserted the values of stare decisis in statutory matters. Compare the discussion of Patterson,
in the text at page 459 ff, and PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 112 S
Ct 2791 (1992); and see Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 57 (1949).
"' 114 S Ct at 2257.
174
Steadman v SEC, 450 US 91 (1981).

7 114 S Ct at 2263 n 4. Compare the discussion of CentralBank of Denver v First Interstate
Bank of Denver at page 510.
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production" understanding and acceptance of the Department's
rule had worked its way into the Court's own jurisprudence in
other cases not directly presenting the issue. 176
If it were the highly controversial source of continuing debate,
an open-and-shut question, or a matter of large practical significance, one might see a need to readdress an issue apparently put
to rest on an earlier occasion; yet the Court has recently been
attentive to stare decisis in such cases. 177 The burden of proof
issue is none of these, and that makes all the more remarkable the
majority's insouciance about ripping up a fabric of understanding
the Court's actions had contributed to creating. It is not evident
why the considerations underlying stability in law should be less
commanding as to a matter not put forward by the parties and as
to which high social stakes cannot easily be identified. The question
was well settled; the issue was at best debatable even in 1946; and
the only negative consequence the Court suggests arising from the
existing understanding is that it would leave agencies with some
discretion to allocate the burden of persuasion programmatically.
This was, however, discretion they had enjoyed for the preceding
decades without demonstrated inconvenience or confusion, discretion that would be granted by the alternative, permissible understanding of the language Congress employed, and discretion that
would have at best marginal impact on outcomes.178 The result is
to underscore both the formally static quality of the Court's approach and its destabilizing potential. Fundamentally, the majority
was concerned only with determining what the statute had meant
in 1946. Although stare decisis might in some circumstances force
the Court to swallow an intervening "error," the statute would
alvays mean what it had meant on enactment. Common law processes could not work upon it, even within the room concededly
176Id at 2265, discussing Ward's Cove Packing Co. v Antonio, 490 US 642 (1989), and
Mullins Coal Co. v Director, Office of Workers' CompensationPrograms, Dept. of Labor, 484 US
135 (1987), and 114 S Ct at 2266 n 6, listing five cases in which the Court had accepted
allocation of the burden of persuasion on a program-by-program basis, following "customary
reference to statutory text, congressional intent, experience, policy, and relevant evidentiary
probabilities."
177See note 171.

178The majority recognized that presumptions and an administrative attitude of solicitude
for claimants would have the same kind of effect as the proposition that a claimant wins if,
he having satisfied their burden of production, persons opposing their claim fail to persuade
that it should not be granted. At 114 S Ct 2259.
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left open by its text. Understandings and structures that had grown
up in the interim were irrelevant to the Court's task-what the
179
law had effectively become, a house of cards.
While this style was a common one during the Term, as this
essay may suggest, it was not universal. On the same day as Greenwich Collieries, the Court announced a unanimous opinion reflecting
much greater willingness to integrate statutory and decisional materials accumulating over time. HawaiianAirlines v Norris8 ' required
the Court to interpret a provision of the Railway Labor Act, extended to airlines in 1936, that might have preempted state law;
uncontroversially identifying the question as one of congressional
intent, the Court held that it did not. To reach this conclusion,
Justice Blackmun's opinion considers statutory text, legislative history, and-most importantly for these purposes-the course of
judicial opinions from the time of the statute's enactment as well
as the relation of this issue to like issues arising under other statutes. All this appears quite unself-conscious; and it points in a
direction of a unifying test that joins the preemption issue under
the RLA with a similar one that had arisen under the Labor Management Relations Act. "[T]he common purposes of the two statutes, the parallel development of RLA and LMRA pre-emption
law, and the desirability of having a uniform common law of labor
law pre-emption support the application of the [LMRA] standard
181
in RLA cases as well.'
One could hardly imagine a stronger contrast with Greenwich
Collieries. Pre-emption is a question of congressional intent, but
here one finds no suggestion that the issue was fixed as of the RLA's
enactment (or its 1936 extension to airlines); the Court accepts as
consistent with its idea that pre-emption is a matter for legislative
determination, the idea that a test articulated under a different,
later statute is the right one to apply here. It does not require any
evidence of congressional action on, or even thought about, its
application to the RLA. The appropriateness of the courts' creating

179For a recent, somewhat more theoretically inclined approach to these issues, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 L & Contemp Probs 75 (1994).
"o 114 S Ct 2239.
18' Id at 2249 n 9; to somewhat similar effect, see the Court's unanimous opinion in Lividas

v Bradsbaw, 114 S Ct 2068; see also Justice Stevens's opinion for a unanimous Court in
McDermott v Amclyde, 114 S Ct 1461, a strictly common law matter.
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a "unified system of judge-made and statute law .. .by the pro-

cesses of adjudication"' 2 is simply assumed.
The tendency of this approach, as Justice Stone well recognized,
is to promote coherence in law, to induce stability in its administration, to reward expectations, to discourage dispute. To see where
the Greenwich Collieries approach might lead, consider the issue of
standing to challenge administrative actions. This APA issue is
more controversial than "burden of proof"; it is one where the
Court's "error" in departing from 1946 understandings is more
readily shown; and it is one that has larger consequences. Section
10(a) of the APA' 8 ' provided that "A person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial

review thereof." In 1970, the Supreme Court interpreted the italicized language as itself conferring standing on persons concretely
injured by agency action, so long as the injury could reasonably
84
be thought one the underlying statute was concerned to avoid.1
The language can support the 1970 interpretation; that interpretation is strongly consonant with administrative law developments
of the late 1960's and following that emphasized participatory values in administrative process and, in particular, greatly expanded
the claims of those who were the intended beneficiaries (rather than
the intended subjects) of regulation to have a part in administrative
action at all levels. This judicial development was both led 8 ' and
kept in check'86 by the Court; its general course doubtless helps to
explain why the APA has not been significantly amended in the
almost half century since its enactment. The judiciary has kept the
APA more or less in step with developing understandings, as it
has the Constitution and other important texts of general law.
If what Congress would have understood in 1946 controls, the
182Stone,
1835

note 8.
USC 702.

114Association of DataProcessingService Organizationsv Camp, 397 US 150 (1970). From this
perspective, the case adopted for APA review a public law rather than a common law model
of standing, in the interesting terms suggested in Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993
Supreme Court Review 37, 53-62. Sunstein generally criticizes ADAPSO for its misleading
focus on "injury" as if that were independent of law.
185For example, in addition toADAPSO, Abbott Laboratoriesv Gardner, 387 US 136 (1967),
and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971).
'"

Vermont Yankee NuclearPower Corp. v NRDC, 435 US 519 (1978).
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contemporary interpretation of § 10(a) is more clearly in error than
the Department of Labor approach challenged in Greenwich Collieries.187 Where the ambiguity of "burden of proof" was well known
in 1946, no one was asserting a doctrine of generalized standing to
challenge agency actions for citizens intended to have been benefited by regulation and concretely injured by some failure of effort
on an agency's part. Rather, Congress had passed a few particular
statutes for the prominent agencies that explicitly provided participatory rights to persons who would be adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action, and these provisions had been held to
authorize those persons to seek judicial review of agency outcomes
that harmed their interests.188 As it would have been understood
in 1946, § 10(a) incorporated-ratified-this approach to statutes
with "adversely affected or aggrieved" provisions in them. Had a
general, undiscriminating grant been intended, one would expect
to find it articulated and debated; those debates are not to be
found,' 89 and it took a quarter century, until 1970, for that interpretation to emerge. If Congress's likely understanding in 1946 of
the words it employed is entitled to prevail, the following quarter
century's development in administrative law-now on a matter of
large significance-is in the balance.
This Court is deeply concerned with standing issues, a majority
approaching them with a sensibility suggesting they would be
happy for the chance to retrench.' 9 0 Is that what Greenwich Collieries
promises? Perhaps some or all signers of the majority opinion
would find, in the standing context, that correcting the Court's
earlier error in discerning what § 10(a) had meant in 1946 would
have so large an effect on the general fabric of the law that stare
decisis considerations would control. But even that way of putting
187The reader is entitled to know that my name was on the government's brief in
ADAPSO, and that I argued the companion case of Barlow v Collins, 397 US 159 (1970) for
the government; the government opposed standing in both cases. In my judgment, the
Court did not act impermissibly in 1970, although it abandoned 1946 meaning; while it
follows that the 1970 meaning, too, has no claim to permanence, change must be grounded
in the general law and circumstances of 1994, not those of 1946.
188 See Associated Industries of New York State v Ickes, 134 F2d 694 (2d Cir 1943).
89 See The Attorney General'sManual on the Administrative Procedure Act 96 (1947).
'90See Justice O'Connor's in-chambers opinion granting a stay in anticipation of a denial
of standing in INS v Legalization Assistance Project, 114 S Ct 422 (1993); see also Lujan v
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S Ct 2130 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan,
91 Mich L Rev 163 (1992).
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it suggests a significant difference in stance from opinions like Hawaiian Airlines. It would be accompanied by expressions of regret
and acceptance rather than affirmation of a judicial choice among
possible meanings that had been shaped by intervening changes in
law, accepted over time by Congress and by the people.' 9 ' The
Court in 1970 did not seem to imagine the APA as forever tied to
1946, until a later Congress was motivated to change it. The language Congress had used could be read and interpreted in 1970,
within the general framework of law as it had developed to that
point and was developing. One Court acts as Congress's partner
and in the framework of development familiar to the common law;
for the other, judicial development is illegitimate and statutes are
fixed, static events.
B. MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP. V AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH CO. AND NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. V COUNTY OF
KENT, MICHIGAN

In 1934, when the technological constraints imposed by wire
transmission of telephone conversations gave AT&T a natural monopoly of interstate transmission, Congress enacted 47 USC § 203,
requiring the FCC to regulate interstate telephone rates; the same
section permitted the Commission "in its discretion and for good
cause shown, [to] modify any requirement" (emphasis added) of the
section imposing this requirement, except that it could not impose
a longer than 120 day notice period on carriers seeking rate
changes. By the 1970s, the development of microwave and satellite
technologies permitted competition in interstate telephone services
to develop. The same period found many economists and others
vigorously criticizing rate regulation in general as an often inefficient regulatory technique, one that served to create barriers to
entry into otherwise competitive markets and in other ways to keep
the rates the public was charged for services above, rather than
below, what they would naturally be in an unregulated market.
The legal environment, as well, showed a strong deregulatory
trend. Responding to these developments, the FCC used public
rule making gradually to relax and then to eliminate rate-filing
requirements for AT&T's new competitors (the "non-dominant
191Compare the discussion of Patterson, in text at page 459 ff.
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carriers"). In doing so, it relied on its statutory authority to "modify" rate regulation requirements. Congress, sharply cutting back
on rate regulation elsewhere in national regulation, did not alter
the Commission's statutory mandate.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v American Telephone and Telegraph
Co.'92 required the Court to decide whether the FCC's action was
within its authority. The thrust of Justice Scalia's opinion for five
members 193 of the Court was that "modify" does not permit
changes as large as these; Justice Stevens wrote for three 94 in dissent. The opinions were in one respect a duel over the use of
dictionaries; in another, a dispute over the application of the
Court's influential opinion in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 195 describing the courts' appropriate relationship to agency gap-filling on questions of law unresolved by
statute.
The dictionary duel, easily caricatured, was in some respects the
Term's textualist apogee. 196 For Justice Scalia, "modify" necessarily connoted incrementalism, not major change, and he supported
this conclusion with dictionary evidence. The making of minor
changes, without radical transformation, was a meaning dictionaries universally attached to the term. While one major dictionary
had recently also included among its possible definitions "to make
a basic or important change in," he regarded that inclusionrendering "modify" a synonym of "change"-as unpersuasive, one
that served to make the word more ambiguous than it had previously been. Justice Stevens expressed doubt whether dictionaries
should be permitted to "substitute for close analysis of what words
mean as used in a particular statutory context"; 97 he argued that
in the larger context the Commission's changes were only incremental. Since rate filing would still characterize the bulk of interstate tariffs, those of the dominant carrier AT&T, the general pur'9'114 S Ct 2223.
193The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg; Justice O'Connor

did not participate.
194Also Justices Blackmun and Souter.
'9'
467 US 837 (1984).

'96See, e.g., Pierce, cited in note 46, which well illustrates the destabilizing potential;
A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation,
17 HarvJ L & Pub Pol 71 (1994), suggests the limits.
'9' 114 S Ct at 2236.
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pose and effect of the statute would remain intact. And he pointed
out that the FCC's action fit well the earliest and still primary
dictionary meaning of "modify," to limit or reduce in extent or degree. Dictionaries consistently list the "minor change" sense Justice
Scalia relied on after definitions suggesting limitation or reduction.
Justice Scalia's opinion in MCI does not appear as committed as
Justice O'Connor's in Greenwich Collieries to the position that only
direct congressional action can change the meaning of statutes.
When Justice Scalia refers to dictionary definitions current when
the provision became law in 1934, he calls it "perhaps gilding the
lily" but "the most relevant time for determining a statutory term's
meaning";"' "large change" was not in the dictionaries then (although the primary sense of limiting or ameliorating was). Later
he considers and rejects the proposition that subsequent legislative
changes may have signaled congressional approval of the FCC's
position; finding those changes mixed in their implication, he argues that
We have here not a consistent history of legislation to which
one or the other interpretation of the Act is essential; but rather
two pieces of legislation to which first one, and then the other
interpretation of the Act is more congenial. That is not enough
to change anything. 99
"Most relevant" is different from "only"; willingness to consider a
consistent subsequent history implies acceptance that meaning
could change without direct amendment. Yet that change would
have to be ascribable to Congress in some sense; neither the
agency's nor the court's sense of developing social and economic
circumstances, and the supervening structure of law, would authorize a departure from the 1934 understanding.
Perhaps the root issue for Justice Scalia is one of delegation-a
factor that has been important to him in other contexts."' It is not
merely the largeness of the change being effected, but also that
accepting it will entail accepting that an agency can be empowered
to change its mandate. For Justice Stevens, author of striking passages in Chevron strongly endorsing delegation,"' the FCC has "un"I Id at 2230.
191
Id at 2233.

200
Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
201467 US at 843-44 (1984).
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usually broad discretion to meet new and unanticipated problems
in order to fulfill its sweeping mandate"; 2 this power to "modify"
is no different in kind from the Commission's responsibility to
allocate licenses and otherwise act in accordance with "public convenience, interest, or necessity. "'23 Justice Scalia accepts broad delegations only because he cannot imagine a judicially manageable
standard for telling the good from the bad, 2" a handicap he does
not face if he can plausibly construe an agency's authority in a
narrow way. It is revealing in this respect that he never explains
how he concludes that the New Deal Congress that so broadly
empowered all the agencies it created, not just the FCC, intended
here only a narrow grant of authority.
The result, in any event, is essentially formal and text-bound.
Whether the FCC has rightly caught the implications of new market conditions and adapted its regulatory regime to them are not
issues for the Court. "[O]ur estimations, and the Commission's
estimations, of desirable policy cannot alter the meaning of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934 .... [A] whole new regime
of regulation (or of free-market competition) . . .may well be a
better regime but is not the one that Congress established."'2' 5 Of
course, the validity of the "but is not" clause depends on one's
conclusions about the meaning of "modify," one's general estimation of the breadth of authority Congress bestowed on the Commission, and also on one's acceptance or not of agency and/or judicial
authority to follow Congress's lead by using existing text to adapt
law to changing circumstances. In its way, the change worked by
the FCC is no different from what the Court accomplished in Hawaiian Airlines. Looking to the general climate of change, in regulation and in technology, it is hard to imagine that the FCC erred.
The general trend of legislation, the absence of any legislative effort
to correct the Commission, indeed the Commission's dogged persistence in its deregulatory course despite prior discouragement
from the courts-all suggest that this was the right reading. It
was one that both ancient and contemporary understandings of
"modify" would permit. The insistence that Congress unmistak202 114 S Ct at 2234.
203Id at 2239 n 7.
2"4Mistretta, cited in note 200, 488 US at 415 ff.
20 114 S Ct at 2233.
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ably act tends, again, to deny the coherence-building judicial
function.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v County of Kent, Michigan06 provides a
contrast with MCI that is not as strong as that between Greenwich
Collieries and HawaiianAirlines, but that is nonetheless suggestive.
The case concerned the legality of airport user fees under both a
federal statute, the Anti-Head Tax Act, 0 7 and the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. The AHTA flatly forbids states and their subdivisions from taxing persons traveling in
air commerce, their carriage, or the gross receipts derived from the
sale of air transportation; but as explicitly permits other forms of
tax, such as property or net income tax, and, of particular importance to this litigation, also permits "collecting reasonable rental
charges, landing fees, and other service charges from aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities." The issue the parties presented
was the application of this permission to particular use charges
imposed on commercial aviation by a Michigan airport; Justice
Ginsburg concluded for all but Justice Thomas20 8 that, applying a
judicial test developed in the Commerce Clause context, the fees
were "reasonable."
The contrast with MCI is provided by the possibility that an
agency-in this case, the Department of Transportation's Federal
Aviation Administration-might initially have assessed whether
the fees were reasonable or not. The airlines challenging the reasonableness of Kent's charges might have initiated an action before the
FAA, but did not, choosing instead to invoke a private right of
action in district court. The Court might have decided that no such
right of action was to be implied from the AHTA; but that question was not jurisdictional, the Court ruled, and the posture of the
case made it otherwise unavailable. Similarly, the Court might
have decided that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required the
district court to have referred the matter to the FAA for decision;
again, the parties had failed to raise this issue." 9 In bypassing
the second of these issues, the Court signaled its preference for
...114 S Ct 855.
.07
49 USC App § 1513.
2"o
Justice Blackmun did not participate.
209See New England Legal Foundation v MassacbusettsPort Authority, 883 F2d 157 (1st Cir
1989), cited by the Court, 114 S Ct at 863 n 11.
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administrative treatment-recognizing that courts "are scarcely
equipped to oversee [such questions] without the initial superintendence of a regulatory agency," reciting the advantages of national
administration, and promising Chevron deference "[i]f we had the
benefit of the Secretary's reasoned decision." This strongly voiced
preference to have an agency give initial voice to what is "reasonable" and promise of deference to its views-perhaps the most
forceful Chevron statement of the Term21°-contrasts with the
Court's refusal to accept agency views of the undefined "modify"
21
in MCI.
That contrast is underscored by Justice Thomas's lone dissent;
he argued that "reasonable" failed to set a judicially administrable
standard under the statute, so that the permissibility or not of the
exactions in question could be decided only under the dormant
Commerce Clause-an issue not developed in the case, and so
requiring remand.2 12 In its insistence that Congress create an administrable standard other than the "common law" standard the
Court had developed under the dormant Commerce Clause, his
opinion appears to reflect delegation concerns such as also seem to
underlie MCI; it is hard for him to imagine "such unbridled discretion" for the Secretary. 213 Again, we see that, for him, what judges
can do as a matter of their separately judicial capacity appears to
be quite different from, and also completely isolated from, what
they may do in the administration of statutes. If this is not a concern for the Justices of the MCI majority, perhaps that is because
"modify" can be cabined in ways "reasonable" cannot; 214 or because
the authority to say what is "reasonable" or not, however broad,
is not authority to define one's own scope of regulation and so does
raise delegation concerns in the same way. The Court's recognition
210See Merrill, cited in note 41.

211And also the agency views in the next discussed case, City of Chicago v Envirnomental
Defense Fund, 114 S Ct 1588 (1994).
2.2Justice Thomas's argument in part reflected the origin of the AHTA in congressional
disapproval of a Supreme Court opinion-the source of many of the statutes interpreted in
the cases discussed in this essay. Neither he nor his colleagues, in this case, directed attention
to the political or administrative history of the statute as an indicator of meaning, however.
213 114 S Ct at 870 (Thomas dissenting). Compare Justice Thomas's unwillingness to
accept a vague regulation as establishing law in ThomasJefferson University v Shalala, discussed
at p 526.
214See Antonin Scalia,JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 Duke
LJ 511, 521; cf Harrisv Forklift, discussed in note 71.
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of potential partnership and of the agency's responsibility nonetheless stands in some contrast with MCI.
C. CITY OF CHICAGO V ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND

City of Chicago v EnvironmentalDefense Fund215 required interpretation of an amendment to a complex statute made in response
to issues that had arisen in the course of its administration. The

amendment had been promptly understood in a particular way by
the agency responsible for the statute, a consideration that in the
past has often been regarded as probative by courts attempting to
decide for themselves questions of statutory meaning. In this case,
however, the Court took a textualist view that essentially ignored
the implications of political history and administrative signaling for
judicial understanding.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)
created a much more stringent regulatory scheme for "hazardous"
than for "nonhazardous" wastes. Those who generate hazardous
waste are subject to handling, record-keeping, storage, and monitoring requirements;2"6 the owners and operators of hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs)are subject to considerably more stringent regulation. 17 RCRA does not itself identify
which wastes are "hazardous," but authorizes the Environmental
Protection Administration to do so by regulation.21 Since 1980,
EPA's regulations have provided that household waste and the resi-

dues of its incineration in power generation plants are not "hazardous
wastes," even though a small portion of that waste stream (such as
discarded batteries) would ordinarily be regarded as hazardous waste
and even though the ash resulting from incineration, as a result,
might if tested have met the ordinary definitions of "hazardous
waste." 219 About 150 cities have been availing themselves of this exemption, including Chicago; Chicago's municipal incinerator gener21s114 S Ct 1588 (1994).
216See

42 USC § 6922; 40 CFR pt 262 (1993).
42 USC §§ 6924-25, 40 CFR pt 264 (1993).
218Hazardous wastes are regulated under Schedule C of the Act, 42 USC § 6921-34,
nonhazardous wastes under Schedule D, 42 USC §§ 6941-49; EPA's authority to designate
matters as hazardous or not appears in 42 USC § 6921(a).
21940 CFR 261.4(bXl). If, for example, lead or cadmium batteries formed part of the
27

household waste stream, the lead or cadmium content of incinerator ash might exceed the
EPA standards of concentration and solubility.
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ates over 100,000 tons of ash annually, which it has been disposing
of at landfills not licensed to receive hazardous wastes.
The 1980 regulation, however, did not exempt incinerator ash
from household waste if (1) the incinerator also processed any industrial waste, and (2) the resulting ash met the usual tests of
hazardousness. The exemption could be withheld even if all the
added industrial waste itself was not "hazardous." 2 0 This created
a somewhat anomalous situation, since the ash from a mixture of
household waste and nonhazardous industrial waste would presumably be more dilute than ash from the household waste alone. In
1984, Congress amended RCRA by adding § 3001(i). 22 ' Entitled
the "clarification of household waste exclusion," § 3001(i) provided
that "a resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass
burning of municipal solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating,
storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes" even if,
inter alia, it also burns "solid waste from commercial or industrial
sources that does not contain hazardous waste" (emphasis added).
EPA interpreted the new provision to ratify its regulation and eliminate the possible anomaly; thus, addition of nonhazardous industrial waste to the household waste stream would not threaten the
"nonhazardous" characterization of the resulting ash, whatever its
actual chemical content. The Chicago incinerator now includes
some nonhazardous commercial waste in its operations.
In 1988, the Environmental Defense Fund brought a citizen's
action under RCRA alleging that Chicago was in violation of its
obligations respecting the "hazardous waste" it was generating.
The city asserted its exemption under the EPA regulation and
subsequent statute, and EPA supported the city's view. If "hazardous" means hazardous, the exemption Chicago relied upon is not
very attractive. To be sure, the degree of hazard presented by
municipal incinerator ash may be slight compared to more concentrated sources; further, mixing in ash from nonhazardous industrial
sources will dilute the household waste product. Nonetheless, hazards are being generated. And one imagines that the legislative
exemption for municipal facilities had its source in politics and the
220Whether this actually happened is doubtful. The Court was informed that that EPA
has "never contended that the acceptance of nonhazardous commercial waste subjected any
of [the facilities] to regulation." 114 S Ct at 1598 n 10 (Stevens dissenting).
22142 USC § 6921(i).
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realities of municipal economics, rather than scientific judgment
about comparative risk. The question for the Court was whether,
contrary to EPA's views, Chicago's waste was subject to hazardous
waste regulation to any degree.
Justice Scalia wrote for seven justices, all butJustices Stevens and
O'Connor, finding that Chicago must be regulated as a generator if
its ash met the physical standards for "hazardous waste," although
not as a TSDF. Central to his analysis was the conjunction of four
textual observations: first, hazardous and nonhazardous wastes are
sharply distinguished in RCRA, with elaborate attention paid to protection of the environment from the ultimate disposition of the former; second, regulation of hazardous wastes and regulation of those
who may come in contact with them are distinct subjects, and §
3001(i)'s exemption is directed to the facility producing the ash and
not to the ash itself; third, those who merely generate hazardous
waste are subject to much less stringent regulation under RCRA than
those who subsequently "treat[], stor[e], dispose[e] of, or otherwise
manag[e]" it; and, finally, the text of the 1984 amendment omits the
word "generation." One can then construct a rational legislative
judgment: municipal incinerators should be relieved of the stringent
regulation attaching to those who "treat[, etc.,]" but since their processes may generate what is in fact "hazardous waste," the incinerators
are subject to the less stringent regulatory regime governing generators and-most important-the ash they produce, if it has the physical
characteristics of "hazardous waste," must be disposed of in hazardous waste facilities.
Considered independently of the amendment's political and administrative history, this is a credible, integrated reading of its text.
The statute's dominating purpose to protect the public from the
long-term consequences of carelessness in handling materials that
threaten the environment is advanced, not merely acknowledged,
by a reading that treats § 3001(i) as speaking to how Chicago is to
be regulated under the law, rather than how the ash it produces
shall be. Justice Stevens's response to the argument at this textual
level was plausible, but not commanding: "Clarification of hazardous waste exclusion," the amendment's tide, is directed to the exclusion of materials from the category "hazardous waste," not to
the exclusion of processors from being regulated. Moreover, Chicago could be "generating" hazardous waste only if its municipal
waste stream is not hazardous; but as a description of the physical
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sitation, if the ash is hazardous, so must the predecessor waste
stream be. Finally, reading that Chicago is not to be treated as
"disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation," recipients of the ash would normally conclude
they had not received "hazardous wastes." "[I]f we are to be guided
only by the literal meaning of the statutory text," Justice Stevens
wrote, "we must either give effect to the broad definition of hazardous waste generation and subject all municipal incinerators that
generate hazardous ash to [the more stringent forms ofi regulation
(including those that burn pure household waste) or give effect to
the exclusion that applies equally to pure household waste and
mixtures that include other nonhazardous wastes." '222 On the text
alone, however, and with an eye to the larger purpose of the statute, this does not seem an untoward result. Incinerators that produce physically hazardous ash will be responsible to see that it is
handled by persons capable of doing so.
However strong the majority's reading might be as a construction of § 3001(i) in the abstract, it bore no resemblance to the
administration RCRA had received from the outset, well before its
1984 amendment by § 3001(i), to the expectations expressed (and
natural to suppose) at the time of that amendment, or to the treatment it had subsequently received. Justice Scalia was uninterested,
however, whether his was the actuallegislative judgment Congress
had reached in a political sense:
The plain meaning of this language is that ... the facility[] is
not subject to [the more extensive] regulation as a facility that
treats, stores, disposes of, or manages hazardous waste. The
provision quite clearly does not contain any exclusion for the
ash itself.2
While a Senate committee report, the only available legislative evidence as to meaning, had described the exemption in terms that
explicitly included "generation," 224 that language was missing from
the statute.
[I]t is the statute, and not the Committee Report, which is the
authoritative expression of the law, and the statute prominently
222114 S Ct at 1598.
2"3Id
224S

at 1591.
Rep No 98-284, p 61 (1983), cited at 1593.
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omits reference to generation. . . . The incineration here is
exempt from [the more stringent form of] regulation,
but sub2s
ject to regulation as hazardous waste generation.
It was irrelevant that EPA had consistently excused these munici-

pal facilities and their ash stream from hazardous waste regulation,
before as well as after the 1984 amendments; or that the amendment's history reflects not disapproval of that practice but rather

(as its title suggests) the purpose to clarify and extend the exception
EPA had developed. Whatever the regulation had been, the statutory text now exempted the cities only from TSDF regulation; if
their ash met the physical standards, they were now generators
of "hazardous waste"-whether or not they mixed nonhazardous
commercial waste into their waste streams. In effect, Justice Scalia
reasoned, the amendment disapproved the EPA regulation. 2 6 Any
thought of deference to EPA's interpretation fell before the observation that "the most reliable guide for [reconciling the diverse
purposes of legislation] is the enacted text. Here that requires us
to reject the Solicitor General's plea for deference to the EPA's
interpretation, which goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity
2 27
§ 3001(i) contains."

While it is tempting to discuss here the misleading treatment the
legislative history had in the majority's hands,228 the opinion's ma25 Id at 1593.
226 Id. The EPA history was dismissed in a footnote reserving "opinion as to the validity

of EPA's household waste generation regulation as applied to resource recovery facilities
before the effective date of § 3001(i)." Id at n 4.
227Id at 1594. See Antonin Scalia,JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law,
1989 Duke LJ 511, 521.
228In the only explanation of § 3001(i) available to Congress, the Senate Committee Report
had used the word "generation," that was not to be found in the statute. S Rep No 98-284,
p 61 (1983), cited at 1593. The majority wrote as if the question about legislative history
were whether the single mention of the word in the report could, in the abstract, make up
for its absence from the statutory text. As in Shannon v United States, discussed at page 471,
one would agree that it could not; but, also as there, the argument is a straw person.
The argument from the legislative history is that the statute had been receiving a certain
interpretation-established, known, relied upon by 150 cities that might be affected by the
amendment. Were there indications that anyone thought Congress might be moving to
increase EPA's regulation of municipal incinerators and their waste streams-a matter one
might suppose would draw fire-much less that that was an announced purpose of the
changes? Justice Stevens's argument is that what is in the legislative history, like the name
Congress "significantly" attached to its action, "Clarification of household waste exclusion,"
confirms that its members had expansion rather than retraction of the existing exemption
in view. "A commonsense reading of the statutory text in light of the Committee Report
and against the background of the 1980 regulation reveals an obvious purpose to preserve, not
to change, the existing rule. The majority's refusal to attach significance to 'a single word
in a committee report' reveals either a misunderstanding of, or a lack of respect for, the
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jor significance for the predictability and stability of law in an
administrative state, in my judgment, lies in its withdrawal of attention from the elements of continuity and responsibility in regulatory regimes-in Justice Scalia's attitude toward the history over
time of RCRA's provisions and EPA's administration of them.
Over half a century ago, and in the same breath as it described the
interpretation of statutes in justiciable controversies "[a]s exclusively a judicial function," the Supreme Court recognized in United
States v American Trucking Association229 at least three conventional
reasons for a court to consider a responsible agency's interpretations in reaching its own conclusions about meaning:
in any case such interpretations are entitled to great weight.
This is peculiarly true . . . where the interpretations involve
"contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged
with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of
making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are
yet untried and new." Furthermore .... [agency] interpretation
gains much persuasiveness [if it is] the fact that it was the
[agency]30 which suggested the provisions' enactment to Congress.2

That is, as of 1940, three propositions were well established: First,
the agency is an expert reader of its statute and consequently its
reading is some evidence of what Congress did. Second, when the
agency is a prompt reader as well, the likelihood that it has understood Congress is increased; the absence of an immediate challenge
or controversy both confirms that belief and contributes to establishing community expectations about legal requirements, enhancing "efficient[] and smooth[]" implementation. Finally, as a participant in the drafting process (and the subject of oversight discipline
as well), an agency is well placed to know what legislation is to
achieve. Note that the American Trucking Association Court's focus
here was on accurate judicial interpretation, not on reasons why a
court has to accept an agency's reading of an ambiguous statute
once it has concluded that its meaning is not clear (Chevron's "step
function of legislative committees. . . . What makes the Report significant is not the single
word 'generation,' but the unmistakable intent to maintain an existing rule of law." 114 S
Ct at 1597 and n 7 (emphasis supplied; the last two sentences quoted are from a footnote
appended to the first sentence quoted). Compare SEC v Collier, 76 F2d 939 (2d Cir 1935)
(L. Hand, J).
229 310 US 534 (1940).
230Id at 549.
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two"). Like other elements of the political process that can help a
court form a context in which to understand the language Congress
employed, these considerations are elements that enter into the
court's own initial assessment of the statute, numbered among the
"traditional tools of statutory interpretation"23' a court is to deploy
at Chevron's step one. In abandoning these aids to its own interpretation of that text, in my judgment, the Court significantly undercut the general stability of law.
Such an accusation warrants a few paragraphs' further explication, which should begin by acknowledging that change and stability are both ends of the law. Judicial administration of law must
always mediate the threat that interpretations, of necessity backward-looking, will defeat expectations engendered before they occur. As law and legal institutions have become more prolix and
more complex over time, however, the point at which the courts
will finally speak has been delayed, and the possibility of ultimate
judicial resolution has become much more remote.232 Expectations
will have been generated, and people will have had to act, without
waiting on the courts. The courts have developed a variety of
means for encouraging and maintaining expectation. While textualist approaches are supported in just these terms, the questions of
responsibility these developments raise and their implications, as
in City of Chicago, have not been clearly faced.
Within the traditional framework of common law, understanding
the importance of reliance on current understandings has made
courts chary of overrulings or even sudden departures from received traditions of analysis. Changes are constructed out of movements and trends already in place; few new rules or overrulings
occur which counsel could not see looming in possibility. Statutes
present harder issues in this respect-they do not have their source
"'

Cbevron, 467 US at 843 n 9; see in this respect the Court's well-regarded opinion in

Skidmore v Swift & Co., 323 US 134 (1944), detailing the elements of agency interpretation

that, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigantsmay properly resort
for guidance." Id at 140 (emphasis added). The resort by litigants-that is, by members of
the public-occurs early in a process that may never reach the judiciary; it is encouraged
by Congress, and tends to produce uniformity and acceptance of sensible administration.

Justice Jackson's invocation of this reliance in Skidmore was hardly accidental or incidental,
but a reaffirmation of the designedly central role of agencies in statutes under administration.
...
See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty CasesPer Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court'sLimited ResourcesforJudicialReview of Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093 (1987).
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in judicial reasoning, and often enough have been passed in reaction
to rather than support of judicial development of law. The challenge for the courts, seemingly met in the first half of this century,
was to transcend a resulting sense of struggle with the legislatures
and find means of interpretation that tended to correspond with
expectations induced by the fact of passage. Courts were not interpreting statutes in the abstract, but in the midst of continuing
growth and change in a legal community with ends in view and
expectations about the results being produced. Putting aside for
the moment the reasonable arguments that can be made of how
well the legislative history tools developed for achieving these ends
can still succeed in the face of changes in the legislative process,
one can see how judicial attention to the political context as well
as the text of legislation will have an effect similar to attention to
precedent in the common law context, in bringing judicial decisions
into line with social and professional expectations about what statu233
tory text means.
The administrative agency is in many respects a competitor with
the courts in the formation both of public policy, and of public
and professional expectations about law's course. Often enough,
assignment of matters to administrative agencies amounts to a declaration of distrust in the judiciary's ability or disposition to manage
the work entailed. As a practical matter, their creation means that
citizens and lawyers look to agencies in the first instance for their
understanding of law's demands. Judicial speaking to the same issues is significantly postponed-they must run the agency gauntlet
first. People must arrange their affairs-decide, for example,
whether to construct a municipal incinerator-and cannot afford
to wait the five years or more it may require to get a judicial
reading. The system of law requires some general confidence that
ultimate judicial results will match the expectations generated today, on the basis of which such plans are, as they must be, made.
Promoting that reliance is, itself, a part of the legislative scheme.
And one can see without difficulty how elements such as the Court
identified in American Trucking Association contribute to that continuity-they tend to match judicial outcomes to the predictable
expectations of the community subject to the agency's jurisdiction.
233The argument is intended to concede that text is the primary source of understanding,
but not that text should be read in ignorance of its provenance.
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They accommodate the courts to the agency's presence and contribution, just as attention to political history accommodated courts
to the emergence of statutes as the dominant mode of law creation.
A judiciary that refuses to educate itself in the historical, political,
and administrative context from which it emerged invites disappointing expectations the public naturally has. The arbitrariness
of the outcomes, in relation to the process that generated them,
invites clever argument and gaming as well; and the judiciary,
with fewer colors to its palette, will inevitably produce surprising
234
outcomes.
The textualist response is that Congress and the agencies, understanding that the judiciary will limit itself to the statutory text,
will respond with clearer expressions. Here again we touch a large
literature of debate about the perfectibility of expression that is not
necessary to repeat. Regarding the agency contribution, however,
it may be appropriate to add these thoughts: First, the problem
with statutes today is rarely that they are too terse, but the opposite. Many ascribe that to Congress's interaction with the agencies-its wish to see them well-instructed. Courts are not necessarily performing a public service, or generating more readily
predictable outcomes, in encouraging Congress to be more verbose. 235 Second, inviting the agencies to rely on text alone, disregarding political background and understanding, will if successful
destabilize agency administration, which is even more subject to
political pressures than are the courts. 236 Third, it is hard to imagine that such an invitation would be consistently acted upon, given
the different settings in which agencies and courts work. Finally,
and most important in my judgment, the turn to text, even if
the agencies make it, still delegitimizes their role and defeats the
possibility of justified reliance on their actions. Absent some principles like those of American Trucking, principles wholly missing in
City of Chicago, the agencies' efforts with the text will be no more
than an interesting prelude to the judiciary's reading. They will not
contribute to the generation of law; the incentives these principles
provide against litigation will drop away. And, in this way, the
231See Merrill (cited in note 41), 72 Wash U L Q at 372.
235See Lieber, quoted in note 33.
236Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read:
Agency Interpretationand the Problem of LegislativeHistory, 66 Chi Kent L Rev 321 (1990).
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courts' work in the middle part of this century, accommodating
themselves to agencies' as they had to statutes' intrusions on their
work of law administration, will have been discarded.
The central point here is that the textualist, static approach denies the conversational, evolutionary character of the congressionalagency relationship. In relation to private conduct, judges have no
difficulty in accepting such realities. Thus, Justice Scalia uttered
the epigram of this essay in concurring with an otherwise unanimous opinion (the opinion, otherwise uninteresting here, turned
on a Treasury Department regulation requiring the disclaimer of
a trust interest within a "reasonable time" of the interest's creation,
to escape gift tax):
The justification for the "reasonable time" limitation must, as
always, be a textual one. It consists, in my view, of the fact
that the failure to make a reasonably prompt disclaimer of a
known 237
bequest is an implicit acceptance. Qui tacet, consentire

videtur.

Acceptance of the same "textual" justification to govern the closely
watched behavior of federal agencies (and courts) administering
federal statutes would have led to different results here and in
many other cases.
We can perhaps imagine why Justice Scalia might argue that
Congress's behavior cannot be treated in the same fashion as the
taxpayer who failed to disclaim. Under the Constitution, Congress
legislates only by the action of both houses with presentment to
the President. Its silence cannot create legislation. This may be
conceded. It only carries the day as an argument, however, if one
also holds that the courts and the agencies are not also authorized
to make law-to fill in gaps as well as to interpret-in partnership
with Congress. That is the move, the radical segregation of the
legislative from the judicial and administrative enterprise, the denial of joint effort, that is the engine of these opinions. Otherwise,
we do not have to say that Congress by silence has amended the
statute, as self-evidently it has not; rather, we say that the congressional silence (along with other factors) arms the interpretation that,
like their other work, courts are adopting in their own right, attempting as best they can to pursue "the ideal of a unified system
237United States v Irvine, 114 S Ct 1473, 1483 (1994).
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of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by the
processes of adjudication.""23 In the context of their common law
responsibilities, courts fill in gaps; in exercising delegated power,
agencies do so as well. The proposition that they are disabled from
doing so in dealing with legislation, far from obvious, is not just a
reaction to recent excesses; it defeats the last century of American
law.
Wouldn't one want at least to see the full course of RCRA's
administration on this issue and how EPA understood both the
initial statute and its 1984 amendment by § 3001(i)-and see them
reflected, as well, elsewhere than in the single case before the
Court? The result the City of Chicago majority reached may be
better policy, in the abstract, than any observer could reasonably
have thought Congress accomplished in 1984 (though one would
want to know something about just how terrible the hazardous
waste problem is, what municipal waste ashes probably contribute,
and what expenses the majority's position will impose). But nothing we know suggests that it was the policy Congress sought to
implement; and every political instinct tells us that, if that policy
had been appreciated as the amendment's aim, it would have been
fully discussed. Indeed, to assume that the drafter of the amendment's text knew it meant what the Court majority insisted it could
only mean, is to tell this story as an abuse of legislative process,
as one in which clever staff and lobbyists (in this case, for the EDF)
put one over on their bosses. The bureaucratic character of today's
Congress reflects itself in gargantuan texts no member has read, as
well as in the materials of legislative history 239 -and will, the more
so, with judicial encouragements to prolixity. The result here is
strictly the Court's contribution; "the text requires it," a facade.
D. CENTRAL BANK OF DENVER V FIRST INTERSTATE
BANK OF DENVER

Greenwich Collieries,24° MCI,24 ' and City of Chicago all find reflec242
tions in Central Bank of Denver v First Interstate Bank of Denver.
238Stone, work cited in n 8.

...
Compare Blanchardv Bergeron, 489 US 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia concurring).
4 Discussed in text following p 486.
241Discussed in text following p 493.
242114 S Ct 1439 (1994).
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Here the issue concerned the meaning of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.243 Section 10(b) makes it "unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, . . . to use or employ [in security
trading] . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe." Central Bank, in its role as trustee on indentures issued
by a Colorado public authority to finance real property under development, arguably had aided and abetted the Authority's and
the developer's violation of § 10(b). First Interstate, harmed in the
financial fallout of the violations, sued Central Bank along with
those directly responsible for the fraud. It invoked the private remedy given by SEC Rule 10b-5 24 on the basis of this conduct "aiding
and abetting" the underlying fraud. "Hundreds of judicial and ad245
ministrative proceedings in every circuit in the federal system"
had previously found that § 10(b)'s prohibition on the "use" of a
device reached the secondary aiding and abetting of violations, both
in connection with SEC enforcement actions and in Rule 10b-5
suits. In the lower courts, narrower questions were disputed:
whether this secondary liability extended to indenture trustees who
had violated none of their obligations under state law; whether the
aider and abettor must have been reckless, not merely negligent.
In Justice Stevens's characterization, Central Bank, the defendant
in the action and the petitioner before the Court, "assumed the existence of a right of action against aiders and abettors, and sought
review only of. . . [these] subsidiary questions .... But instead
of simply addressing the questions presented by the parties, on
which the law really was unsettled, the Court sua sponte directed
the parties to address [the existence or not of the right of action,]
a question on which even the petitioner thought the law was settled, and reaches out to overturn a most considerable body of precedent. 2 46
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, and Thomas that the text of § 10(b), as enacted in 1934
and not since amended, could not support private (Rule 10b-5)
liability for "aiding and abetting." After noting that the question
243 15

USC § 78j.

244 17

CFR § 240.10b-5 (1993).

245 114 S Ct at 1456 (Stevens dissenting) (emphasis in original).
246Id

at 1457 (emphasis in original).
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had been open since the Court had signaled its doubts in the mid1970's, he turned to the meaning of § 10(b), on which "the text of
the statute" controls. For him, it was "uncontroversial" that the
text "does not itself reach those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation.
... [T]hat conclusion resolves the case.... We cannot amend the
statute to create liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the statute."247 At greater
length, he also explained why a court should reach the same result
even if the statute did not resolve the case: Congress in 1934 had
shown no inclination to attach "aiding and abetting" liability in
those cases in which it expressly created private causes of action
under the securities law. Neither the general criminal provision
on aiding and abetting,2 4 nor any other source, show a general
congressional purpose to establish aiding and abetting as a basis
for civil liability associated with federal statutes. The 1934 Congress could not be thought to have accepted such liability as an
anticipatable offshoot of general tort principles. And, finally, no
post-1934 amendments to securities legislation spoke directly to the
aiding and abetting question. Justice Kennedy noted that Congress
had failed in the late 1950's to enact proposed legislation that would
have made such liability explicit, and then, after the SEC and the
courts developed that liability in the course of decision, failed to
correct it; he thought neither silence persuasive. Finally, he concluded, policy considerations advanced by the SEC "cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the Act ....
[l]t is far from clear that Congress in 1934 would have decided that
the statutory purposes would be furthered by the imposition of
private aider and abettor liability."249
Thus, the static character of statutory law, which courts (and
agencies) do not influence, is once again a dominant theme of the
majority. The questions are what was in the statute in 1934, what
attitude or understanding the Congress of 1934 might have had to
.47
Id at 1448.
'4' 18 USC § 2.
249 114 S Ct at 1454 (emphasis added). The majority appears not to have been indifferent
to policy considerations; Justice Kennedy's opinion makes clear that he was aware of the
argument that American liability principles, as they had developed, might be making it
harder for "newer and smaller companies ... to obtain advice from professionals." Id at
1454. But the Court's rhetorical position was not that a change in course might now be
warranted; rather, it was that the SEC and private plaintiffs had, from the beginning, been
relying upon absent authority.
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private causes of action or secondary liability, and the like. One
can argue, as Justice Stevens does in his dissent (joined by Justices
Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg), whether the majority has correctly assessed the likely stance of Congress in 1934; Justice Kennedy makes it far more conservative and chary of administrative
innovation than most historians would likely ascribe to the early
New Deal Congress. But that is secondary to the static quality of
the analysis generally-its hostility both to the idea of meaning
evolving over time, and to ascribing significance to agency administration. The SEC's views on policy are equated with those a private
party might advance; they are calls on the Court for discretionary
action, rather than a reflection of assigned responsibility. Indeed,
while the opinion states that it only concerns private liability under
Rule 10b-5-a subject to which the Court has been increasingly
hostile in recent years-its reasoning limns the permissible meaning of § 10(b), which the SEC enforces directly. The plain implication, as the dissent points out, is that the SEC can no longer bring
enforcement actions based on aiding and abetting.25 ° Given this
reasoning, it is remarkable that the Court fails directly to confront
either the SEC's authority or the implications to be drawn from
the SEC's continuous pursuit of such actions under congressional
oversight.2 5 '
For the dissent, in contrast, the central idea is the importance
of respecting the shape § 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) has assumed over
time. "While we have reserved decision on the legitimacy of the
theory in two cases that did not present it, all 11 Courts of Appeals
to have considered the question have recognized a private cause of
action against aiders and abettors .. .""' Justice Stevens might
have added that the reservations were expressed in 1976 and 1977;
the following 18 years of administration of the rule, without con250Compare the following from Skidmore, cited in note 231, describing reasons why
courts should conform their interpretations in private actions to those an agency was seeking
publicly to enforce: "Good administration of the Act and good judicial administration alike
require that the standards of public enforcement and those for determining private right
shall be at variance only when justified by very good reasons." 323 US at 140. Skidmore, of
course, was reasoning in the opposite direction; from the agency's public authority rather
than to conclusions what it must be.
25! As previously noted, the opinion does consider the implications of proposals to Congress, and of failures to amend § 10(b) when other provisions were changed. The point here
is the different one developed in the text following p 504-that during these years a body
Congress had appointed to act as its agent had consistently been behaving in a certain way,
and Congress had shown no disposition to correct it.
25 114 S Ct at 1456.
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gressional reaction to the signal thus given, suggest solidified consensus, not continuing doubt, about the underlying position. "A
policy of respect for consistent judicial and administrative interpretations leaves it to elected representatives to assess settled law and
to evaluate the merits and demerits of changing it."253 Here, Justice
Stevens appended a footnote noting prior congressional correction
of the Supreme Court's recent overruling of settled securities lawstrongly suggesting that here, as in Landsgraf and Rivers, 25 4 the
Court has been battling with Congress rather than implementing
its decisions. "[W]e should .. .be reluctant to lop off rights of
action that have been recognized for decades, even if the judicial
methodology that gave them birth is now out of favor ...particu-

larly.., because the judicially recognized right in question accords
with the longstanding construction of the agency Congress has
assigned to enforce the securities laws." 255 From a perspective treating Congress as a constant monitor of evolving agency and judicial
interpretations, subsequent congressional actions spoke more
loudly of acquiescence to Justice Stevens than to Justice Kennedy.
Justice Stevens's principal point was that the statute's meaning
in 1934 was not limiting, if one could today find in its terms support for the approach that had been taken. That support is provided
by the statute's reference to persons who "directly or indirectly"
use manipulative devices, and by the usual openness of common
law courts to building liability on such foundations as the criminal
law's general extension of liability to aiders and abettors. As he
had in his dissent from Patterson years earlier,2 56 Justice Stevens
ended his dissent by invoking Benjamin Cardozo's The Nature of
the Judicial Process. The majority's refusal "to build upon a 'secure
foundation

. . .

laid by others,' ,257 is in the service of instability

and, one might add, politicization in American law.
E. NLRB V HEALTH CARE & RETIREMENT CORP. OF AMERICA

Readers who have reached this point will not doubt my unhappiness with the Term's developments. They may have questions
"5 Id at 1458.
254Discussed in text following p 454.
25 114 S Ct at 1460.
Text at n 99 above.
256
257 114 S Ct at 1460.
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about the fairness of my summarizing of what are, of necessity
at the Court's level, complex issues and arguments. Surely my
impatience has inflected my tone. Surely it has, although my effort
has been to present the Justices' arguments in their own termsbelieving this tree should fall of its own weight, and rhetorical
distortion would be a disservice to my effort. In any event, the
majority opinion in this workaday NLRB case may help to quell
the suspicion that I am the one supplying the tone toward legislative effort that sometimes marks these pages.
As part of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress adopted two
definitions of who might and might not be a statutory "employee"
eligible to organize that appear to be in considerable tension with
one another. Section 2(3) expressly excludes from the category "employee" any individual employed as a "supervisor,"' 258 and § 2(11)
defines a supervisor as a person having "authority, in the interest
of the employer," to perform a variety of tasks in relation to other
employees, including the authority to "assign," "responsibly to direct," or "effectively to recommend" such action, if it "requires the
use of independent judgment. '259 Section 2(12), on the other hand,
expressly includes as statutory "employees". "professional employees," persons whose work involves "the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance."' 2 60 Professionals' "exercise of discretion and judgment" very often includes giving
assignments to other employees and directing their performance to
some extent; the reader imagining the work of a lawyer in a public
defender's office, for example, will easily see how this must be
so. One has, then, an inevitable issue of characterization, whether
professionals are excluded supervisors or included employees, on
particular facts.
In NLRB v Health Care & Retirement Corp. ofAmerica,26 1 the Court
was reviewing the Labor Board's assessment of this issue for staff
nurses working at nursing homes. On the one hand, the nurses are
clearly professionals; on the other, management staff was on hand
only during normal weekday business hours, and during the rest
of the week-that is, the substantial majority of a nursing home's
...
29 USC § 152(3).
29 29 USC § 152(1 1).
26029

USC § 152(12).

261 114 S Ct 1778 (1994).
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operating hours-the nurses on duty had immediate charge of the
larger number of nurses aides. The aides were the ones more likely
to deal directly with patients on routine matters; they required
assignment and oversight; and their conduct might have to be reported for consideration of praise or discipline. This of course was
not a new issue in 1994. The Board's consistent position has been
that these nurses are "professional employees" and are not "supervisors." To the Court, it argued that their direction of the aides was
professional rather than managerial in character, and hence was
not "in the interest of the employer" as it understood § 2(11).
Justice Kennedy wrote for the five most consistent textualists
and Justice Ginsburg for the four most frequent contextualists,
finding the nurses to be excluded supervisors and included professionals, respectively. While Justice Kennedy drew support from a
single Supreme Court precedent excluding Labor Act coverage of
a similarly conflicted situation,26 his principal arguments drew on
his understanding of Congress's action in 1947 and were indifferent
to subsequent events. He took the phrase, "in the interest of the
employer," to have the broad meaning that had been given it in a
then-recent Supreme Court opinion whose result the Taft-Hartley
Act had intended to reverse.263 That the Board, the national body
responsible in the first instance for giving shape to national labor
policy, had consistently understood the phrase in a different wayeven as applied to nursing homes-is dismissed; in other settings
involving the "professional"-"supervisor" tension, the Board had
relied on other rationales than its interpretation of "in the interest
of the employer," and it was the use of that particular argument,
rather than uniformity of outcome, that Justice Kennedy found
significant. "[1]n almost all of those cases (unlike in cases involving
nurses) the Board's decisions did not result from manipulation of
the statutory phrase 'in the interest of the employer,' but instead
2.2

NLRB v Yeshiva University, 444 US 672 (1980). Here, the issue was whether faculty

members were "managerial employees," and the Board had argued that they acted in their
own, rather than their employer's, interest.
"' PackardMotor Car Co. v NLRB, 330 US 485 (1947). In contrast to Justice Ginsburg's
careful survey of the legislative history, Justice Kennedy said of the legislative history only
that "there is no indication that Congress intended any different meaning when it included
the phrase in the statutory definition of supervisor ... in 1947." 114 S Ct at 1782. While
Congress repudiated the result in Packard, "we of course have rejected the argument that a
statute altering the result reached by a judicial decision necessarily changes the meaning of

the language interpreted in that decision." Id at 1783.

516

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1994

from a finding that the employee in question had not met the
'
other requirements for supervisory status." 264
When the Act was
amended in some but not these respects in 1974, the Board's interpretations were before Congress; the approving mention of these
interpretations in a Committee report is not binding on the courts,
"for the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that
Congress must follow in legislating.""26 "If Congress wishes to enact the policies of the Board, it can do so without indirection."266
These impatient words are Justice Kennedy's; assuming as they do
that Congress should have known the Board was in error, they
reflect a strikingly antagonistic and formal stance to the interrelation of legislative, agency, and judicial effort, and one that essentially denies the possibility of law's growth over time, or of Congress's assignment to others of responsibility in that regard.
Justice Ginsburg gave closer attention to the inherent tension
between the two statutory definitions involved and the Board's
primary responsibility for the Act. Within that context, she found
the legislative history supported the interpretation the NLRB had
given language over time, and noted the consistency of this interpretation with other well-established aspects of the Board's work.
"The Board's endeavor to reconcile the inclusion of professionals
with the exclusion of supervisors, in my view, is not just 'rational
267
and consistent with the Act'; it is required by the Act."
F.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE V FEDERAL LABOR
RELATIONS AUTHORITY

The dispute in United States Department of Defense v FLRA 268 required the Court to interrelate three somewhat disparate statutes'64

Id at 1785.

265 114 S Ct at 1784, quoting American Hospital Association v NLRB, 499 US 606, 616

(1991). In this respect, this opinion reiterates the misleading "single mention" reasoning of
Shannon, City of Chicago, and Central Bank of Denver, discussed above at pp 471, 499, and
509. It does not follow from their undoubted insufficiencies as legislative acts that these
events are irrelevancies for a court interpreting the phrase. That would be so only if the
expert judgment of the agency appointed by Congress to administer the laws in the first
instance, the course of interpretation over time, and its apparent acceptance by Congress
had no appropriate bearing on judicial judgment on the matter.
266 114 S Ct at 1785.
267 114 S Ct at 1793 (emphasis in original), quoting NLRB v Curtin Matheson Scientfic Inc.,

494 US 775, 796 (1990).
2'6114 S Ct 1006.
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the Federal Labor Relations Act ("the Act"), 269 the Privacy Act,27°
and the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA").271 Its performance
reflects, again, a disinclination to take an actively integrative role.
The Act, in general, seeks to bolster the position of public unions,
giving them rights comparable to those enjoyed by employee representatives in the private sector; and § 7114(b)(4), in particular, requires agencies to furnish their public employee unions with data
necessary for collective bargaining purposes, "to the extent not
prohibited by law." Employee unions sought the names and home
addresses of employees in the bargaining units they represented-a
request a private employer would be required to honor under the
National Labor Relations Act.27 Under the Privacy Act, release
of such personal information is prohibited unless disclosure would
be "required" under FOIA.2 73 And FOIA, in turn, requires agencies to comply with "any person['s]" demand for information in
government possession, unless one of its exemptions applies-in
this instance, its sixth exemption, for "personnel and medical files
and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."2 74 Could one look to
the Act and the focused judgment of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority ("FLRA") that such disclosure was necessary for collective bargaining, in assessing the existence or not of "warrant" for
invading an employee's personal privacy by disclosing her home
address? Or may that invasion be "warranted" only by the sort of
general considerations that might attend "any person['s]" request
for this information, as assessed by a reviewing court?
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion finding that the information could not be disclosed. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in
a bittersweet concurrence, all courts of appeals to address this issue
before 1989 had easily interpreted these three acts, in conjunction,
to permit enforcement of the FLRA's judgment. Congress's labor
policy choice to promote collective bargaining for federal civil ser269

5 USC § 7101-35.

2705 USC § 552a.
2

5 USC § 552.

example, NLRB v Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 633 F2d 766 (9th Cir
1980), cert den, 452 US 915 (1981), cited in 114 S Ct at 1017 n 9.
2735 USC § 552a(bX2).
274 5 USC § 552(b)(6).
272 For
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vants provided a solid basis for concluding that the disclosure of
home addresses to a bargaining representative was not "a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"; the disclosure placed
federal unions and the federal employer in an equivalent position
to unions and employers under the NLRA. "It is surely doubtful
that, in the very statute bolstering federal-sector unions, Congress
aimed to deny those unions information their private-sector counterparts routinely receive."275
Congress did not relevantly amend any of the three acts involved
subsequent to these interperetations. But in 1989 the Court decided, in the context of the FOIA's similarly worded exemption
for investigative files, 276 that the balancing suggested by reference
to an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" could not consider the identity of a particular requester and the legitimacy of its
needs, since the Act confers the right to information on "any person." Rather, one must justify disclosure in terms of FOIA's "core
purpose" of "contributing significantly to public understanding of
the operations or activities of the government. 2 77 Since that decision, all but one of the courts of appeal considering the matterincluding a panel of the D.C. Circuit on which Justice Ginsburg
had sat 2 78-found that this restructured inquiry compelled the conclusion that the addresses could not be released. The general public
would learn little if anything about the operation of government
from their disclosure, and so in the only terms that now counted
there was no warrant at all to counterbalance public employees'
privacy interest in having their addresses secure from disclosure to
the public.
The case provided the majority a straightforward occasion for
applying its earlier precedent. FOIA gives the right to information
to "any person," and gives that right in order to enhance knowledge
27 114 S Ct at 1018.

2765 USC § 552(b)(7)(C) exempts law enforcement records to the extent that their production "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy."
277Department ofJustice v Reporters' Committeefor Freedom of Press, 489 US 749, 775 (1989).

The public's interest in knowing the contents of criminal "rap sheets" on individuals could
be expected to do little to expose the operations of government, but could constitute a
significant invasion of the privacy of individuals who might never have been tried for the
crimes alleged on them.
278FLRA v Department of Treasuy, 884 F2d 1446 (DC Cir 1989), cert den, 493 US 1055
(1990).
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about government. That policies external to FOIA make a strong
case for making this information available is irrelevant to a case that
arises within its four comers. In one sense, the Court is assuming
responsibility for the statute's shape; as Justice Ginsburg remarked,
the "'core purpose' limitation is not found in FOIA's language,"
but was supplied by the Court in the particular context of disclosing information about criminal investigations; here, it is extending
that reasoning.279 Yet, "in the matter at hand, . . . it is Congress

that has declared the importance of the request's purpose, and
Congress that has selected a single entity-the employees' exclusive bargaining representative-as entitled to assert that purpose."'2 80 In its insistence that "we do no more than give effect to
the clear words of the provisions we construe,"'2 8' in declining to
accept what it describes as "respondents' ambitious invitation to
rewrite the statutes before us," 282 the majority denies its partnership with Congress. "Speculation about the ultimate goals of the
Labor Statute is inappropriate ' 283 where the words are clear; if
the Court's interpretation creates a difference between private and
public labor law that is contrary to the responsible agency's view,
inexplicable as labor policy and irreconcilable with the general purposes of the Act, "Congress may correct the disparity. '"284 It is not
for the Court to seek the integration of statutory commands that
Justice Ginsburg shows to be both available, and a fairer rendering
of overall public policy attributable to Congress; it is not for the
Court to pursue "the ideal of a unified system of judge-made and
woven into a seamless whole by the processes of adjudistatute law
285
cation."
G. THREE COUNTER-EXAMPLES?

1. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Harris Trust and Savings Bank. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v Harris Trust and
279 114 S Ct at 1019.
280Id.
21 Id at 1016.
21 Id at 1014.
211Id at 1016.
284Id.

Stone, work cited in note 8. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence rests on the strength, as
2185
she reports it, of her colleagues' views and of statutory stare decisis. 114 S Ct at 1019
(Ginsburg concurring).
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Savings Bank286 was Justice Ginsburg's first opinion of the Term
and the first opinion to consider issues of statutory interpretation in
detail. Justice Ginsburg's cases, even when (as often) fairly closely
divided, tended not to produce the rhetoric of division which concerns this essay, and that was also the case in Hancock. If one can
find the Term's patterns here, they are in subdued form.
The Court decided, 6-3, that John Hancock's administration of
certain annuity contracts subjected it to the fiduciary standards of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, ERISA.
ERISA is a complex statute, and the problem of interpretation
facing the Court defies easy description. In general, ERISA makes
persons responsible for managing the assets of retirement plans
into fiduciaries of plan beneficiaries, with corresponding duties and
limitations respecting their investment decisions. However, 29
USC § 110 1(b)(2)(B) creates an exception for the assets of insurance
companies who issue retirement policies, "to the extent that [a]
policy or contract provides for benefits the amount of which is
guaranteed by the insurer." Insurance companies are predominantly regulated by state law, which tends not to regard them as
fiduciaries for their policy-holders; exemption from fiduciary status
is thus of some importance to them. The consequence of characterizing a given plan as a guaranteed benefit plan is that the manager
will be considerably freer to commingle investment funds for the
plan with its general funds, to deal in securities of the employer
purchasing the plan, and so on. Should Hancock's plan with the
Sperry Rand Corporation, of which Harris Trust and Savings was
trustee, be so characterized? Following a common insurance industry practice in administering retirement plan portfolios, the plan
guaranteed the benefits a Sperry employee would receive ultimately; during the period before any particular employee retired,
however, the funds contributed on her account were treated as part
of the insurer's general investment pool. To the extent Hancock
was successful in its investments, it built up surpluses, beyond the
level its guarantees required it to pay. These surpluses and the
possibility that retirees would share in them as a supplement to
their defined benefits produced the question to what extent this
was a "guaranteed benefit" plan. Disputes over how and on what
valuations Hancock would share them with the retirement plan
286 114

S Ct 517.
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in question produced the occasion for deciding whether it was a
"fiduciary," and the Court held that it was. It did so in the face of
contrary, but somewhat hesitant, advice from the Department of
Labor and, according to the dissent, nearly 20 years of conduct
based on the opposite understanding in the insurance industry as
a whole.
It may be appropriate for our purposes to focus on the tools
of interpretation invoked by the two opinions. In its breadth of
consideration of statutory patterns, congressional process, and integration with the decision of other like questions, the majority opinion generally reflects a contextual style of analysis. For Justice
Ginsburg and the majority, the important considerations were
ERISA's general pattern of inclusion, and the limited ("to the extent that") way in which the statute stated the "guaranteed benefit"
exclusion from the general principle of fiduciary obligation. The
latter qualification held particular importance; other exclusions
were stated in a much broader fashion. Similar exemptions in
other, like statutes had been interpreted narrowly. In adopting the
exclusion, moreover, the Senate had rejected a broader formulation, that would clearly have entitled Hancock to prevail. And
prior cases, arising in analogous circumstances, tended also to suggest that "[t]o the extent that [Hancock] engages in the discretionary
management of assets attributable to that phase of the contract
which provides no guarantee of benefits payments or fixed rates of
87
return, . . . [it] should be subject to fiduciary responsibility.
The majority was unresponsive, however, to claims of administrative interpretation and of insurance industry practice during the
first two decades of ERISA's administration. In 1975, shortly after
ERISA had been enacted, the Department of Labor had taken the
contrary position in an interpretive bulletin addressing another but
coordinate question, whether in like circumstances an insurance
company could engage in transactions involving the company
whose plan it was administering. Insurance companies like Hancock administered plans like Sperry's as if they were not fiduciaries,
to the extent of $332 billion, 288 without prompting a regulatory
response. The Departmental bulletin, however, did not focus on
the question of fiduciary status or the "guaranteed benefit" issue,
27 Id at 528, quoting the opinion below, 970 F2d 1138, 1144 (2d Cir 1992).
288Id at 531 (Thomas dissenting).
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and the majority was unpersuaded that treatment of its questions
was implicit there. It also noted that in 1992 the Department of
Labor had been unwilling to provide requested assistance on the
precise point to the Second Circuit, pleading the complexity of the
issues and the press of other business. The majority concluded
that the text of ERISA would not support the interpretation the
Department urged. The majority's response to the practical concerns expressed by the Department of Labor and the industry was
that "we cannot give them dispositive weight" and that "administrative relief" of an unspecified character might be available.
One finds the opposite pattern in Justice Thomas's opinion for
himself, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy. He begins by
parsing the phrases of § 1101(b)(2)(B) in turn, and in isolation"provides for," "the amount of which is guaranteed," and then,
finally and quite briefly, "to the extent that." The history of consideration in the Senate, the unusual character of this exclusion compared with others in ERISA, overall ERISA policy, and learning
from other statutes are beside the point.
Unlike the Court, I see no need to base an understanding of
[the guaranteed benefit exception] on principles derived from
the interpretation of dissimilar provisions in the Securities Act
of 1933 or from a sense of the policy of ERISA as a whole.
The meaning of the provision can be determined readily by
examining its component terms.
More surprising, Justice Thomas calls attention as well to considerations of practical impact and community expectations about what
statutes mean, factors generally absent from his analyses during
the Term. The majority wrote as ifits conclusion would affect only
a part of one particular insurance arrangement. Justice Thomas
argues that the structure of Hancock's business assures that, in
fact, the decision will have a sweeping impact on how it does
business; it deals with many plans as it does with Sperry's, mingling all their funds in its general accounts up to the point at which
any particular employee retires and begins to draw benefits. To
apply principles of fiduciary responsibility at this stage is, as he
characterizes it, to "radically alter[] the law applicable to insurance
companies."28 9 As a formal matter, as Justice Thomas would usu289Id at 535.
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ally describe "law," this statement is untrue: The language of
ERISA has not been changed since its enactment and had not been
2 90
definitively interpreted by the Supreme Court in the interim.
The 1975 interpretive bulletin concerned another, although related, subject. And, an interpretive bulletin in any event does not
establish binding law. If it established a shared understanding
throughout the insurance industry, "[i]n reliance on [which] settled
understanding" the insurance companies had been conducting their
business, 29 1 without congressional response, that is in the framework of this essay a sound argument for interpreting ERISA as
Hancock urged. It is, however, the kind of argument that, in other
cases, the dissenters usually rejected.
2. PUD No. 1 ofJfferson County v Washington Departmentof Ecology. Under the Clean Water Act, the states and the federal government share responsibility for "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," 292 and states are encouraged to develop comprehensive standards that may be more stringent than federal standards. The states
may include enhancing water quality, preventing degradation, and
assuring "water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife" among their goals. 93 In general, administration of the Act and approval of state standards or
private initiatives that may come within its terms are the business
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Section 401 of the
Act294 can bring other federal regulators into the picture, however;
applicants for any federal license or permit "which may result in
any discharge into the navigable waters" must secure from the state
a certificate "that any such discharge will comply with [the Act]."
Section 401 also provides that "any certification provided under
this section shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations [under the Act or appropriate requirements of State law,]"
which "shall become a condition on any Federal license or permit."
An application to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
M Compare the civil rights retroactivity cases, discussed in the text at p 454, and the
treatment of the burden of proof issue in Director,Office of Workers' Compensation Programsv
Greenwicb Collieries, discussed at p 486.
'9 114 S Ct 535.
9'2
33 USC § 1251(a).

'9 33 USC § 1251(aX2).
m 33 USC § 1341.
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(FERC) for a license to operate a hydroelectric facility is one such
application. A Washington state standard sought to protect a
stream's fish life by requiring a certain amount of water to be left
in the stream after diversion for other uses, such as hydroelectric
power generation. Does that standard qualify as an "other limitation[]"; or is it outside the statute since it concerns water left in the
river rather than removed to generate power and then returned
("discharged")?
In PUD No. 1 ofJefferson County v Washington Department of Ecology,. 5 Justice O'Connor, writing for seven Justices, accepted the
state standard as a qualifying condition, after considering the EPA's
view as embodied in its regulations and practices, and other contextual factors. Justices Thomas (writing) and Scalia found a more restrictive meaning in the statute's textual reference to "any discharge,"
and were unpersuaded by the course of administration the statute
was said to have received at EPA. The differences were not stark.
While in general the dissent appeared to be the more concerned with
the limits text imposed, in one respect it gave more reflective attention than the majority to the integrative responsibilities of courts.
Justice Thomas would have left the issue of stream flow protection to be decided federally by FERC, a view that drew force from
FERC's role. In licensing a proposed hydroelectric facility, FERC
is required to consider "the protection, mitigation of damage to,
and enhancement of fish and wildlife. '296 Section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act 297 empowers it to impose conditions, including minimum stream flow, to that end. Earlier judicial interpretations of
this fish-protection authority had found that it preempted state
requirements, even requirements for higher flows.298 In effect,
FERC must think about protecting fish, but has some discretion
to prefer electricity. In PUD, the majority's interpretation of the
Clean Water Act gives states a way to make their stream flow
preferences necessary conditions of any later federal licenses, including hydroelectric licenses. The interpretation thus pretermits
FERC's power to compromise between the nation's needs for electricity and its interest in fish protection.
295

114 S Ct 1900 (1994).

296

16 USC § 797(e).

297

16 USC § 803(a).

298Californiav

FERC, 495 US 490 (1990).
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The majority found no conflict between FERC and the state,
since FERC had not yet acted on a license application; in arguing
amicus for the government, the Solicitor General had represented
that FERC had no objection to the stream flow condition. 299 For
the dissent, this reasoning failed to make a reasonable whole of the
federal statutes. If the issue was merely avoiding after-the-fact state
frustration of prior federal determinations, the majority approach
might be acceptable; if, on the other hand, Congress has given
FERC the federal role of reconciling national interests in electricity
supply and stream flow protection for fish, it is not responsive to
observe that a policy attributable to EPA takes effect prior to
FERC's opportunity to act. A holistic, integrative account of the
statutes would nonetheless have to recognize FERC's primacy;
such accounts are perhaps especially needed in settings of great
regulatory complexity, in which Congress may often have created,
out of inadvertence, arguably redundant responsibilities. Here too,
then (as Justice Stevens recognized in a wry, one-paragraph concurrence), Justice Thomas appears to have departed from his more
frequently static view of legislation.
3. ThomasJefferson University v Shalala. ThomasJefferson University
v Shalala °° divided the Court 5-4, along unusual lines, about the
meaning of Department of Health and Human Services regulations
implementing Medicare. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion attracted Justices Blackmun and Souter in addition to the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia; Justice Thomas's dissent was joined by
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg. Here the issue concerned, not the potential of conflict between two federal agencies,
but the clarity with which one had provided in its regulations for
matters unquestionably under its control. One problem Medicare
authorities face in reimbursing teaching hospitals for their patients
is that the hospital may be seeking reimbursement as a medical
expense for an item that ought to be viewed as an educational
expense. The problem is underscored by Congress's increasing
concern to control Medicare costs generally. It surfaced here when
Jefferson Medical School reexamined the accounting practices it
had been following and decided it could properly claim reimbursement as medical items for some expenses it previously had been
m 114 S Ct at 1914.
...114 S Ct 2381 (1994).
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financing on the educational side-perhaps thus recapturing funds
it was losing to more stringent cost controls elsewhere. Jefferson
at first lost, then won, then finally lost these claims within the
Department, when the Secretary interpreted a regulation quoted
in the margin as forbidding the reimbursement. 0 1 Justice Kennedy, for the majority, resolved the dispute in the Secretary's favor
largely in reliance on the conventional proposition that her reasonable interpretation of her own regulation was entitled to control.30 2
Like his opinion in John Hancock Mutual Life,3 3 Justice Thomas's
dissent mixes attention to the text with attention to the realities of
its administration. Regarding the text, his principal argument is
holistic, although motivated by a generally conservative attitude
toward the exercise of rulemaking power. The relevant language
just does not read like a rule; although appearing in CFR, it is an
explanatory "preamble," "cast in vague, aspirational terms," not
a statement of propositions that bind. 3°4 Reading the regulatory
language as a whole, that assessment is a commanding one. 305 And
it is reinforced by Justice Thomas's strong preference for definitive
legislative acts:
It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue
vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power
and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through
adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rule301Educational Activities. Many providers engage in educational activities including training
programs for nurses, medical students, interns and residents, and various paramedical specialties. These programs contribute to the quality of patient care within an institution and
are necessary to meet the community's needs for medical and paramedical personnel. It is
recognized that the costs of such educational activities should be borne by the community.
However, many communities have not assumed responsibility for financing these programs
and it is necessary that support be provided by those purchasing health care. Until communities undertake to bear these costs, the [Medicare] program will participate appropriately in
the support of these activities. Although the intent of the program is to share in the support
of educational activities customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction
with their operations, it is not intended that this program should participate in increased
costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educational institutions or units to patient
care institutions or units.
42 CFR § 413.85(c).
30' Compare the different approach the majority took in Greenwich Collieries, disussed at
page 487.
303Discussed in text following p 519.
"" 114 S Ct at 2390.
301See note 301; the precise language in issue in the case is the last sentence of the quoted
material.
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making process. Nonetheless, agency rules should be clear and
definite so that affected parties will have adequate
30 6 notice concerning the agency's understanding of the law.
"The agency has to say it clearly" resonates strongly with "Congress must say what it means; I won't look outside the text."
Justice Thomas also asserted that during the first two decades
of its administration the Secretary had in fact treated his regulation
as merely precatory. Its application here only served to prevent
Jefferson from changing its accounting practices to conform to
practices that regularly (and properly) produced reimbursement for
other teaching hospitals. Here, then, Justice Thomas focused upon
the actual administration and understanding respecting the Secretary's rules over time-how they seem to have been understood in
the community to which they applied, what would be the practical
implications of one or the other reading. As he did in John Hancock
Mutual Life, he attaches importance here to the element of continuity in actual administration, as providing proper insight into possible meaning. That contextual element is more often missing from
his address to statutory issues, and marks the most frequent divide
between Justice Stevens and himself.
VI. CONCLUSION

This somewhat discursive review of the Court's work during the Term suggests that a majority of Justices, not invariably
but consistently, took an essentially static and oppositional view of
the task of statutory interpretation. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas most directly, and the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor
often, tended to treat statutes as the one-time pronouncements of
an independent Congress-binding so far as they imposed a meaning, but not instructive, not illuminated either by their political
history or by the course of their implementation, not an invitation
to judicial partnership. They seem to imagine that legislature,
agencies, and courts work in isolation, as if uninformed in their
own judgments by the work the others are doing and their constant, overseeing, and responsive presence. This approach reverses
understandings that long predate the New Deal, about the need to
" Citing the Davis and Pierce Administrative Law Treatise in a passage making a strong

quasi-delegation argument for this proposition.
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accommodate the growth of statutes and administration as sources
of law. It resegregates the worlds of statute and common law.
The Court was not constant in this; HawaiianAirlines30 7 coexisted
with Greenwich Collieries.308 Perhaps we have little to learn beyond
the realist bromide that only results, not reasons, count. 30 9 Or perhaps the inconstancy is a function of judicial personality. Professor
Merrill has suggested that the appearance of change in the Court's
reasoning may be the result of consistent attention to the matter
by only two of the Justices, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,
who by attaching importance to methodological issues other Justices find secondary make it appear their views are more widely
insisted upon than in fact they are. 311 Justice Blackmun, who wrote
Hawaiian Airlines, was more likely than most to take integrative
approaches; in a unanimous matter near the Term's end, when the
most difficult controversies also remained to be resolved, the Justices may have had less time for careful scrutiny of reasoning to a
result on which all had agreed. Or, possibly, we should be looking
past the Justices to their law clerks; inconstancy in the intellectual
premises of the Court's work may be evidence that its thirty-odd
young and transient law clerks control [too] much of its workproduct. The lawyers too may bear some responsibility. Arguments do not come to the Justices perfectly shaped in each case;
how particular cases are briefed and argued will influence the outcomes. Widely varying styles of advocacy (which would be encouraged by unpredictability in the intellectual premises on which the
Justices appear to approach their work) both evidence and serve to
enlarge the extent to which lawyering has lost a grounding in
shared traditions of understanding and technique.
Yet any such "explanation" insufficiently credits, in my judgment, the seriousness with which the separatist position was, again
and again, advanced. Often stated as a position about the function
of Congress-what judicial approach is necessary to preserve Congress's assigned responsibilities under the constitutional separation
3o'Discussed in text following p 490.
308Discussed in text following p 486.
31 Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv L Rev 802
(1982).
310
Merrill, work cited in n 41, 72 Wash U L Q at 365. In my judgment, Justice Kennedy
is also persistent in emphasizing the gulf between the worlds of statute and court-the
wrongness of courts taking responsibility for what is Congress's to provide.
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of powers-it is equally (and inevitably) a position about the function of being a court. Five years ago, writing for himself, the Chief
Justice, and Justice O'Connor,3 1' Justice Kennedy had justified his
general reluctance to consult legislative history in terms of the constitutional separation of powers; the strength of his view is demonstrated by its consequence, that he then had to decide a constitutional issue adversely to the statute.312 To use legislative history to
give a statute meaning beyond what its language could bear, he
argued,
creates too great a risk that the Court is exercising its own
"WILL instead of JUDGMENT," with the consequence of
"substituti[ng] [its own] pleasure to that of the legislative body."
The Federalist No. 78, p. 469 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)....

...

Where it is clear that the unambiguous language of a statute

embraces certain conduct, and it would not be patently absurd
to apply the statute to such conduct, it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to
of the statute with which
discover an alternative interpretation
31 3
the Court is more comfortable.
In this Term's cases, similar reasoning has been used to reject meanings that statutory language could bear (and meanings that for a
time may have prevailed) but that the majority found unpersuasive, 314 and to reject judicial gap-filling in cases that were not directly provided for by a statute but that fall within stable expectations past precedents have promoted about its application. 315 The
...
Justice Scalia

was not participating in the case; Justice Thomas had not yet joined the

Court.
312Public Citizen v U.S. Department of Justice, 491 US 440 (1989). The avoidance of a
constitutional question, particularlywhen one's judgment will be to find against constitutionality, has long been promoted by the Justices and influntial commentators, as a means of
preventing unnecessary friction between the branches. See, e.g., Ashwander v TVA, 297 US
288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis concurring); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch
(1962).
313491 US at 471-73.
314For

example, BFP, discussed at p 449; Shannon, discussed at p 471; Greenwich Collieries,

discussed at p 486; Health Care and Retirement Corp., discussed at p 513; MCI Telecommunica-

tions Corp., discussed at p 493; City of Chicago, discussed at p 499.
31' E.g., Gotshall, discussed at p 429; Holder, discussed at p 464; CentralBank of Denver,

discussed at p 509. The concurrence in Rivers and Landgraf,discussed at p 457, is to similar
effect.
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Court's responsibility for separation of powers, the argument appears to be, reaches beyond the legislative history dispute. It requires the Court to promote congressional accountability for political judgments-and that means requiring Congress to make those
judgments-at whatever cost to supportive collaboration between
Congress and the courts.
A similar but more limited argument has long been made in
support of the proposition cast aside with surprising ease in Greenwich Collieries316 and, in effect, CentralBank of Denver,317 that protection of congressional function requires the courts not to revisit
statutory constructions once established. In 1948, for example, Edward Levi argued in his Introduction to Legal Reasoning that for courts
freely to "reinterpret legislation" 318 would sap Congress's political
responsibility.
If legislation which is disfavored can be interpreted away from
if controtime to time, then it is not to be expected, particularly
319
versy is high, that the legislature will ever act.
For Levi, however, this argument is addressed to second looks,
not first ones. In the initial filling of the gap that legislation (like
all use of language) inevitably leaves, Levi intends that the courts
must be sympathetic to legislative purposes; "[1legislatures and
courts are cooperative lawmaking bodies." 320 That initial interpretation will set the course for the legislation; its legitimacy depends
on the courts' sympathy for the democratic impulse underlying
Congress's action. But
[i]f the court is to have freedom to reinterpret legislation, the
result will be to relieve the legislature from pressure. The legislation needs judicial consistency .... [O]nce a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has been made, and in that sense
a direction has been fixed within the gap
of ambiguity, the
32
court should take that direction as given. '
316Discussed in text following p 488.

"' Discussed in text following p 511. In effect because, as the majority would not consider, the interpretation had become so well established in the lower courts, over such an
extensive period.
318At 23 (emphasis added).
319Id.
320Id.
321Id.
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To put this another way, and generalize the argument somewhat, the "pressure" Levi is referring to appears to be pressure to
move the law from some existing community understanding of it.
Once it is established what legislatively created law "is" in community regard, Congress should be responsible for changing that, not
the courts. But we can see, too, that this establishment can occur
without the intervention of the Supreme Court-indeed, given the
enormous level of judicial (and agency) business, and the very limited resources available to the Court, this is inevitable. 322 Interpretations may have become thoroughly settled in the community, the
"direction... fixed within the gap of ambiguity," long before the
Court, with its one hundred or so yearly occasions for pronouncement, reaches a matter. Even if the Court is formally free to adopt
a different interpretation, because it has never before considered
the issue, the direction may be so clearly set that a contrary reading
would be confrontational, and inconsistent with the primary legislative responsibility for change. Just as the accretion of lower court
experience presages change in the common law, a gathering body
of lower court or agency interpretation, under the gaze of a responsible legislature, fixes a context of community understanding from
which the Court cannot depart without raising questions of democracy. 323 It, too, may set a baseline of understanding that Congress
has the responsibility to vary.
Preserving legislative responsibility also animates arguments
about delegation, and thus about how ready courts should be to
find that statutes present a "gap of ambiguity" they can fill. If,
rather than voice policy directions, legislatures enact vacuous formulas that leave essential choices to others, shouldn't courts refuse
that responsibility and find means to require the legislatures to act?
Even conceding the argument, of course, requires some sensitivity
to the question whether or in what respects a legislature has failed
to decide in a particular instance-a question that cannot be answered by resort to artificial rules about the use of language without, again, placing the courts into possible conflict with the legislature. As Daniel Farber has persuasively remarked, this formal
approach "contrasts with normal methods of communication,
121Strauss,

work cited at n 232.

323See Cammaranov UnitedStates, 358 US 498, 508-11 (1959) (IRS interpretations of tax

law issue in effect adopted through congressional oversight process).
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which assume a cooperative listener."32 4 If one can know the judgments that underlay a statute from its political history and other
indicators, a decision based on formal failure to include a particular
word in an operative list seems at best pedantic, at worst a symptom of struggle and uncooperativeness.32 5 The inquiry whether
Congress has in fact decided a matter, that is, may itself be a
political one, animated by an unwillingness to find a certain kind
of result; and when it is, the problem is not that Congress has failed
to fulfill its appropriate function.
Principles of interpretation have often been defended in terms
of their instructive possibilities, but the appropriate premises and
limitations of judicial instruction of Congress should be kept in
view. The very idea of instructing or teaching Congress suggests
a hierarchical view quite inappropriate to a government of co-equal
branches.32 6 In a democratic society, moreover, one would anticipate premises generally supportive rather than destructive of the
legislative enterprise. Levi's arguments do not suppose or seek to
justify a general judicial attitude of unfriendliness toward the work
of the legislature. His argument is one about the conditions most
conducive to social peace, and is premised on the understanding
that
[n]ot only do new situations arise, but in addition peoples'
wants change. The categories used in the legal process must be
left ambiguous in order to permit the infusion of new ideas.
• . . [T]he laws come to express the ideas of the community,
and even when written in general terms, in statute or constitution, are molded to the specific case.327
The dialogue he seeks is one supposed to respect democratic
values; it is not an argument for the superiority of the common
law but supposes as a general endeavor judicial and legislative cooperation toward the community's preferences.
Levi, writing in 1948, assumes that the legislature speaks with a
legitimately democratic voice, that its claim to having its judgments
324 Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of
Law, 45 Vand L Rev 533, 551 (1992).
325City of Chicago, discussed at p 501.
326See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, UpdatingStatutory Interpretation, 87, Mich L Rev 20,
31-32 (1988); Farber, 45 Vand L Rev at 549 n 89 and 551 (cited in note 324).
327Levi at 4.
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respected and implemented is that it utters the voice of the people
in some broad sense. Both a large body of recent scholarly literature
and enduring themes of contemporary politics raise difficult questions about the accuracy of that claim.328 Should the courts agree
with this broadly held perception that Congress has been captured
by "faction," would that warrant their refusal to cooperate? One
steps here well past the CaroleneProducts propositions that support
unusual judicial interventions into politics on the ground that they
may serve to unblock the political process.329 While one sees how
measures protective of speech or responsive to malapportionment
may serve to reinvigorate political branches themselves blocked
from self-reform, it is unclear how restrictive judicial attitudes toward legislation in general would tend to make Congress more
representative. Indeed, the very fact of reasoning in this way would
offend central values of the Constitution, which imagine the
branches as coordinate; would appear like posing as Congress's
teacher. To thus judge Congress's capacity for action is to raise33a0
political question in the classic sense adumbrated by Baker v Carr:
"expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of gov331
ernment."
Moreover, the argument presupposes that the courts would
somehow remain outside politics in a government otherwise dominated by factional excess. Neither our history nor political theory
warrant any such claim. 332 It was Progressive legislation enacted
by new majorities on behalf of the formerly oppressed that excited
judicial resistance at the turn of the century-legislation easing
the obstacles to recovery for injuries suffered in the workplace, or
protecting workers from unsafe or unhealthy working conditions.
More recently, the Supreme Court's narrow interpretations have
328For example, Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice (Chicago,
1991); Symposium: Regulating Regulation: The Political Economy of Administrative Procedures
and Regulatory Instruments, 57 L & Contemp Probs 1 (1994); Symposium: Positive Political

Theory and PublicLaw, 80 Georgetown LJ 457 and 1737 (1992); Symposium: TheNew Public
Law, 89 Mich L Rev 707 (1991).
9 United States v CaroleneProducts Corp., 304 US 144, 152-53 n 4 (1938); see, e.g., John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
330369 US at 186 (1962).
. Id at 210.
332See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practiceand Theory, 81 Cal L Rev 1657 (1993);

Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process and
Illustratedby Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U Pa L Rev 1, 65-68 (1990).
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been visited upon legislation that expanded civil rights, provided
for consumer protection, and protected bankrupts' estates. While
one certainly knows that Congress sometimes enacts special interest
legislation, it is hard to see these particular measures as reflecting
chiefly the interests of the politically powerful. That characterization is much more easily attached to the judicial results.333 In any
competition for political legitimacy in putting into effect their political views, the judiciary has long understood, as the people have,
that it comes last among the branches.
Taking seriously the separation of powers argument requires
attention to an aspect that its proponents have not much discussed,
but that seems implicit in some of the cases discussed in this essay:
namely, what is entailed in being a "court." It is not only Congress
that has a constitutional function; so does the federal judiciary.
Separation of powers reasoning about Congress's role cannot properly be taken so far as to deny to the judiciary the quality and
responsibility of courts. In particular, the argument here supposes
the legitimacy of federal courts' common law function-that is,
that it is sometimes appropriate for them to develop the law outside
the realm of statutes, exercising authority of the character traditional to the English courts and to state judicial systems. That is
what permits us to ask why they should do any less in the statutory
context-indeed, whether they have a higher obligation to observe
legislative signals as the source of policy, than their own prior
reasoning.
A common law court cannot persuasively invoke, as a reason
why courts should not fill out what Congress has not directly ex334
pressed, the proposition that lawmaking is only for Congress.
133
Aleinikoff, 87 Mich L Rev at 32, cited in note 29, considers whether formalist techniques are warranted to discipline otherwise over-adventurous "intentionalist" judges, rather
than to instruct the legislature.
But if the instances of bad-faith judging are so great that the plain meaning theorists
are comfortable in their calculation, one wonders why the legislature (which after
all is the injured party) hasn't taken steps to reduce bad-faith judging by writing
statutes more clearly. Furthermore, if we assume such a plethora of willful judges,
why should we believe that they will not similarly misuse a plain meaning approach?
If one looks to recent cases in which Congress has corrected judicial "error," as in the civil
rights area, those opinions have been predominantly formalist, not intentionalist, in character. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playingthe Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 Cal L Rev 613, 675-80 (1991).
3" This formalist argument was among those earlier and persuasively addressed in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479, 1497 ff(1987),
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To the extent that argument depends on a wholly formal view of
judicial function-the idea that judges find but do not make
law-it is indistinguishable from, and no more credible than, the
similar argument once made about the common law function. City
of Chicago335 and BFP336 are good illustrations of the point. Outside
the sphere of legislation, we readily see that judicial disclaimers of
lawmaking are disingenuous or, at best,337metaphors for the appropriateness of restraint in that function.
It is important that the mechanism of legal reasoning should
not be concealed by its pretense. The pretense is that the law
is a system of known rules applied by a judge; the pretense has
long been under attack. In an important sense legal rules are
never clear, and if a rule had to be clear before it could be
imposed, society would be impossible. The mechanism accepts
the differences of view and ambiguities of words. It provides
for the participation of the community in resolving the ambiguity by providing a forum for the discussion of policy in the gap
of ambiguity. On serious controversial questions, it makes it
possible to take the first step in the direction of what otherwise
would be forbidden ends.8 The mechanism is indispensable to
peace in a community.3
So long as this is what judges are doing-as in the common law
context-then building upon the political judgments expressed in
legislation would seem, ceteris paribus, to improve the chances that
the judges' inevitable resolution of "policy in the gap of ambiguity"
would conform to society's wishes and thus tend toward "peace in
[the] community." Indeed, this proposition lies at the heart of the
arguments of Pound and Stone with which, in a sense, this article
began. 339 When Pound wrote, the courts customarily elevated their
common law functions over statutes, preferring the policies of the
common law to the policies of statutes; the result of this self-evident
struggle with state and federal legislatures was to submerge the views
of the community in resolving "policy in the [inevitable] gap of
an article both germinal of much contemporary literature on the subject and self-consciously
continuous with the earlier literature. See, e.g., id at 1480.
3' Discussed in text following p 499.
336Discussed in text following p 449.
331
Compare Edward Rubin, Book Review: Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study, 41
Am J Comp L 129, 131 (1993).
311
Levi, at 1.
339
Works cited at nn 5 and 8.
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ambiguity," rather than to foster its expression. Judicial behavior
was in this way destructive, not supportive, of social peace. It
defeated rather than supported principles of accountability."
If we were to conclude that the federal courts were not courts
in this sense, then much of the preceding argument would be
undercut. The Constitution, its foundational documents, and early
federal judicial practice are all instinct with the understanding that
the federal courts were to be courts as the English colonists and
then the citizens of the states had experienced courts.3 41 In areas
of undoubted federal jurisdiction, such as admiralty, they have
always acted as courts in the full Anglo-American sense. To be
sure, Erie R. Co. v Tompkins342 stands for the proposition that federal
courts lack competence to generate common law independent of
relevant state law in the diversity jurisdiction.3 43 But that is an
artifact of diversity jurisdiction, which depends on the character
of the parties and assumes state law will apply. Extending that
conclusion to federal question jurisdiction would be a stunning
revision of constitutional understandings; it would convert the federal courts into instruments genuinely foreign to American legal
traditions. 344
Perhaps there are other ways of perceiving the occasional indicaNo To Robert Gross I owe the observation that the only actors accountable for interpretations driven by dictionaries may be their commercial publishers. The decisions legislatures
actually make, as the public knows them, are not implemented. The decisions judges make
are, at least ostensibly, not their own. See Muriel M. Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism
as Power Struggle, 67 So Cal L Rev 585 (1994).
341Compare the evocation of judicial function in David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation (unpublished).
342 304 US 64 (1938).
143In this respect, its overruling of Swift v Tyson, 41 US 1 (1842), depends on a reading
of Swift not obvious at the time it was decided, that it resolved an issue not within federal
question jurisdiction. The Swift Court's broad insistence on the importance of uniform rules
for the protection of commerce, 41 US at 18-19, might instead have been understood to
invoke the federal jurisdiction over interstate commerce. One can imagine objections to
invoking the Constitution in support of a necessarily federal rule; but the argument that
federal courts have power to generate common law supportive of federal authority is indistinguishable in principle from the argument that they may generate principles of admiralty.
Compare Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U Chi L Rev
1, 30, 64-65 and n 279 (1985).
" Thomas Merrill develops such an argument at length in the work cited in the immediately preceding note; he seems to concede, however, the bearing of the framers' expectation
that the federal judiciary would be "courts." Id at 65 n 279; his essay is strongly criticized
in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479, 14981501 (1987).
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tions from some Justices that the Supreme Court is not a fully
fledged common law court, even for federal question purposes.
Might dependency on state court definitions of common law doctrine be justified on grounds of their relatively greater expertise,
as they encounter such questions more often? Or as an unspoken
balancing factor, given the enormity of the federal constitutional
and statutory authority over the content of law for the states? Or
as a reflection that the Court, with other arguably more important
and in any event more distinctively federal tasks to accomplish, is
simply not very adept at this function, and should not try to do it
for itself? While a certain reality underlies these speculations, what
also underlies them is, again, a rather aconstitutional vision of what
it means to be a court in American legal culture. It may be so, in
some sense, that constitutional cases are the most important element in the Court's docket, but it is nonetheless an ordinary court
in our Constitution's contemplation-not a constitutional court or
an administrative court, such as characterize some European systems. Indeed, we tend to think its legitimacy importantly derives
from its conventional judicial function. We cannot, then, afford to
let the character of its docket defeat its characteristics, without
changing our Constitution. Moreover, even if the Supreme Court
is in some factual sense relatively removed from ordinary judging,
the lower federal courts are not. They have a steady diet of common law questions, both in the diversity jurisdiction and in the
federal question jurisdiction. And the same positivistic view of the
common law that underlies Erie-that it is simply the judge-made
law of a particular political jurisdiction-makes it unthinkable that,
as to federal questions, federal common law should be parasitic on
state court choices. In making federal common law, where it is
appropriate to do so, the federal courts can no more be limited by
what California and North Carolina courts have chosen for their
jurisdictions than are the courts of Minnesota.
Perhaps there is a sense in which this is all quite unconscious.
One characteristic of formalism, often enough noted, is that it permits judges to claim-to themselves as well as to others-that they
can always make decisions without drawing on their own ideas of
good policy or social justice. It externalizes responsibility. Even to
Justices who learned too well that formation of the common law
does not work that way, common law rules can provide a similar
refuge from responsibility, if they can be made to comefrom some-
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place else. One no longer entertains the possibility of a single source
in the heavens; but the Erie idea that the state courts are the necessary source in matters of diversity jurisdiction (because the questions there are questions of state law) is easily and perhaps unconsciously transmogrified into a more general responsibility. The
common law now comes from out there, if not up there. Its federal
character in these cases, and the Court's consequent responsibility
for the choices that shape it, is simply ignored. Here, as in dealing
with legislation by dictionary, the Court will have escaped its own
345
responsibility.
From a certain perspective, the risk of judicial politics is present,
whichever approach the Justices take. In whatever fashion the Justices may interpret a statute, Congress can change that interpretation only by the concurrence of two houses and (in the usual case)
acquiescence by the then President. As Professors Eskridge and
Ferejohn, among others, have shown us, that in effect means that
the judiciary can effectively put into place any interpretation Congress will be unable to change-a considerable degree of freedom
of maneuver. 3" Even if we assume a cooperative process between
courts and legislature, judicial "mistakes" will inevitably occur;
but they will be mistakes made despite a posture of concern for
congressional political judgment and attention to community expectations. That is the apparent story of the differences between
the vetoed Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1990 and the enacted
Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1991 that gave rise to the problem
in Rivers and Landgraf.347 To assert that the Constitution requires
that the Congress and the Court not be cooperators, however-that
the courts are obliged to honor only those instructions that are
unmistakable on the "objective" surface of the text-is to free the
Court of any such posture, its tools limited to the manipulable
world of the text. 348 Thus one sees how the insistence on the static
quality of legislation, which only Congress can correct, not only
denies responsibilities for cooperation, but also plays into a rather
cynically political game.
315See note 340.
31 William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 George-

town LJ 523 (1992).
3" Discussed in text following p 454.
311Merrill, work cited in n 41.
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Whatever its source, the emerging view of judging and judges'
place in the political order is not only profoundly altered from
that which has generally characterized our polity; it also portends
rigidity and destabilization for law and its administration. The
constant rising and resolution of issues through the judicial system
has been a means by which law continually refits itself to social
needs, reducing to that extent the need for constant legislating.
Clearly enough judges sometimes err, and legislatures may then
correct; or the judiciary fails to accommodate the law quickly
enough to changing social circumstances and, again, legislation
may do so. But the premise that legitimate change occurs only
legislatively puts under constant threat all those understandings
that inevitably arise-are acted upon and relied upon-in its wake.
The Supreme Court hears the smallest proportion of the cases
resolved by the federal system each year; its interventions are made
necessarily episodic by that fact. If its task in dealing with statutes
is to enforce original understandings as a majority of Justices come
to see them, regardless what developments may have occurred in
the interim, the prospect is more, not less, uncertainty; and this
impact is heightened if the Court, in so acting, is also unwilling to
educate itself about the political context within which Congress has
acted-elevating, in that way, the chances of conflict over political
judgments Congress has reached.
It is hard to believe that the result of this struggle will be improved performance by the legislature. First, legislation for other
reasons is already assuming proportions too large for the more
careful drafting the Court ostensibly invites; second, if history is
any guide, the only outcome to be anticipated from the Court's
formal and distant approach is a larger rather than a smaller volume
of specification from the legislature. 49 Finally, and perhaps most
important, even if we can imagine Congress learning from its dialog
with the Court, the lesson is in one large measure perverse: While
the Court says that it is contributing to settled expectations, that
can be so only for legislation written in response to its opinions
about interpretation, after those opinions have been written. But
earlier legislation was written in the context of other interpretive
3' Lieber, work cited in n 33. A similar argument appears in modem dress in Edward
P. Schwartz, Pablo T. Spiller, and Santiago Urbiztondo, A Positive Theory of Legislative
Intent, 57 L & Contemp Probs 51 (1994).
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expectations. By failing to honor the interpretive expectations that
governed Congress's action when the earlier statutes were passed,
the Court teaches that today's lessons have no necessary relevance
to the style of interpretation the Court will use tomorrow.
The Justices are changing the premises of our system, and not for
the better. Perhaps, they will say, it is to correct for an excessively
powerful view the prior generation of Justices held; but the act of
deconstruction is powerful and destructive-and its premises quite
outside what had until now been the shared political premises of
a common law system of judging.

